This article examines how the special theoretical significance of the sociology of scientific knowledge is affected by attempts to apply relativist-constructivism to technology. The article shows that the failure to confront key analytic ambivalences in the practice of SSK has compromised its original strategic significance. In particular, the construal of SSK as an explanatory formula diminishes its potential for profoundly reconceptualizing epistemic issues. A consideration of critiques of technological determinism, and of some empirical studies, reveals similar analytic ambivalences in the (...) social study of technology. The injunction to consider "technology as text" is critically examined. It is concluded that a reflexive interpretation of this slogan is necessary to recover some of the epistemological significance lost in the constructivist move from SSK to SST. (shrink)

The dramatic and ongoing changes in the funding of science have stimulated interest in an economics of scientific knowledge, which would investigate the effects of these changes on the scientific enterprise. Hands has previously explored the lessons for such an ESK from the existing precedent of the sociology of scientific knowledge. In particular, he examines the philosophical problems of SSK and those that any ESK in its image would face. This paper explores this argument further by contending that more recent (...) literature in SSK exposes even deeper philosophical problems than those identified by Hands. Meaning finitism has emerged as the philosophical core of SSK. An examination of the profound problems with this position is used to show that an underlying extensionalism is the root of SSK's intractable philosophical difficulties, and to illustrate the entirely different approach of a critical philosophy that is advocated in its place. In this way, the project of an ESK is shown to depend upon a critical philosophy. (shrink)

In this paper recent research involving interdisciplinary ethnography is presented as an exploration of its contribution to studies of people and technology in the workplace. Three main patterns of interaction between ethnography and ‘the others’ are examined. First, the influence of ethnography in promoting people-oriented perspectives of technology is discussed with reference to workplace studies in manufacturing. Second, ethnography contribution to the development of hybrid methods for the design and implementation of technology for use in the workplace is illustrated by (...) several examples of such frameworks. Third, the influence of ethnographic research to providing a theoretical basis for computer-mediated communication is explored and documented by analyses of design teams working together as part of construction projects. From a practical point of view, this exploration has resulted in a brief discussion of the broad range of ‘users’ in the real-life workplace who benefit from ethnographic research. Future work in this area will rely on a reflexive stance on the part of the ethnographer in relation to both users of technology and users of ethnography. (shrink)

In applied health care research, an essentialised notion of culture is often used when studying ethnic disparities in health and health care access between the majority populations of Western countries and migrants, with ethnic backgrounds that differ from majority population. This notion of culture, however, is considered highly problematic in anthropology and ethnic studies. Therefore, in our research on Dutch illness certification practices, we employed a dynamic conceptualisation of culture. Our research shows that, in practice, when clients fail to meet (...) the implicit norms of this practice, doctors ascribe this nonconformity differently when the client is a migrant than when he or she is a Dutch client. More specifically, when migrants fail to meet the norms, doctors are inclined to automatically ascribe this nonconformity to the assumed cultural background of the client. Consequently, these doctors feel less able to use the tools they normally use to coach their clients. This, in turn, results in more problematic and longer reintegration trajectories for migrants in comparison to Dutch clients in similar circumstances. In other words, framing the problems of migrants in terms of culture results in greater sick leave rates for migrants than for Dutch people. Clearly, culturalistic perspectives on ethnic differences have negative consequences. We therefore implore the application of a dynamic notion of culture in applied research. (shrink)

This essay explores how the distinctively anthropological concept of culture provides uniquely valuable insights into the workings of science in its cultural context. Recent efforts by anthropologists to dislodge the traditional notion of culture as a homogenous, stable whole have opened up a variety of ways of imagining culture that place power differentials, flux, and contradiction at its center. Including attention to a wide variety of social domains outside the laboratory, attending to the ways nonscientists actively engage with scientific knowledge, (...) and focusing on the complex interactions that flow both into and out of research laboratories are ways the activities of both scientists and nonscientists can be situated in the heterogeneous matrtx of culture. Three images—the citadel, the rhizome, and the string figure—allow us to picture the discontinuous ways science both permeates and is permeated by cultural life. (shrink)

In developing an "internal" sociology of science, the sociology of scientific knowledge drew on Wittgenstein’s later philosophy to reinterpret traditional epistemological topics in sociological terms. By construing scientific reasoning as rule following within a collective, sociologists David Bloor and Harry Collins effectively blocked outside criticism of a scientific field, whether scientific, philosophical, or political. Ethnomethodologist Michael Lynch developed an alternative, Wittgensteinian reading that similarly blocked philosophical or political critique, while also disallowing analytical appeals to historical or institutional contexts. I criticize (...) these Wittgensteinian sociologies and argue for the historical and contemporary significance of methodological criticisms of scientific practice that conjoin epistemological and political categories. I consider two such cases briefly: the Baconian criticism of Scholastic science in the early Royal Society and the criticism of AIDS drug testing protocols by activists. Key Words: Wittgenstein • sociology of scientific knowledge • ethnomethodology • scientific method • interpretive sociology. (shrink)

During the last few years, several sociological accounts of scientific consensus appeared in which a radically skeptical view of cognitive consensus in science was advocated. Challenging the traditional realist conception of scientific consensus as a sui generis social fact, the radical skeptics claim to have shown that the traditional historical sociologist's supposedly definitive account of scientific consensus is only a linguistic chimera that easily can be deconstructed by the application of different interpretive schema to the given data. I will argue (...) in this article that such an idealistic conception of scientific consensus results from the radical skeptics' failure to take into account the following three factors that are central to the historical sociologist's narrative account of consensus formation: the "judgmental" character of the reconstruction of scientists' beliefs, the hierarchical nature of the consensus change in science, and the importance of the "temporal dimension" in the explanation of scientific consensus formation. To substantiate these three points, I will draw extensively on two recent historical-sociological studies of scientific consensus formation. (shrink)

The ArgumentDavid Bloor often wrote that Karl Mannheim had “stopped short” in his sociology of knowledge, lacking the nerve to consider the natural sciences sociologically. While this assessment runs counter to Mannheim's own work, which responded in quite specific ways both to an encroaching “modernity” and a looming fascism, Bloor's depiction becomes clearer when considered in the light of his principal introduction to Mannheim's work — a series of essays by Robert Merton. Bloor's reading and appropriation of Mannheim emerged from (...) his background in experimental psychology and his attempts to supercede Merton's own structural-functionalist program for the sociology of knowledge. By retracing this extended trail of readings and re-readings, we may begin to understand the roots of Bloor's curious interpretation of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge, and inquire in a reflexive way about the present and future directions of science studies. (shrink)

This article develops the thesis that normative social orders are always fore-structured by horizons of possibilities. The thesis is spelled out against the background of a criticism of ethnomethodology for its hermeneutic deficiency in coping with radical reflexivity. The article contributes to the debates concerning the status of normativity problematic in the cultural disciplines. The concept of hermeneutic pre-normativity is introduced to connote the interpretative fore-structuring of normative inter-subjectivity. Radical reflexivity is reformulated in terms of hermeneutic phenomenology.

The paper presents a comparative analysis between hermeneutics and ethnomethodology of science. A careful examination of the approaches suggested by the two programs not only demonstrates that a non-essentialist inquiry of scientific practices is possible, it also reveals how the significant methodological differences between these (post-phenomenological) programs inform divergent pictures of science’s practical rationality. The role these programs play in the debates on science’s cognitive autonomy is illuminated by spelling out the idea of the internal criticism of scientific research they (...) advance. In contrast to the external criticism of social epistemologists, the internal one does not aim at a deconstruction of science’s cognitive autonomy. Its task is to promote the epistemic emancipation of scientific communities by stressing the reflexive dimension of scientific research. (shrink)

Em Science and Partial Truth (da Costa and French 2003) argumentamos que inconsistências no raciocínio científico podem ser acomodadas pela combinação de estruturas parciais e quase-verdade, junto com uma noção de ‘crença representacional’. Neste artigo, examino se isso pode ser estendido aos raciocínios e crenças de outras culturas, focando em particular nas crenças de feitiçaria dos Azande. Argumento que tais crenças são similares às crenças teóricas da ciência ocidental, mas que o modo mais apropriado de representar esta última — e (...) portanto também a primeira — é através de estruturas parciais e quase-verdade. Dessa maneira, espero encontrar um caminho plausível entre as abordagens ‘imperialista’ e ‘relativista’. DOI: 10.5007/1808-1711.2011v15n1p77. (shrink)

The ArgumentTwo dominant models of criticism are identified and analyzed. One is selfconsciously normative. It conceives of criticism as subject to strict logical rules. The other views itself as essentially descriptive and accounts for the critical activity in terms of social factors. In spite of their different origins and purposes, it is argued that both models share a reductionistic thrust, which minimizes the role of the critic qua agent. It is further agreed that neither provides an adequate account of critical (...) activity and its role in science. (shrink)

The article re-examines the relationship between the works of Alfred Schütz and Harold Garfinkel, focusing on their respective approaches to temporality in interaction. Although there are good reasons to emphasize the differences between Schütz’s notion of individual projects of action and Garfinkel’s interest in communicative sequencing, there is also an interesting historical connection. In order to elucidate this connection, the article provides a close reading of the steps that lead Schütz from his premise of ‘egological’ time consciousness to his understanding (...) of the reflexive and interactive process of meaning establishment and interpretation developed in his first book, _The Phenomenology of the Social World_ (1967 [1932]). The article reflects further upon which aspects of Schütz’s considerations resonated with Garfinkel in his formative years and how Garfinkel related to them variously in his later development of ethnomethodology. Hence, it appears that Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology successively departs from many of Schütz’s premises while simultaneously incorporating and further developing some of his notions on the sequential organization and temporal flux of interactive processes. (shrink)

A collective volume in memoriam Mihail Radu Solcan.

This inaugural handbook documents the distinctive research field that utilizes history and philosophy in investigation of theoretical, curricular and pedagogical issues in the teaching of science and mathematics. It is contributed to by 130 researchers from 30 countries; it provides a logically structured, fully referenced guide to the ways in which science and mathematics education is, informed by the history and philosophy of these disciplines, as well as by the philosophy of education more generally. The first handbook to cover the (...) field, it lays down a much-needed marker of progress to date and provides a platform for informed and coherent future analysis and research of the subject. -/- The publication comes at a time of heightened worldwide concern over the standard of science and mathematics education, attended by fierce debate over how best to reform curricula and enliven student engagement in the subjects There is a growing recognition among educators and policy makers that the learning of science must dovetail with learning about science; this handbook is uniquely positioned as a locus for the discussion. -/- The handbook features sections on pedagogical, theoretical, national, and biographical research, setting the literature of each tradition in its historical context. Each chapter engages in an assessment of the strengths and weakness of the research addressed, and suggests potentially fruitful avenues of future research. A key element of the handbook’s broader analytical framework is its identification and examination of unnoticed philosophical assumptions in science and mathematics research. It reminds readers at a crucial juncture that there has been a long and rich tradition of historical and philosophical engagements with science and mathematics teaching, and that lessons can be learnt from these engagements for the resolution of current theoretical, curricular and pedagogical questions that face teachers and administrators. (shrink)

This chapter considers Wittgenstein’s philosophy, particularly as elaborated in Philosophical Investigations and later works, as it has obtained relevance in science education research. The specific focus is on contributions related to students’ learning of science. Wittgenstein’s writings have been used in science education in several ways: to argue for an alternate conception of rationality in theories of learning science, to support theories examining the discursive and social nature of learning, to advocate for investigations of science classrooms that parallel ethnographic and (...) sociological investigations of professional science labs, and to develop alternative research methodologies. An examination of this influence in science education necessitates discussion of the frequent implicit attempts made to reconcile Wittgenstein’s analytic philosophy with empirical habits firmly grounded in a cognitivist tradition. Particular attention is given to the way in which a typical focus in science education on students’ “meaning making” is likely at odds with Wittgensteinian philosophy. It is argued that the exemplars provided in his later work suggest that conceptual clarity is necessary for coherence in asking empirical questions and interpreting results and that they imply an alternative, descriptive orientation for researchers. (shrink)