Several philosophers have argued that human enhancements should be considered a potential solution to climate change. In this paper, I consider one such argument offered by S. Matthew Liao, Anders Sandberg, and Rebecca Roache. I argue that, while their argument is plausible, we have an even stronger reason to consider enhancements a potential solution. In particular, enhancements could align our interests with the promotion of a proper response to climate change: if enhancements were in our interest to adopt and also (...) reduced the pernicious effects of climate change, then it would, indirectly, become in our interest to reduce those effects. (shrink)

Alors que le temps présent paraît marqué par une incertitude forte, voire croissante, comment (re)trouver des prises sur ce qui est en devenir et qui pourrait composer le futur? Cette contribution propose de montrer que la science-fiction offre un matériau qui a aussi une pertinence et qui peut être travaillé pour être incorporé dans un processus de production de connaissance. Les textes de science-fiction peuvent en effet être pris à la fois comme un réservoir d’expériences de pensée et comme des (...) formes de problématisations (au sens de Michel Foucault). En s’appuyant sur un corpus de textes francophones et anglophones orientés vers un futur plus ou moins proche et généralement considérés comme porteurs de positions engagées (fiction spéculative, anticipation sociale, cyberpunk et postcyberpunk, biopunk, etc.), une première base de démonstration précisera d’abord l’appréhension réflexive qui peut être faite de la science-fiction au-delà de la forme culturelle et de son expression littéraire. Une seconde avancera ensuite une série de propositions méthodologiques pour saisir l’objet et pouvoir traduire cet imaginaire en prises expérimentales sur le futur. (shrink)

The disability critique of negative genetic selection is frequently accused of threatening reproductive liberty. This paper describes the disability critique and defends it against that objection. It also contends that the critique can work to deflate belief in genetic determinism. Recognizing the influence of genetic determinism helps advocate for existing persons in the disability community and protects reproductive liberty. The disability critique can point to genetic determinism but does not suggest a ban or obstacles to the choice of negative genetic (...) selection; therefore, it is not antithetical to reproductive liberty, as has been charged. (shrink)

Alors que le temps présent paraît marqué par une incertitude forte, voire croissante, comment trouver des prises sur ce qui est en devenir et qui pourrait composer le futur? Cette contribution propose de montrer que la science-fiction offre un matériau qui a aussi une pertinence et qui peut être travaillé pour être incorporé dans un processus de production de connaissance. Les textes de science-fiction peuvent en effet être pris à la fois comme un réservoir d’expériences de pensée et comme des (...) formes de problématisations. En s’appuyant sur un corpus de textes francophones et anglophones orientés vers un futur plus ou moins proche et généralement considérés comme porteurs de positions engagées, une première base de démonstration précisera d’abord l’appréhension réflexive qui peut être faite de la science-fiction au-delà de la forme culturelle et de son expression littéraire. Une seconde avancera ensuite une série de propositions méthodologiques pour saisir l’objet et pouvoir traduire cet imaginaire en prises expérimentales sur le futur. (shrink)

In discussions about the ethics of enhancement, it is often claimed that the concept of ‘human nature’ has no helpful role to play. There are two ideas behind this thought. The first is that nature, human nature included, is a mixed bag. Some parts of our nature are good for us and some are bad for us. The ‘mixed bag’ idea leads naturally to the second idea, namely that the fact that something is part of our nature is, by itself, (...) normatively inert. The Inert View claims that nothing normative follows from the mere fact that some trait is a part of our nature. If the Inert View is correct, then appeals to the value or importance of human nature in debates about enhancement are indeed misplaced. We argue that the Inert View is wrong, and that a certain concept of human nature – which we refer to as human form – does have an important role to play in debates about enhancement. (shrink)

Ethics, Policy & Environment, Volume 15, Issue 2, Page 248-251, June 2012.

Ethics, Policy & Environment, Volume 15, Issue 2, Page 241-243, June 2012.

Background: Nonhuman animals are regularly enhanced genomically with CRISPR and other gene editing tools as scientists aim at better models for biomedical research, more tractable agricultural animals, or animals that are otherwise well suited to a defined purpose. This study investigated how genome editors and policymakers perceived ethical or policy benefits and drawbacks for animal enhancement and how perceived benefits and drawbacks are alike, or differ from, those for human genome editing. Methods: We identified scientists through relevant literature searches as (...) well as conference presentations. Policymakers were identified through rosters of genome editing oversight groups (e.g., International Commission on the Clinical Use of Human Germline Genome Editing, World Health Organization) or efforts aimed at influencing policy (e.g., deliberative democracy groups). Interviews covered participants’ views on ethical differences between interventions affecting somatic or germline cells and distinctions between using gene editing for disease treatment, prevention, and enhancement purposes. Results: Of the 92 participants interviewed, 81 were genome editing scientists, and 33 were policymakers, with 22 interviewees being both scientists and policymakers. Multiple areas were identified in which the ethical implications of genomic enhancements for nonhuman animals differ from those for human animals including with respect to experiential welfare; germline edits; environmental sustainability; and justice. Conclusions: Overall, respondents viewed that animal enhancement is unburdened by the ethical complexities of human enhancement. These views may be related to participant perceptions of animals’ lesser moral status and because germline editing in animals is common practice. (shrink)

Some proponents of the Anthropocene argue that it is time adopt a future-oriented outlook: natural baselines no longer matter, and humans should remake the planet for the better. This raises questions about whose vision should guide such remaking, and whether the past deserves any consideration in adapting for the future. I argue that the past remains relevant, because the natural, cultural, and social worlds people enter into – shaped by those who came before us – matter. On this view, there (...) are reasons to value ‘nature’, even in a human-altered world, and climate adaptation should take that into account. (shrink)

In Unfit for the Future, Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu present a challenging argument in favour of biomedical moral enhancement. In light of the existential threats of climate change, insufficient moral capacities of the human species seem to require a cautiously shaped programme of biomedical moral enhancement. The story of the tragedy of the commons creates the impression that climate catastrophe is unavoidable and consequently gives strength to the argument. The present paper analyses to what extent a policy in favour (...) of biomedical moral enhancement can thereby be justified and puts special emphasis on the political context. By reconstructing the theoretical assumptions of the argument and by taking them seriously, it is revealed that the argument is self-defeating. The tragedy of the commons may make moral enhancement appear necessary, but when it comes to its implementation, a second-order collective action-problem emerges and impedes the execution of the idea. The paper examines several modifications of the argument and shows how it can be based on easier enforceability of BME. While this implies enforcement, it is not an obstacle for the justification of BME. Rather, enforceability might be the decisive advantage of BME over other means. To take account of the global character of climate change, the paper closes with an inquiry of possible justifications of enforced BME on a global level. The upshot of the entire line of argumentation is that Unfit for the Future cannot justify BME because it ignores the nature of the problem of climate protection and political prerequisites of any solution. (shrink)

Ethics, Policy & Environment, Volume 15, Issue 2, Page 234-236, June 2012.

New emerging biotechnologies, such as gene editing, vastly extend our ability to alter the human being. This comes together with strong aspirations to improve humans not only physically, but also mentally, morally, and socially. These conjoined ambitions aggregate to what can be labelled “the gene editing of super-ego.” This article investigates a general way used to argue for new biotechnologies, such as gene-editing: if it is safe and efficacious to implement technology X for the purpose of a common good Y, (...) why should we not do so? This is a rhetorical question with a conditional, and may be dismissed as such. Moreover, investigating the question transformed into a formal argument reveals that the argument does not hold either. Nonetheless, the compelling force of the question calls for closer scrutiny, revealing that this way of arguing for biotechnology is based on five assumptions. Analysis of these assumptions shows their significant axiological, empirical, and philosophical challenges. This makes it reasonable to claim that these kinds of question based promotions of specific biotechnologies fail. Hence, the aspirations to make a super-man with a super-ego appear fundamentally flawed. As these types of moral bioenhancement arguments become more prevalent, a revealing hype test is suggested: What is special with this technology, compared to existing methods, that makes it successful in improving human social characteristics in order to make the world a better place for all? Valid answers to this question will provide good reasons to pursue such technologies. Hence, the aim is not to bar the development of modern biotechnology, but rather to ensure good developments and applications of highly potent technologies. So far, we still have a long way to go to make persons with goodness gene. (shrink)

Recently some bioethicists and neuroscientists have argued for an imperative of chemical cognitive enhancement. This imperative is usually based on consequentialist grounds. In this paper, the topic of cognitive self-enhancement is discussed from a Kantian point of view in order to shed new light on the controversial debate. With Kant, it is an imperfect duty to oneself to strive for perfecting one’s own natural and moral capacities beyond one’s natural condition, but there is no duty to enhance others. A Kantian (...) approach does not directly lead to a duty of chemical cognitive self-enhancement, but it also does not clearly rule out that this type of enhancement can be an appropriate means to the end of self-improvement. The paper shows the benefits of a Kantian view, which offers a consistent ideal of self-perfection and teaches us a lesson about the crucial relevance of the attitude that underlies one’s striving for cognitive self-improvement: the lesson of treating oneself as an end in itself and not as mere means to the end of better output. (shrink)

Ethics, Policy & Environment, Volume 15, Issue 2, Page 222-224, June 2012.

Ethics, Policy & Environment, Volume 15, Issue 2, Page 237-240, June 2012.

Resumen Repensar la naturaleza en la época actual significa enfrentar las nuevas perspectivas desarrolladas por la ética ambiental, es decir, las respuestas a la crisis ecológica contemporánea. Los dos paradigmas ambientales principales, biocentrismo y antropocentrismo, antes que ser paradigmas éticos son dos visiones antropológicas desarrolladas a partir de una cierta idea del puesto del ser humano en el cosmos. En este sentido, el objeto de este artículo es destacar el hecho de que la ecología es una antropología y, debido a (...) esto, para repensar la naturaleza tenemos que reformular nuestra visión antropológica, dada la insuficiencia a nivel teórico de los principales paradigmas ambientales.Rethinking nature nowadays means to face the new perspectives developed by environmental ethics, i.e., the responses to the contemporary ecological crisis. The two main environmental paradigms, biocentrism and anthropocentrism, even before being ethical paradigms, are two anthropological visions developed from a certain idea of the position of human beings in the cosmos. In this sense, the purpose of this article is to highlight the fact the ecology is rooted in anthropology. In order to rethink the idea of nature, then, we have to reformulate our anthropological view, given the failure of the two main environmental paradigms at this theoretic level. (shrink)

Ethics, Policy & Environment, Volume 15, Issue 2, Page 227-229, June 2012.

Ethics, Policy & Environment, Volume 15, Issue 2, Page 230-233, June 2012.

Ethics, Policy & Environment, Volume 15, Issue 2, Page 244-247, June 2012.

Much of the human enhancement literature focuses on the ethical, social, and political challenges we are likely to face in the future. I will focus instead on whether we can make decisions to modify ourselves that are known to be likely to satisfy our preferences. It seems plausible to suppose that, if a subject is deciding whether to select a reasonably safe and morally unproblematic enhancement, the decision will be an easy one. The subject will simply figure out her preferences (...) and decide accordingly. The problem, however, is that there is substantial evidence that we are not very good at predicting what will satisfy our preferences. This is a general problem that applies to many different types of decisions, but I argue that there are additional complications when it comes to making decisions about enhancing ourselves. These arise not only for people interested in selecting enhancements but also for people who choose to abstain. (shrink)

Ethics, Policy & Environment, Volume 15, Issue 2, Page 225-226, June 2012.