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Introduction: The Admissible Contents of Experience

In The Admissible Contents of Experience. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 1–15 (2011)

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  1. A Map of Consciousness Studies: Questions and Approaches.Takuya Niikawa - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11:530152.
    This article aims to present a map of consciousness studies, which consists of a list of fundamental questions about consciousness and existing approaches to them. The question list includes five fundamental categories: Definitional, Phenomenological, Epistemological, Ontological, and Axiological. Each fundamental category is divided into more determinate questions. Existing approaches to each question are also classified into a few groups, presenting principal researchers who take each kind of approach. In the final section, I demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed map of (...)
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  • Bivs, Space and ‘In’.Clare Mac Cumhaill - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (1):369-392.
    I present a novel anti-sceptical BIV argument by focusing on conditions on the production and use of the locative preposition ‘in’. I distinguish two uses of ‘in’—material and descriptive phenomenological—and I explain in what respect movement is central to the concept that our use of ‘in’ expresses. I go on to argue that a functionalist semantics of the intelligible use of ‘in’ demands a materialist philosophy of action in the spirit of G.E.M. Anscombe, but also why the structure of space (...)
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  • On Perceptual Confidence and “Completely Trusting Your Experience”.Jacob Beck - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 61 (2):174-188.
    John Morrison has argued that confidences are assigned in perceptual experience. For example, when you perceive a figure in the distance, your experience might assign a 55-percent confidence to the figure’s being Isaac. Morrison’s argument leans on the phenomenon of ‘completely trusting your experience’. I argue that Morrison presupposes a problematic ‘importation model’ of this familiar phenomenon, and propose a very different way of thinking about it. While the article’s official topic is whether confidences are assigned in perceptual experience, it (...)
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  • Editorial: Perception–Cognition Interface and Cross-Modal Experiences: Insights into Unified Consciousness.Aleksandra Mroczko-Wąsowicz - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
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  • Recent Issues in High-Level Perception.Grace Helton - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (12):851-862.
    Recently, several theorists have proposed that we can perceive a range of high-level features, including natural kind features (e.g., being a lemur), artifactual features (e.g., being a mandolin), and the emotional features of others (e.g., being surprised). I clarify the claim that we perceive high-level features and suggest one overlooked reason this claim matters: it would dramatically expand the range of actions perception-based theories of action might explain. I then describe the influential phenomenal contrast method of arguing for high-level perception (...)
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  • A New Method for Establishing high-level Visual Content: The Conflict cross-modal Approach.Daniel Tippens - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (1):169-191.
    Restrictivists hold that visual experience only represents low-level properties such as shape, spatial location, motion, color, etc. Expansionists contend that visual experience also represents high-level properties such as being a pine tree. I outline a new approach to support expansionism called the conflict cross-modal argument. What I call the conflict cross-modal effects occur when at least two perceptual systems disagree about some property belonging to a common stimulus, and this disagreement causes a change in the representational and phenomenal content of (...)
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  • Redefining Illusion and Hallucination in Light of New Cases.Fiona Macpherson & Clare Batty - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):263-296.
    In this paper, we present new cases of illusion and hallucination that have not heretofore been identified. We argue that such cases show that the traditional accounts of illusion and hallucination are incorrect because they do not identify all of the cases of non-veridical experience that they need to and they elide important differences between cases. In light of this, we present new and exhaustive definitions of illusion and hallucination. First, we explicate the traditional accounts of illusion and hallucination. We (...)
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  • Replies to Falkenstein, Copenhaver, and Winkler.James Van Cleve - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):232-245.
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  • Towards a rich view of auditory experience.Elvira Di Bona - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (11):2629-2643.
    In this paper I will argue that the gender properties expressed by human voices are part of auditory phenomenology. I will support this claim by investigating auditory adaptational effects on such properties and contrasting auditory experiences, before and after the adaptational effects take place. In light of this investigation, I will conclude that auditory experience is not limited to low-level properties. Perception appears to be much more informative about the auditory landscape than is commonly thought.
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