The Tulis thesis becomes even more powerful when the constitutional revolution he describes is put in its Progressive‐Era context. The public had long demanded social reforms designed to curb or replace laissez‐faire capitalism, which was seen as antithetical to the interests of ordinary working people. But popular demands for social reform went largely unmet until the 1910s. Democratizing political reforms, such as the rhetorical presidency, were designed to facilitate “change” by finally giving the public the power to enact social reforms. (...) The resulting political order has created systemic pressure for policy demagoguery in place of rational deliberation. Mass political mobilization seems to be better achieved by contests of grand principle that pit the well‐meaning supporters of obviously needed reforms against “villains and conspirators,” than by technical discussions of the possibly counterproductive effects of those reforms. (shrink)

The Rhetorical Presidency places great importance on the transformative power of political ideas. For Tulis, Progressive ideas informed the rhetorical practices of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson—practices that reconstituted the American presidency. They did so, in part, by trading on the ambiguous nature of the concept of “publicity”—which at once evoked liberal ideals of public deliberation and transparency, and modern practices of manipulative communication. In turn, the new practices of publicity revolutionized not only the American presidency, but American politics as (...) a whole. (shrink)

Commentators agree that simple conclusions about a general base rate fallacy are not appropriate. It is more constructive to identify conditions under which base rates are differentially weighted. Commentators also agree that improving the ecological validity of the research is desirable, although this is less important to those interested exclusively in psychological processes. The philosophers and ecologists among the commentators offer a kinder perspective on base rate reasoning than the psychologists. My own perspective is that the interesting questions (both psychological (...) and normative/prescriptive) are best answered through empirical studies that use real-world performance standards. (shrink)

This commentary presents a self-assessment inventory that will allow readers to determine their own attitude toward the base rate fallacy and its literature. The inventory is scientifically valid but not Medicare/Medicaid reimbursable.

Koehler is right that base rate information is used, to various degrees, both in laboratory tasks and in everyday life. However, it is not time to turn our backs on laboratory tasks and focus solely on ecologically valid decision making. Tightly controlled experimental data are still needed to understandhowbase rate information is used, and how this varies among groups.

Consistent with Koehler's position, we propose a generalization of the base rate fallacy and earlier conservatism literatures. In studies using both traditional tasks and new tasks based on ecologically valid base rates, our subjects typically underweight individuating information at least as much as they underweight base rates. The implications of cue consistency for averaging heuristics are discussed.

Base rates are vital in predicting violent criminal recidivism. However, both lay people given simulated prediction tasks and professionals milking real life predictions appear insensitive to variations in the base rate of violent recidivism. Although there are techniques to help decision makers attend to base rates, increased decision accuracy is better sought in improved actuarial models as opposed to improved clinicians.

When base rates are learned and used in an experiential manner subjects show better base rate use, perhaps because the implicit learning system is engaged. A causal framework in which base rates are relevant might also be necessary. Humans might thus perform better on more ecologically valid tasks, which are likely to contain those three components.

Koehler's summary and critique of research on the base rate fallacy is cogent and persuasive. However, he may have overstated the case, and his suggestions for future research may be too restrictive. We agree that methodological approaches to this topic should be broadened, but we argue that experimental laboratory research and the Bayesian normative standard are useful and should not be abandoned.

Base rates have no necessary relation to judgments that are not themselves probabilities. There is no logical imperative, for instance, that behavioral base rates must affect causal attributions or that base rate information should affect judgments of legal liability. Decision theorists should be cautious in arguing that base rates place normative constraints on judgments of anything other than posterior probabilities.

Two distinct issues are sometimes confused in the base rate literature: Why do people make logical mistakes in the assessment of probabilities? and why do subjects not use base rates the way experimenters do? The latter problem may often reflect differences in an implicit reference class rather than a disinclination to update a base rate by Bayes' theorem. Also important are considerations concerning the interaction of several potentially relevant base rates.

Koehler's target article attempts a balanced view of the relevance of knowledge of base rates to judgments of subjective or credal probability, but he is not sensitive enough to the difference between requiring and permitting the equation of probability judgments with base rates, the interaction between precision of base rate and reference class information, and the possibility of indeterminate probability judgment.

Koehler is right to argue for more nuanced interpretation of base rate anomalies. These anomalies are best understood in relation to a broader class of cognitive anomalies, which are important for theory and practice. Recognizing a need for more nuanced analysis should not be taken as a license for treating the effects as “explained away.”.

The fallacy beneath the base rate fallacy is that we know what a base rate is. We talk as if base rates and individuating information were two different kinds of information. From a Bayesian perspective, however, the only difference between base rate and individuating information is – which comes first.

Failure to consider base rate is regarded as potentially hazardous, mainly because its consideration is assumed to be determined solely by P(H/D), the probability of the individuating data if the hypothesis is true, and not at all by P(D/˜H), the probability if the hypothesis is false. However, when P(D/˜H) is unconfounded from P(D/H), it turns out to be the stronger determinant of base rate consideration.

This commentary discusses three points: (1) The implications of the fact that it is rational to ignore base rates if probabilities are estimated by frequencies from samples without missing data (natural sampling); (2) second order probabilities distributions are a plausible way to model imprecise probabilities; and (3) Bayesian networks represent a normative reference for multi-cue models of probabilistic inference.

Koehler's call for a reanalysis of the base rate fallacy is particularly important in the applied domain of accounting, since base rate data appear to be an important input for many accounting tasks. In this commentary I discuss the use of base rates in accounting and explain why more flexible standards of performance are important when judging the use of base rates.

The underutilization of base rates is a consistent finding. The strong claim that base rates are ignored has been rejected and this needs no further emphasis. Following the path of “normal science,” research examines the conditions predicting changes in the degree of underutilization. A scientific revolution that might dethrone the heuristics and biases paradigm is not in sight.

The base rate literature has an opposite twin in the social psychological literature on stereotypes, which concludes that people use their preexisting beliefs about probabilistic category attributes too much, rather than not enough. This ironic discrepancy arises because beliefs about category attributes enhance accuracy when the beliefs are accurate and diminish accuracy when they are not. To determine the accuracy of base rate/stereotype beliefs requires research that addresses specific content.

In contrast to traditional research on base-rate neglect, an ecologically-oriented research program would analyze the correspondence between cognitive algorithms and the nature of information in the environment. Bayesian computations turn out to be simpler when information is represented in frequency formats as opposed to the probability formats used in previous research. Frequency formats often enable even uninstructed subjects to perform Bayesian reasoning.

A recent study showed physicians' reasoning about a realistic case to be ignorant of base rate. It also showed physicians interpreting information pertinent to base rate differently, depending on whether it was presented early or late in the case. Although these adult reasoners might do better if given hints through talk of relative frequencies, this would not prove that they had no problem of base rate neglect.

Setting the two hypotheses of complete neglect and full use of base rates against each other is inappropriate. The proper question concerns the degree to which base rates are used (or neglected), and under what conditions. We outline alternative approaches and recommend regression analysis. Koehler's conclusion that we have been oversold on the base rate fallacy seems to be premature.

There is a familiar risk of antinomy if fromxisEand p(xisH/xisE) =rit is permissible to infer p(xisH) =r, and what Carnap (1950) called “The requirement of total evidence” will not prevent such antinomies satisfactorily. What is needed instead is a properly developed theory of evidential weight.

The base rate fallacy is directly dependent on a particular judgment paradigm in which information may be unambiguously designated as either “base rate” or “individuating,” and in which subjects make two-stage sequential judgments. The paradigm may be a poor match for real world settings, and the fallacy may thus be undefined for natural ecologies of judgment.

As illustrated by research Koehler himself cites (Dawes et al. 1993), the purpose of experiments is to choose between contrasting explanations of past observations – rather than to seek statistical generalizations about the prevalence of effects. True external validity results not from sampling various problems that are representative of “real world” decision making, but from reproducing an effect in the laboratory with minimal contamination (including from real world factors).

The important question is how people process probabilistic information, not whether they process it in accordance with a normative model that we never should have expected them to be capable of following. Experience is not the cure, as widely thought, to problems with utilizing base rate information.

Abstract(1) There is enough contradictory evidence regarding the role of base rates in category learning to confirm the nonexistence of biases in such learning. (2) It is not always possible to activate statistical reasoning through frequentist representation. (3) It is necessary to use the concept of systematic processing in reconsidering the published work on biases.

Cognitive algebra strongly disproved the representativeness heuristic almost before it was published; and therewith it also disproved the base rate fallacy. Cognitive algebra provides a theoretical foundation for judgment-decision theory through its joint solution to the two fundamental problems – true measurement of subjective values, and cognitive rules for integration of multiple determinants.

Koehler's work will assist the effort to understand legal fact finding. It leaves two questions somewhat open: (i) the extent to which empirical research can measure correctness of fact-finding, a function that involves the resolution of normative questions and (ii) the standards judges should use in the absence of the research he advocates.

Do people tend to disagree over political issues because of conflicting values? Or do they disagree about which policies will most effectively promote shared values? In a previous article, I argued that the issues most people think are most important tend to fall into the latter category. On the issues of greatest importance to the mass public, most citizens agree about the ends that are desirable, but disagree about which policy means would best effectuate those ends. Consequently, disputes about facts—disputes (...) about the actual effects of proposed public policies—lie at the heart of the most important divisions in contemporary American public opinion. However, people do not necessarily interpret their political disagreements this way. If they fail to recognize that facts that they see as self-evident are disputed by their opponents, they may see their opponents as having different values, since there could be few other explanations for their opponents' disagreement with them. However, evidence that disagreements about facts are really driving public opinion can be found by using conditional surveys, which ask respondents if they would support a given policy if they believed that it would cause specific negative consequences. (shrink)

In Capitalism and the Jews, Jerry Z. Muller attempts to resolve Milton Friedman's paradox: Why is it that Jewish intellectuals have been so hostile to capitalism even though capitalism has so greatly benefited the Jews? In one chapter Muller answers, in effect, that Jewish intellectuals have not been anticapitalist. Elsewhere, however, Muller implicitly explains the leftist tendencies of most intellectuals—Jewish and gentile—by unspooling the anticapitalist thread in the main lines of Western thought, culminating in Marx but by no means ending (...) with him. Thus, Milton Friedman saw a paradox where none existed. This may have been because Friedman was an economist, and economics is the one strand of Western thought that is, by and large, procapitalist. To an economist, opposition to capitalism may be paradoxical; to noneconomists, economics is alienating in its form and in its content. There is thus no mystery as to why intellectuals, including Jewish intellectuals, tend to shun economics and therefore gravitate to the left. (shrink)

Deliberative democracy is unrealistic, but so are rational-choice models of democracy. The elements of reality that rationalistic theories of democracy leave out are the very elements that deliberative democrats would need to subtract if their theory were to be applied to reality. The key problem is not, however, the altruistic orientation that deliberative democrats require; opinion researchers know that voters are already sociotropic, not self-interested. Rather, as Schumpeter saw, the problems lie in understanding politics, government, and economics under modern—and postmodern—conditions. (...) Modernity entails levels of complexity that stymie voters' attempts to be well informed about which political promises will actually solve social problems. Postmodernity adds to complexity an overabundance of fragmented information experienced impatiently and fleetingly by citizens who confuse entertainment with knowledge, and whose political demands are as unrealistic as their personal desire for a unique identity. These factors can be added, one by one, to the minimalist rational-choice model of politics, with each step leading us farther away from deliberative democracy. (shrink)

In the ongoing debate about the impact that studies of public ignorance should have on the study of culture, Mark Fenster and Bret Chandler assume that wider political participation must be our goal, because, to them, political ignorance is a culturally imposed, and therefore removable, obstacle—as if, without the baleful influence of culture, political participants would be well informed. Culture is indeed a primary influence on people's political opinions, so political scientists should indeed study the role it plays in the (...) formation of political beliefs. But such studies should begin with ignorance as people's default position, and should refrain from assuming that the source of ignorance is cultural domination or manipulation. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Social‐scientific data, such as those found in Philip E. Converse's 1964 essay, “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics,” have led some to question whether basic assumptions about democratic legitimacy are unfounded. However, by another set of criteria, we have the “democracy” that was intended by the Framers—namely, a liberal representative system that avoids strong civic engagement by the citizenry. At its deepest level, the American system has been designed to ensure elite influence over the main ambitions of (...) American policy: the expansion of public and private power. When social scientists accumulate findings of civic disengagement and ignorance, it is wrongly supposed to be an indictment of the citizenry; rather, those findings should be understood as the expected result of a certain set of commitments throughout American political history, of which civic apathy and ignorance are the desired outcomes. (shrink)

ABSTRACT A review of two of the strands of cultural studies that Mark Fenster contends are superior to Murray Edelman’s analysis of mass public opinion—Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, and Bourdieu’s sociology—and a more general look at work in the field of cultural studies suggests that all of these alternatives suffer from severe theoretical and methodological limitations. Future studies of culture and politics need to pose questions similar to the ones that preoccupied Edelman, but they must move beyond the political and (...) interpretive biases that have dominated cultural studies (some of which Edelman shared), as well as the questionable view of “ideology” as a matter of elite domination of the masses, rather than as a mediating, constitutive force in the process of individual opinion formation. (shrink)

Zaller's Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion initially sets out an epistemic view of politics in which the ultimate determinants of political action are ideas about the society in which we act. These ideas are usually mediated to us by others, so Zaller begins the book by describing its topic as the influence of the media on public opinion, and he includes journalists among the “political elites” who exert this influence (along with politicians, public officials, and experts). But the book (...) eventually reduces journalists to being messengers of politicians' cues to the public. This understanding of the media is built into the book's model of opinion formation, in which cued predispositions are pivotal to the acceptance or rejection of culturally mediated “messages”—but are themselves insulated from cultural influence. A cueing model of message reception, however, ignores messages that are differentially persuasive not because of the predispositions they cue but the content they convey. Gauging the heterogeneous persuasiveness of messages requires qualitative content analysis and cultural contextualization, and if this research is to contribute to a general understanding of public opinion, it will have to extend beyond news-media messages to ideational influences carried in high culture, formal education, and the entertainment media. All of these sources of ideas, in turn, may contribute to the shaping of predispositions, as suggested in part by public opinion regarding the Vietnam War. Research of this kind would signal a new type of political science that focused on the actual thoughts of real people trying to understand a complex environment: exactly the type of political science suggested at the beginning of Zaller's book. (shrink)

Using the recommendations of the Commission on Freedom of the Press, we ask today's media consumers how they rate the performance of modern American journalism. We employ original survey data collected from journalism students at a major Midwest university, framing our findings in the context of the commission's 1947 recommendations. The result is presentation of contemporary opinions about the performance of American media in the context of journalism ideals articulated more than 60 years ago.

I present a theory of alienation that accounts for the cognitive processes involved with moral thinking and political behavior in modern societies. On my account, alienation can be understood as a particular kind of atrophy of moral concepts and moral thinking that affect the ways individuals cognize and legitimate the social world and their place within it. Central to my argument is the thesis that modern forms of social integration—shaped by highly institutionalized, rationalized and hierarchical forms of social life—serve to (...) constrain the moral- cognitive powers of subjects leading to a condition of alienation as moral atrophy. This state results from the withering of the subject's internal powers of moral reflection and an overriding predisposition to rely on external value schemas to make sense of moral and political problems. I then present an analysis of alienated moral consciousness and its implications for modern social theory. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Twenty years ago Leif Lewin made the case that altruistic motives are more common than selfish motives among voters, politicians, and bureaucrats. We propose that motives and beliefs emerge as reactions to immediate feedback from technical-causal, material-economic, and moral-social aspects of the political task environment. In the absence of certain kinds of technical-causal and material-economic feedback, moral-social feedback leads individuals to the altruism Lewin documents, but also to righteousness (moralized regard for the in-group and disregard for the out-group) and (...) myopia (disregard for distant consequences). The mix of altruism, righteousness, and myopia increases the focus on winning the next high-stakes election rather than on discovering or enforcing socially productive institutions. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Four decades ago, Gerald Kramer showed that economic conditions affect electoral outcomes. Some researchers took this to mean that voters were self-interested, voting their “pocketbooks,” while others, such as Leif Lewin, took it to mean that voters were sociotropic, motivated by the public interest—and therefore altruistic. It is important, however, to avoid conflating sociotropic voters with altruistic ones. Voters might be voting in favor of politicians or parties that they think will further the public interest as an indirect route (...) to furthering their own interests, as members of the public. More research, perhaps conducted using novel methodologies, is needed in order to settle the extent to which voters are motivated by self-interest or by the public interest. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Laurel Gleason contends that deliberative polling constrains the autonomy of participants and substitutes the ideas and agendas of ?experts? for those of the deliberators. However, the format and informational constraints faced by participants in deliberative forums are no worse, and are in many ways better, than those faced by ordinary citizens. The real problem with deliberative polls is that if they were to become popular, it would be tempting for interest groups and partisan elites to create polls in which (...) the constraints and briefing materials subtly tilted the participants in a desired direction. Public criticism of biased deliberative polls would, in turn, invite biased criticism of unbiased polls. In short, ?policing? the quality of deliberative polls could recreate the very pathologies of real-world democratic discourse that the polls are designed to rectify. However, this problem is not insurmountable, because the participants themselves can police the proceedings by questioning the veracity and balance of the briefing materials. (shrink)

Abstract If voters do not understand the programs of rival candidates or their likely consequences, they cannot rationally exercise control over government. An ignorant electorate cannot achieve true democratic control over public policy. The immense size and scope of modern government makes it virtually impossible for voters to acquire sufficient knowledge to exercise such control. The problem is exacerbated by voters? strong incentive to be ?rationally ignorant? of politics. This danger to democracy cannot readily be circumvented through ?shortcut? methods of (...) economizing on voter knowledge costs. A truly democratic government must, therefore, be strictly limited in scope. (shrink)

Karl Popper's methodology highlights our scientific ignorance: hence the need to institutionalize open‐mindedness through controlled experiments that may falsify our fallible theories about the world. In his endorsement of “piecemeal social engineering,” Popper assumes that the social‐democratic state and its citizens are capable of detecting social problems, and of assessing the results of policies aimed at solving them, through a process of experimentation analogous to that of natural science. But we are not only scientifically but politically ignorant: ignorant of the (...) facts that underpin political debate, which are brought to our attention by theories that, as Max Weber emphasized, can be tested only through counterfactual thought experiments. Public‐opinion and political‐psychology research suggest that human beings are far too unaware, illogical, and doctrinaire to conduct the rigorous theorizing that would be necessary to make piecemeal social engineering work. F.A. Hayek realized that the public could not engage, specifically, in piecemeal economic regulation but failed to draw the conclusion that this was due to a specific type of political ignorance: ignorance of economic theory. (shrink)

For Murray Edelman, political realities are largely inaccessible to the public, save by the mediation of symbols generated by elites. Such symbols often create the illusion of political solutions to complex problems—solutions devised by experts, implemented by effective leaders, and undemonstrably successful in their results.