ABSTRACT (ENG) One of the concerns of Greek philosophy centred on the question of how a manifold and ordered universe arose out of the primitive state of things. From the mythical accounts dating around the seventh century B.C. to the cosmologies of the Classical period in Ancient Greece, many theories have been proposed in order to answer to this question. How these theories differ in positing a “something” that pre-existed the ordered cosmos has been widely discussed. However, scholars have rarely (...) made explicit how they differ in style of thought. In the span of four centuries the first deductive arguments of the Eleatic philosophers culminated in the emergence of logical proof and a form of explanation of natural phenomena, which consisted of searching for the simplest and fewest premises and deducting implications. In this paper it will be discussed how, at distinct stages of its development, the deductive thinking informed the solutions proposed to solve the chaos-order problem, that of how an ordered universe has been possible. -/- ABSTRACT (ITA) Una delle più importanti questioni della filosofia greca è stata quella di comprendere come sia stato possibile un universo ordinato a partire da uno stato primordiale. Dalle teogonie del VII secolo a.C. fino alle cosmologie dei filosofi dell’età classica, sono state proposte diverse teorie per dare risposta a questa domanda. Come esse differiscano nel postulare l’esistenza di un “qualcosa” di primordiale che preesisteva all’ordine del cosmo è stato molto discusso. Pochi studiosi, però, le hanno esaminate sullo sfondo della lenta evoluzione del pensiero deduttivo, culminata nella dimostrazione in geometria e in una forma di spiegazione dei fenomeni che consisteva nel cercare semplici premesse e inferire conclusioni. In questo articolo si mostrerà come il lento affermarsi della spiegazione razionale prima, dell’argomento deduttivo e della dimostrazione in geometria poi, abbiano dato forma alle diverse risposte al problema caos-ordine, e in particolare alla domanda su come sia sorto un universo ordinato. (shrink)

Discusses the conditions of possibility for intercultural and comparative philosophy, and for crosscultural communication at large. This innovative book explores the preconditions necessary for intercultural and comparative philosophy. Philosophical practices that involve at least two different traditions with no common heritage and whose languages have very different grammatical structure, such as Indo-Germanic languages and classical Chinese, are a particular focus. Lin Ma and Jaap van Brakel look at the necessary and not-so-necessary conditions of possibility of interpretation, comparison, and other forms (...) of interaction and how we can speak of similarities and differences in this context. The authors posit that it is necessary to dissolve the question of universalism versus relativism by replacing the ideal language paradigm with a paradigm of family resemblances and that it is not necessary to share a common language to engage in comparison. Numerous case studies are presented, including many comparisons of Western and Chinese concepts. (shrink)

Plato articulates a deep perplexity about inquiry in ?Meno's Paradox??the claim that one can inquire neither into what one knows, nor into what one does not know. Although some commentators have wrestled with the paradox itself, many suppose that the paradox of inquiry is special to Plato, arising from peculiarities of the Socratic elenchus or of Platonic epistemology. But there is nothing peculiarly Platonic in this puzzle. For it arises, too, in classical Indian philosophical discussions, where it is formulated with (...) great clarity, and analysed in a way that casts it in a new light. We present three treatments of the puzzle in Indian philosophy, as a way of refining and sharpening our understanding of the paradox, before turning to the most radical of the Indian philosophers to tackle it. The Indian philosophers who are optimistic that the paradox can be resolved appeal to the existence of prior beliefs, and to the resources embedded in language to explain how we can investigate, and so move from ignorance to knowledge. Highlighting this structural feature of inquiry, however, allows the pessimist philosopher to demonstrate that the paradox stands. The incoherence of inquiry is rooted in the very idea of aiming our desires at the unknown. Asking questions and giving answers rests on referential intentions targeting objects in a region of epistemic darkness, and so our ?inquiry sceptic? also finds structurally similar forms of incoherence in the pragmatics of interrogative discourse. (shrink)

A comparative study of the thinkers of China is meant to stimulate philosophical dialogue and not to deliver the observations of the “Man from Mars − the Western reader”. There has been an ongoing debate regarding the validity of interpreting the classical texts of China in the framework of Western philosophical categories and applying classical precepts to contemporary philosophical discussions. While it has been acknowledged that there are differences in cultural traditions, there is also an increasing awareness of the need (...) for sustained and systematic efforts toward formulating philosophical foundations which incorporate diverse intellectual perspectives. Specific topics discussed in the paper are: the parallels between Socrates as a gadfly and Confucius as a wooden bell; “confrontational hermeneutics” (a hermeneutics oriented toward having “a confrontation with a text or a tradition which pays careful attention to otherness of text or tradition”); convergent and divergent evolution of ideas; the parallels between the Book of Odes and Homeric epics; analogical reasoning from India, China, and Greece to Wittgenstein. Reflecting on the continuity of ideas between the philosophical thought of China and the West, we discover a vantage point from which the ideas can be approached with a fresh mind. In the philosophical legacy of China the familiar ideas and problems of Western philosophy are cast in a new light. Philosophical ideas, insofar as they are discoveries and inventions of the human mind, resonate across the ages and across geographical and cultural boundaries. (shrink)

Observation and experiment as categories for analysing scientific practice have a long pedigree in writings on science. There has, however, been little attempt to delineate observation and experiment with respect to analysing scientific practice; in particular, scientific experimentation, in a systematic manner. Someone who has presented a systematic account of observation and experiment as categories for analysing scientific experimentation is Ian Hacking. In this paper, I present a detailed analysis of Hacking’s observation versus experiment account. Using a range of cases (...) from various fields of scientific enquiry, I argue that the observation versus experiment account is not an adequate framework for delineating scientific experimentation in a systematic manner. (shrink)

Comparison is fundamental to the practice and subject-matter of philosophy, but has received scant attention by philosophers. This is even so in “comparative philosophy,” which literally distinguishes itself from other philosophy by being “comparative.” In this article, the need for a philosophy of comparison is suggested. What we compare with what, and in what respect it is done, poses a series of intriguing and intricate questions. In Part One, I offer a problematization of the tertium comparationis (the third of comparison) (...) by examining conceptualizations of similarity, family resemblance, and analogy, which it is sometimes argued can do without a tertium comparationis. In Part Two, I argue that a third of comparison is already required to determine what is to be compared, and insofar as that determination precedes the comparison that tertium may be called “pre-comparative.” This leads me to argue against incomparability and to show how anything can indeed be compared to anything. In Part Three, I relate my arguments to what is today commonly labelled “comparative philosophy.” Finally, I raise some questions of ontology and politics in order to demonstrate the relevance of a philosophy of comparison. (shrink)

In this essay, I examine the nature of Chinese logic and Chinese sciences in the history of China. I conclude that Chinese logic is essentially analogical, and that the Chinese did not have theoretical sciences. I then connect these together and explain why the Chinese failed to develop theoretical sciences, even though they enjoyed an advanced civilization and great scientific and technological innovations. This is because a deductive system of logic is necessary for the development of theoretical sciences, and analogical (...) logic cannot provide the deductive connections between a theory and empirical observations required by a theoretical science. This also offers a more satisfactory answer to the long-standing Needham Problem. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe response comments upon the idea of there being a multidimensionality to reality that G.E.R. Lloyd introduced in recent works. The idea is that while different equally intelligent perceivers might inhabit one and the same world, there can be a plurality of equally valid accounts. In putting forward the idea, Lloyd sought to strike a balance between ‘realism’ and ‘relativism.’ The response proposes two main points. First, the most interesting version of the thesis will have to be about how otherwise (...) incompatible accounts may be equally valid, as for instance, Greek versus early Chinese cosmology. Second, the relevant comparison needs to be between epistemic peers of a certain sort. But once both points are admitted, then it becomes possible for us to make the judgment that entire classes of accounts can be set aside as no longer supported given better evidence as, for instance, in a contest between both Greek and early Chinese cosmologies, and a modern counterpart. This outcome puts some pressure on the relativist aspects of Lloyd's thesis. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis response to Analogical Investigations concentrates on the legacy of Lloyd's polarity and analogy, other theories of metaphor, and relations between theories of metaphor and theories of nature.

In the vast literature on human rights and natural law one finds arguments that draw on science or mathematics to support claims to universality and objectivity. Here are two such arguments: 1) Human rights are as universal (i.e., valid independently of their specific historical and cultural Western origin) as the laws and theories of science; and 2) principles of natural law have the same objective (metahistorical) validity as mathematical principles. In what follows I will examine these arguments in some detail (...) and argue that both are misplaced. A section of the paper will be devoted to a discussion of arguments relying on the historical and cultural specificity (and intrinsic superiority) of Western science. The conclusion is that both science and mathematics offer little help to anyone wanting to make use of them as paradigms of universality, objectivity, and rationality. Finally, I will draw some consequences for the idea of human rights. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn this commentary I suggest that a comparative investigation of Ancient psychological notions may contribute to Professor Lloyd's project of understanding the role that analogy plays in human reasoning. In particular, I propose that the Greek notion of imagination may serve as a starting point. I argue that, because in Platonic and Aristotelian thought the ultimate object of knowledge is form, thinkers working in this paradigm were obliged to introduce a faculty mediating between the senses and the intellect. This is (...) the imagination. Some of the problems associated with Greek conceptions of imagination carry over to the use of analogy. I suggest that because Chinese thought had a very different approach to images and a different approach to the object of knowledge, they did not need to forge a conception of a specific faculty of imagination and were thus in a position to exploit analogies in a way which was rather different from Greeks. (shrink)