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Habituation, Habit, and Character in Aristotle’s Ethics

In Tom Sparrow & Adam Hutchinson (eds.), A History of Habit: From Aristotle to Bourdieu. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. pp. 19-36 (2013)

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  1. Does Aristotle believe that habituation is only for children?Wouter Sanderse - 2020 - Journal of Moral Education 49 (1):98-110.
    Full virtue and practical wisdom comprise the end of neo-Aristotelian moral development, but wisdom cannot be cultivated straight away through arguments and teaching. Wisdom is integrated with, and builds upon, habituation: the acquisition of virtuous character traits through the repeated practice of corresponding virtuous actions. Habit formation equips people with a taste for, and commitment to, the good life; furthermore it provides one with discriminatory and reflective capacities to know how to act in particular circumstances. Unfortunately, habituation is often understood (...)
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  • Buyer Beware: A Critique of Leading Virtue Ethics Defenses of Markets.Roberto Fumagalli - 2020 - Journal of Social Philosophy 51 (3):457-482.
    Over the last few decades, there have been intense debates concerning the effects of markets on the morality of individuals’ behaviour. On the one hand, several authors argue that markets’ ongoing expansion tends to undermine individuals’ intentions for mutual benefit and virtuous character traits and actions. On the other hand, leading economists and philosophers characterize markets as a domain of intentional cooperation for mutual benefit that promotes many of the character traits and actions that traditional virtue ethics accounts classify as (...)
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  • (1 other version)Social sensitivity and the ethics of attention.Elisa Magrì - 2022 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):725-739.
    Social sensitivity is a crucial aspect of interpersonal relationships, as it is intrinsic to the understanding of other selves as subjects situated in a social world. In revitalizing such a concept in the philosophical literature, this article examines the relation between habit, attention, and critical self‐awareness that lies at the core of social sensitivity. On the one hand, I reconsider the so‐called “passivity” of habit and tackle the role of attention as the power of varying point of view. On the (...)
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  • Is my feeling your pain bad for others? Empathy as virtue versus empathy as fixed trait.Gregory R. Peterson - 2017 - Zygon 52 (1):232-257.
    The purpose of this article is to critique the primary arguments given by Paul Bloom and Jesse Prinz against empathy, and to argue instead that empathy is best understood as a virtue that plays an important but complicated role in the moral life. That it is a virtue does not mean that it always functions well, and empathy sometimes contributes to behavior that is partial and unfair. In some of their writings, both Bloom and Prinz endorse the view that empathy (...)
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  • (1 other version)Social sensitivity and the ethics of attention.Elisa Magrì - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):725-739.
    European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 30, Issue 2, Page 725-739, June 2022.
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  • Citizenship Education through the Pragmatist Lens of Habit.Gideon Dishon - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy of Education.
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