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  1. Epistemic Feelings and Epistemic Emotions (Focus Section).Santiago Arango-Muñoz & Kourken Michaelian - 2014 - Philosophical Inquiries.
    Philosophers of mind and epistemologists are increasingly making room in their theories for epistemic emotions (E-emotions) and, drawing on metacognition research in psychology, epistemic – or noetic or metacognitive – feelings (E-feelings). Since philoso- phers have only recently begun to draw on empirical research on E-feelings, in particular, we begin by providing a general characterization of E-feelings (section 1) and reviewing some highlights of relevant research (section 2). We then turn to philosophical work on E-feelings and E-emotions, situating the contributions (...)
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  • JFGI: From Distributed Cognition to Distributed Reliabilism.Kourken Michaelian - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):314-346.
    While, prima facie, virtue/credit approaches in epistemology would appear to be in tension with distributed/extended approaches in cognitive science, Pritchard () has recently argued that the tension here is only apparent, at least given a weak version of distributed cognition, which claims merely that external resources often make critical contributions to the formation of true belief, and a weak virtue theory, which claims merely that, whenever a subject achieves knowledge, his cognitive agency makes a significant contribution to the formation of (...)
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  • Epistemic Action, Extended Knowledge, and Metacognition.Joëlle Proust - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):364-392.
    How should one attribute epistemic credit to an agent, and hence, knowledge, when cognitive processes include an extensive use of human or mechanical enhancers, informational tools, and devices which allow one to complement or modify one's own cognitive system? The concept of integration of a cognitive system has been used to address this question. For true belief to be creditable to a person's ability, it is claimed, the relevant informational processes must be or become part of the cognitive character of (...)
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  • Confidence in One’s Social Beliefs: Implications for Belief Justification.Asher Koriat & Shiri Adiv - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (4):1599-1616.
    Philosophers commonly define knowledge as justified true beliefs. A heated debate exists, however, about what makes a belief justified. In this article, we examine the question of belief justification from a psychological perspective, focusing on the subjective confidence in a belief that the person has just formed. Participants decided whether to accept or reject a proposition depicting a social belief, and indicated their confidence in their choice. The task was repeated six times, and choice latency was measured. The results were (...)
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