Being an "untimely review", this paper reviews Aristotle's 'Categories' as if they were published today, in the era of computerised information, where categorisation becomes more and more essential for information retrieval. I suggest a systematic ordering of Aristotle's list of categories and argue that Aristotle's discussion of ontological dependency and his focus on concrete entities are still a source of new insight and can indeed be read as a contribution to the emerging field of applied ontology and ontological engineering.

According to the cluster of theories in the metaphysics of properties known as ‘trope’ theories, properties are collections of particular qualitative instances. Though increasingly influential, the cluster is sufficiently diverse for there to be little agreement as to the prospects of its members. The present essay articulates and defends a conception of tropes as primitively qualitatively complex, somewhat in the vein of Quinean nominalist objects. After clarifying the relationships among tropes, properties, property exemplification, and property conferral, the essay discusses the (...) benefits of this new ‘ostrich’ trope theory. Specifically, the theory explains better than prior trope theories both the spatiotemporal status of tropes and the capacity tropes have to confer properties onto objects. Moreover, the theory is immune to many of the concerns that threaten more orthodox trope ontologies. (shrink)

The main purpose of this paper is to uphold the very fact that there are many ways of understanding the concept Universal and also the several issues revolving round it but then the fundamental aim must be to free the ontology of any extra pressure. Thus, the prime aim of the paper is to exhibit the different ways in which discussions relating to Universals were usually dealt with. The thrust nevertheless lies on the reference of Tropes which is found to (...) be more apt in providing a less cumbersome ontology. The aim thus is not to provide a comparative study on whether Universals are more fundamental than Particulars but to show that the usual ways of discussing Universals could be looked differently and secondarily; both Universals and Particulars are ways of explaining an object as a whole. The point thus is to concentrate on our understanding of the given object. The purpose of bringing in the reference of Tropes thus proves that there can be discussions that arise from the discussions of Universals undoubtedly but nevertheless can provide better opportunities. The methods applied are the revisiting of concepts like non-relational tie, relation of attachment, the explanation on Supervenience and finally the concept of Tropes (the ontological glue and what is it for a substance to have properties, etc.). There is also a special effort made of introducing the concept “generality” and “peculiarity.” Tropes stand true to a great extent to expectations especially as independent entities. Though it is true that they form clusters to help in the emergence of substances as a whole, their explanatory powers are a sure welcome. In philosophy, we always try to reach the simplest element or an explanation that would serve as a unit or as the fundamental, and Universals and Tropes serve this purpose in their own way. (shrink)

Contingent negative existentials give rise to a notorious paradox. I formulate a version in terms of metaphysical grounding: nonexistence can't be fundamental, but nothing can ground it. I then argue for a new kind of solution, expanding on work by Kit Fine. The key idea is that negative existentials are contingently zero-grounded – that is to say, they are grounded, but not by anything, and only in the right conditions. If this is correct, it follows that grounding cannot be an (...) internal relation, and that no complete account of reality can be purely fundamental. (shrink)

Ontology is the philosophical discipline which aims to understand how things in the world are divided into categories and how these categories are related together. This is exactly what information scientists aim for in creating structured, automated representations, called 'ontologies,' for managing information in fields such as science, government, industry, and healthcare. Currently, these systems are designed in a variety of different ways, so they cannot share data with one another. They are often idiosyncratically structured, accessible only to those who (...) created them, and unable to serve as inputs for automated reasoning. This volume shows, in a nontechnical way and using examples from medicine and biology, how the rigorous application of theories and insights from philosophical ontology can improve the ontologies upon which information management depends. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine Peter Schulte’s “Grounding Nominalism” (Schulte, 2018), understood as the claim that first-order properties and relations are grounded in the concrete particulars which instantiate them. While Schulte offered reasons to think that this view is consistent, along with answers to a number of objections, a more straightforward argument for GN is still needed. I take on this task here, by discussing and defending what I call the “argument from abstraction”. The latter, I suggest, offers more grounds (...) to Grounding Nominalism. (shrink)