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Situation theory and mental models.Alice G. B. ter Meulen - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):358-359.details
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On the determinants of the conjunction fallacy: Probability versus inductive confirmation.Katya Tentori, Vincenzo Crupi & Selena Russo - 2013 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 142 (1):235.details
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How the conjunction fallacy is tied to probabilistic confirmation: Some remarks on Schupbach (2009).Katya Tentori & Vincenzo Crupi - 2012 - Synthese 184 (1):3-12.details
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Actions, inactions and the temporal dimension.Karl Halvor Teigen - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):30-31.details
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Moral heuristics.Cass R. Sunstein - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):531-542.details
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Biological Function and Epistemic Normativity.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (1):94-110.details
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Formal versus Bounded Norms in the Psychology of Rationality: Toward a Multilevel Analysis of Their Relationship.Thomas Sturm - 2019 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 49 (3):190-209.details
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Objective probability as a guide to the world.Michael Strevens - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 95 (3):243-275.details
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What is Experimental Philosophy?Stephen Stich - 2015 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 23:21-31.details
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Normativity and epistemic intuitions.Jonathan M. Weinberg, Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich - 2001 - Philosophical Topics, 29 (1-2):429-460.details
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Naturalizing epistemology: Quine, Simon and the prospects for pragmatism.Stephen Stich - 1993 - In C. Hookway & D. Peterson (eds.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 1-17.details
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Naturalizing Epistemology: Quine, Simon and the Prospects for Pragmatism.Stephen Stich - 1993 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 34:1-17.details
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Evolution, altruism and cognitive architecture: a critique of Sober and Wilson’s argument for psychological altruism.Stephen Stich - 2007 - Biology and Philosophy 22 (2):267-281.details
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Nonsentential representation and nonformality.Keith Stenning & Jon Oberlander - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):365-366.details
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Models, rules and expertise.Rosemary J. Stevenson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):366-366.details
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Innate ideas as a naturalistic source of metaphysical knowledge.Steve Stewart-Williams - 2005 - Biology and Philosophy 20 (4):791-814.details
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Evolutionary explanations of human behaviour.Kim Sterelny - 1992 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (2):156 – 173.details
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Advancing the rationality debate.Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West - 2000 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):701-717.details
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What goals are to count?Mark D. Spranca - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):29-30.details
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Relevance theory explains the selection task.D. Sperber - 1995 - Cognition 57 (1):31-95.details
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Charity Implies Meta‐Charity.Roy Sorensen - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):290-315.details
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Stich`s The Fragmentation of Reason: Preface to a Pragmatic Theory of Cognitive Evaluation.Miriam Solomon - 1994 - Informal Logic 16 (2).details
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Considering Causalisms.Andrew Sneddon - 2001 - Dialogue 40 (2):343.details
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Evidentialism doesn’t make an exception for belief.Keshav Singh - 2021 - Synthese 198 (6):5477-5494.details
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Demoting promoting objections to epistemic consequentialism.Daniel J. Singer - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):268-280.details
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A stitchwork quilt: Or how I learned to stop worrying and love cognitive relativism.Stuart Silvers - 1992 - Philosophical Psychology 5 (4):391 – 410.details
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Discussion Note: Selim Berker’s Combinatorial Argument against Practical Reasons for Belief.Adam Shmidt - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (2):763-776.details
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X - Phi and Carnapian Explication.Joshua Shepherd & James Justus - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (2):381-402.details
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Explaining Evidence Denial as Motivated Pragmatically Rational Epistemic Irrationality.Michael J. Shaffer - 2019 - Metaphilosophy 50 (4):563-579.details
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Epistemic instrumentalism and the reason to believe in accord with the evidence.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3791-3809.details
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Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and the Moral Niche.Eleonora Severini - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (3):865-875.details
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You can't always get what you want: Evolution and true beliefs.Jeffrey P. Schloss & Michael J. Murray - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):533-534.details
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Structural flaws: Massive modularity and the argument from design.Armin Schulz - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):733-743.details
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Practical rationality is a problem in the philosophy of mind.Timothy Schroeder - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):394-409.details
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Open Your Eyes and Look Harder! (An Investigation into the Idea of a Responsible Search).Robert Schroer - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):409-430.details
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Open your eyes and look harder! (An investigation into the idea of a responsible visual search).Robert Schroer - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):409-430.details
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Object persistence in philosophy and psychology.Brian J. Scholl - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (5):563–591.details
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Goals, values and benefits.Frederic Schick - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):29-29.details
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Defusing eliminative materialism: Reference and revision.Maurice K. D. Schouten & Huib Looren de Jong - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (4):489-509.details
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Cognitive Success: A Consequentialist Account of Rationality in Cognition.Gerhard Schurz & Ralph Hertwig - 2019 - Topics in Cognitive Science 11 (1):7-36.details
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Could Evolution Explain Our Reliability about Logic.Joshua Schechter - 2005 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 214.details
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Unjustified presuppositions of competence.Leah Savion - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):364-365.details
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Evolutionary psychology and the massive modularity hypothesis.Richard Samuels - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (4):575-602.details
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Irrationality and Pathology of Beliefs.Eisuke Sakakibara - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (2):147-157.details
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Testimony, simulation, and the limits of inductivism.Patrick Rysiew - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):269 – 274.details
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Rationality disputes – psychology and epistemology.Patrick Rysiew - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1153-1176.details
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The Advantages of Moral Diversity.Amélie Oksenberg Rorty - 1992 - Social Philosophy and Policy 9 (2):38.details
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Concepts and Perceptual Belief: How (Not) to Defend Recognitional Concepts.Bradley Rives - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (4):369-391.details
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Can goals be uniquely defined?Ilana Ritov - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):28-29.details
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