A collection of material on Husserl's Logical Investigations, and specifically on Husserl's formal theory of parts, wholes and dependence and its influence in ontology, logic and psychology. Includes translations of classic works by Adolf Reinach and Eugenie Ginsberg, as well as original contributions by Wolfgang Künne, Kevin Mulligan, Gilbert Null, Barry Smith, Peter M. Simons, Roger A. Simons and Dallas Willard. Documents work on Husserl's ontology arising out of early meetings of the Seminar for Austro-German Philosophy.

The discussions which follow rest on a distinction, first expounded by Husserl, between formal logic and formal ontology. The former concerns itself with (formal) meaning-structures; the latter with formal structures amongst objects and their parts. The paper attempts to show how, when formal ontological considerations are brought into play, contemporary extensionalist theories of part and whole, and above all the mereology of Leniewski, can be generalised to embrace not only relations between concrete objects and object-pieces, but also relations between what (...) we shall call dependent parts or moments. A two-dimensional formal language is canvassed for the resultant ontological theory, a language which owes more to the tradition of Euler, Boole and Venn than to the quantifier-centred languages which have predominated amongst analytic philosophers since the time of Frege and Russell. Analytic philosophical arguments against moments, and against the entire project of a formal ontology, are considered and rejected. The paper concludes with a brief account of some applications of the theory presented. (shrink)

In 1941, Tarski published an abstract, finitely axiomatized version of the theory of binary relations, called the theory of relation algebras, He asked whether every model of his abstract theory could be represented as a concrete algebra of binary relations. He and Jonsson obtained some initial, positive results for special classes of abstract relation algebras. But Lyndon showed, in 1950, that in general the answer to Tarski's question is negative. Monk proved later that the answer remains negative even if one (...) adjoins finitely many new axioms to Tarski's system. In this paper we describe a far-reaching generalization of the positive results of Jonsson and Tarski, as well as of some later, related results of Maddux. We construct a class of concrete models of Tarski's axioms-called coset relation algebras-that are very close in spirit to algebras of binary relations, but are built using systems of groups and cosets instead of elements of a base set. The models include all algebras of binary relations, and many non-representable relation algebras as well, We prove that every atomic relation algebra satisfying a certain measurability condition-a condition generalizing the conditions imposed by Jonsson and Tarski-is essentially isomorphic to a coset relation algebra. The theorem raises the possibility of providing a positive solution to Tarski's problem by using coset relation algebras instead of the standard algebras of binary relations. (shrink)

Ontic structuralists claim that there are no individual objects, and that reality should instead be thought of as a “web of relations”. It is difficult to make this metaphysical picture precise, however, since languages usually characterize the world by describing the objects that exist in it. This paper proposes a solution to the problem; I argue that when discourse is reformulated in the language of the calculus of relations ‐ an algebraic logic developed by Alfred Tarski ‐ it can be (...) interpreted without presupposing the existence of objects. What is distinctive about the language of the calculus is that it contains no operator that resembles a quantifier, and yet it can be used to paraphrase any sentence expressible in first‐order logic. Since the use of a first‐order quantifier (or some similar operator) is usually what establishes commitment to an ontology of objects, and since the calculus of relations eschews the quantifier in favor of a composition operator that can be given a natural interpretation consistent with structuralist metaphysics, the calculus is an ideal language for the structuralist to use to describe the world. (shrink)