I systematically defend a novel account of the grounds for identity and distinctness facts: they are all uniquely zero‐grounded. First, this Null Account is shown to avoid a range of problems facing other accounts: a relation satisfying the Null Account would be an excellent candidate for being the identity relation. Second, a plenitudinist view of relations suggests that there is such a relation. To flesh out this plenitudinist view I sketch a novel framework for expressing real definitions, use this framework (...) to give a definition of identity, and show how the central features of the identity relation can be deduced from this definition. (shrink)

Some propositions are true, and it is true that some propositions are true. Each of these facts looks like an impeccable ground of the other. But they cannot both ground each other, since grounding is asymmetric. This paper explores two new diagnoses of this much discussed puzzle. The tools of higher-order logic are used to show how both diagnoses can be fleshed out into strong and consistent theories of grounding. These theories of grounding in turn demand new theories of the (...) granularity of propositions, properties, and relations. Even those who are uninterested in grounding should take seriously these pictures of reality’s logical structure, which are in many ways reminiscent of Russell’s and Wittgenstein’s logical atomism. (shrink)