It is argued that we need a richer version of Bayesian decision theory, admitting both subjective and objective probabilities and providing rational criteria for choice of our prior probabilities. We also need a theory of tentative acceptance of empirical hypotheses. There is a discussion of subjective and of objective probabilities and of the relationship between them, as well as a discussion of the criteria used in choosing our prior probabilities, such as the principles of indifference and of maximum entropy, and (...) the simplicity ranking of alternative hypotheses. (shrink)

There is a long standing debate as to whether or not time is ‘real’ or illusory, and whether or not human time is a direct reflection of physical time. Differing spacetime cosmologies have opposing views. Exactly what human time entails has, in our opinion, led to the failure to resolve this ‘two times’ problem. To help resolve this issue we propose a dualistic model of human time in which each component has both an illusory and non-illusory aspect. With the dualistic (...) model we are able to provide experimental tests for all of the human time assertions of 10 chosen spacetime cosmologies. The illusory aspect of the ‘present,’ i.e. a ‘unique present’ was confirmed. An information gathering and utilizing system was constructed using a virtual reality apparatus allowing the observer to experientially roam back and forth along the worldline ad lib. The phenomenon of ‘change’ was experimentally found to be illusory at high frequency observation and non-illusory at low frequency observation, the latter phenomenon coinciding with ‘change’ referred to in the ‘Order of Time’ and ‘Relativity Refounded’ views. Additional experiments are presented indicating that both motion and temporality are dualistic. In sum, the dualistic model of human time allows for the existence of both illusory and non-illusory aspects of human time that are not in conflict with one another. It also provides experimental evidence for various spacetime cosmological assertions regarding human time. (shrink)

The widely known but also somewhat esoteric Mach principle envisages a fully relational formulation of physical theories without any reference to a concept of ‘absolute space’. When applied to classical mechanics, under the guise of an extended symmetry group, this procedure is known to lead to an equation of motion with inertial-like forces that are sourced by the mass distribution of the system itself. In this paper we follow a similar procedure and reformulate the Schrödinger equation of non-relativistic quantum mechanics (...) in a fully Machian way. Just like its classical counterpart, the resulting quantum theory is fully relational in the positions and momenta of the bodies comprising a given physical system, leaving no room for the notion of absolute space. (shrink)

Utilizing Einstein’s comparison of General Relativity and Descartes’ physics, this investigation explores the alleged conventionalism that pervades the ontology of substantival and relationist conceptions of spacetime. Although previously discussed, namely by Rynasiewicz and Hoefer, it will be argued that the close similarities between General Relativity and Cartesian physics have not been adequately treated in the literature—and that the disclosure of these similarities bolsters the case for a conventionalist interpretation of spacetime ontology.

In Kant's Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science are found a dynamist reduction of matter and an account of the communication of motion by impact. One would expect to find an analysis of the causal mechanism involved in the communication of motion between bodies given in terms of the fundamental dynamical nature of bodies. However, Kant's analysis, as given in the discussion of his third law of mechanics (an action-reaction law) is purely kinematical, invoking no causal mechanisms at all, let alone (...) dynamist mechanisms, in the explanation. It is argued that the reason for the non-incorporation of Kant's theory of matter in the account of impact is his overriding desire to provide a mathematical framework to explain the communication of motion, a provision which Kant felt to be impossible in the context of a metaphysical dynamism. (shrink)

All suggested notions of reduction of two scientific theories are critically reviewed and analyzed. In particular those applied to the case of the alleged reduction of Chemistry to Quantum mechanics are examined. Since it is recognized that the weakness of this field of research is the lack of a definition of a scientific theory, it is suggested that a scientific theory is characterized by two choices regarding two dichotomies, that is, the kind of mathematics and the kind of logic. According (...) to this view a reduction is only possible between two theories in which the same choices are shared. As a consequence, only one case of reduction in the history of physics is recognized: physical optics to electromagnetism, a case that is commonly accepted. The other cases of claimed reductions are recognized as impossible, owing to the different choices of the two theories at issue and hence the radical variations in meaning of their shared basic notions. In particular, the claimed reduction of Chemistry to Quantum mechanics is disproved in detail. (shrink)

I argue that Carl Hempel’s pioneering work on scientific explanation introduced an assumption that Hempel never motivated, namely, that explanation is an aim of science. Ever since, it has remained largely unquestioned in analytic philosophy of science. By expanding the historical scope of the debate on explanation to philosophers from the first half of the twentieth century, I show that the debate should include a critical reflection on Hempel’s assumption. This reflection includes two problems: how to motivate one’s position on (...) the aims of scientific knowledge and how to decide which examples count as expressions of those aims. (shrink)

Modern commentators have doubts about the authenticity and cogency of the early propositions of Archimedes’ On Equilibrium of Planes Book 1. Ernst Mach famously said that the proof of Prop. 6, the so-called law of the lever, assumes what is to be proven. Comparing the initial text in Heiberg’s modern edition (1881, 1913) to the first propositions in Eutocius’ commentary on EP 1, J. L. Berggren ([1976]. ‘Spurious Theorems in Archimedes’ Equilibrium of Planes: Book I’, Archive for History of Exact (...) Sciences 16.2 (1976), 87–103.) claimed that the propositions up through Proposition 3 of the standard modern edition are schoolbook additions written by an ancient author inferior to Archimedes. The present paper argues for the logical connectedness of Postulates 1–5 to Props. 1–6, by means of a detailed examination of the course of the argument and a re-examination of Eutocius’ remarks. The paper reinterprets the role of the empirical in the early propositions and offers a reading of the contribution of Archimedes’ mechanics to the method of EP 1. (shrink)

Helmholtz’ electrically induced extra mass inside a charged hollow sphere, recently evidenced by Mikhailov, is analogous to Mach’s inertial mass. Existence of a corresponding magnetically induced extra mass in an electron flying around an “autistic magnet” is derived. The overall electro-magnetic effect can be covariantly expressed.

The problem of theoretical equivalence is traditionally understood as the problem of specifying when superficially dissimilar accounts of the world are reformulations of a single underlying theory. One important strategy for answering this question has been to appeal to formal relations between theoretical structures. This article presents two reasons to think that such an approach will be unsuccessful and suggests an alternative account of theoretical equivalence, based on the notion of interpretive equivalence, in which the problem is merely an instance (...) of a broader problem in the philosophy of physics. I thus conclude that there is no distinctive problem of theoretical equivalence at all. Two difficulties my approach raises for realist replies to the threat of underdetermination are then discussed, with particular emphasis on a recent reply by Norton. 1 Introduction2 Methodological Confusion3 Asymmetrical Equivalence3.1 Maxwell’s field equations3.2 Classical Lagrangian dynamics4 Formal Approaches: Quine and Glymour5 Theoretical Equivalence as Interpretive Equivalence6 Theoretical Equivalence without Interpretive Judgement?7 Lessons for Underdetermination. (shrink)

This paper takes an integrated history and philosophy of science approach to the topic of "simplicity out of complexity". The reflex theory was a framework within early twentieth century psychology and neuroscience which aimed to decompose complex behaviours and neural responses into simple reflexes. It was controversial in its time, and did not live up to its own theoretical and empirical ambitions. Examination of this episode poses important questions about the limitations of simplifying strategies, and the relationship between simplification and (...) the engineering approach to biology. (shrink)

Opponents of ceteris paribus laws are apt to complain that the laws are vague and untestable. Indeed, claims to this effect are made by Earman, Roberts and Smith in this volume. I argue that these kinds of claims rely on too narrow a view about what kinds of concepts we can and do regularly use in successful sciences and on too optimistic a view about the extent of application of even our most successful non-ceteris paribus laws. When it comes to (...) testing, we test ceteris paribus laws in exactly the same way that we test laws without the ceteris paribus antecedent. But at least when the ceteris paribus antecedent is there we have an explicit acknowledgment of important procedures we must take in the design of the experiments — i.e., procedures to control for “all interferences” even those we cannot identify under the concepts of any known theory. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that (at least many) philosophical thought experiments are unreliable. But I argue that this notion of unreliability has to be understood relative to the goal of thought experiments as knowledge producing. And relative to that goal many thought experiments in science are just as unreliable. But in fact thought experiments in science play a varied role and I will suggest that knowledge production is a goal only under quite limited circumstances. I defend the view that (...) these circumstances can (sometimes) arise in philosophy as well. (shrink)

Both physicists and philosophers claim that quantum mechanics reduces to classical mechanics as 0, that classical mechanics is a limiting case of quantum mechanics. If so, several formal and non-formal conditions must be satisfied. These conditions are satisfied in a reduction using the Wigner transformation to map quantum mechanics onto the classical phase plane. This reduction does not, however, assist in providing an adequate metaphysical interpretation of quantum theory.

Complex organisms thwart the simple rectilinear causality paradigm of “necessary and sufficient,” with its experimental strategy of “knock down and overexpress.” This Essay organizes the eccentricities of biology into four categories that call for new mathematical approaches; recaps for the biologist the philosopher's recent refinements to the causation concept and the mathematician's computational tools that handle some but not all of the biological eccentricities; and describes overlooked insights that make causal properties of physical hierarchies such as emergence and downward causation (...) straightforward. Reviewing and extrapolating from similar situations in physics, it is suggested that new mathematical tools for causation analysis incorporating feedback, signal cancellation, nonlinear dependencies, physical hierarchies, and fixed constraints rather than instigative changes will reveal unconventional biological behaviors. These include “eigenisms,” organisms that are limited to quantized states; trajectories that steer a system such as an evolving species toward optimal states; and medical control via distributed “sheets” rather than single control points. (shrink)

Complex organisms thwart the simple rectilinear causality paradigm of “necessary and sufficient,” with its experimental strategy of “knock down and overexpress.” This Essay organizes the eccentricities of biology into four categories that call for new mathematical approaches; recaps for the biologist the philosopher's recent refinements to the causation concept and the mathematician's computational tools that handle some but not all of the biological eccentricities; and describes overlooked insights that make causal properties of physical hierarchies such as emergence and downward causation (...) straightforward. Reviewing and extrapolating from similar situations in physics, it is suggested that new mathematical tools for causation analysis incorporating feedback, signal cancellation, nonlinear dependencies, physical hierarchies, and fixed constraints rather than instigative changes will reveal unconventional biological behaviors. These include “eigenisms,” organisms that are limited to quantized states; trajectories that steer a system such as an evolving species toward optimal states; and medical control via distributed “sheets” rather than single control points. (shrink)

The primary purpose of the paper is to try to prove that it is impossible to write or understand history without making epistemological and ontological assumptions, In particular assumptions about whether physical objects and processes are within or beyond the limits of what can be made empirical or conscious.

With the advent of the relativity theory science has entered a transformative period in which previous certainties are undergoing critical scrutiny and renovation. Critical movements in science arise at periods of its history when its foundations are brought into question. True it is that natural philosophers still regard science as a growing body of propositions dealing with natural events enabling them to find the structural laws of the external world. But this “external world” about them changes in significance, interpretation, and (...) meaning as new epoch-making theories are propounded and experimental verification of some of their consequences tend to give them scientific plausibility. (shrink)

This is a short, nontechnical introduction to features of time in classical and relativistic physics and their representation in the four-dimensional geometry of spacetime. Topics discussed include: the relativity of simultaneity in special and general relativity; the ‘twin paradox’ and differential aging effects in special and general relativity; and time travel in general relativity.

While many take Newton's argument for absolute space to be an inference to the best explanation, some argue that Newton is primarily concerned with the proper definition of true motion, rather than with independent existence of spatial points. To an extent the latter interpretation is correct. However, all prior interpretations are mistaken in thinking that 'absolute motion' is defined as motion with respect to absolute space. Newton is also using this notion to refer to the quantity of motion (momentum). This (...) reading reveals a misunderstood argument for absolute space, according to which absolute space is necessary for a workable definition of momentum. (shrink)

In the end of the nineteenth century, there was a remarkable ‘empiricist attitude’ found among certain philosopher-scientists, an attitude which arguably emerged in the main as a reaction to the anti-scientific mood prevalent in the culture that time. Those philosopher-scientists, such as Mach and Hertz, were particularly anxious to emphasize and laud the privileged status of the empirical dimension ofour scientific knowledge, distinguishing it carefully from the theoretical constructions and hypothetical entities that are ordinarily posited by scientists. Yet, as I (...) exhibit in this article, there were certain crucial philosophical differences between these two thinkers with respect to their general conception of scientific theories and scientific norms guiding the activity. I suggest further that the most central difference in this context between Mach and Hertz can justifiably (and, perhaps, more fruitfully) be articulated and reckoned in traditional andcontemporary epistemological terms. (shrink)

A full appreciation for Ernst Mach's doctrine of the economy of thought must take account of his direct realism about particulars (elements) and his anti-realism about space-time laws as economical constructions. After a review of thought economy, its critics and some contemporary forms, the paper turns to the philosophical roots of Mach's doctrine. Mach claimed that the simplest, most parsimonious theories economized memory and effort by using abstract concepts and laws instead of attending to the details of each individual event (...) or experiment. For Mach, the individual case never truly repeated in all of its uniqueness, nor was all of the individual detail of a physical element adequately captured in abstract laws and schemata, however necessary these were for the pursuit of science. As can be shown from specific passages, some already published, some not, Mach's elements included physical qualia in nature similar to Russell's unsensed sensibilia, which existed even where there were no conscious observers. An argument will be presented to make the case that Mach believed in the mind-independent elements from the 1870s on, while other aspects of his thought evolved over time; I have thus dated the references to reflect this historical progression. I concentrate on Mach's ontology, as it bears on economy of thought, not his epistemology per se, which might well have been restricted to observable elements/sensations. After his own conversion to neutral monism, in the 1920s, Bertrand Russell echoed Mach's call for a 'future science' capable of handling the 'intrinsic character' of qualitative data directly without the excessive abstraction of physics. (shrink)

Neutral monism is a position in metaphysics defended by Mach, James, and Russell in the early twentieth century. It holds that minds and physical objects are essentially two different orderings of the same underlying neutral elements of nature. This paper sets out some of the central concepts, theses and the historical background of ideas that inform this doctrine of elements. The discussion begins with the classic neutral monism of Mach, James, and Russell in the first part of the paper, then (...) considers recent neo-Russellian versions in the second half. The chances for a revival of neutral monism are probably slight; its key ideas and starting points lie far from those in contemporary philosophy of mind. A better route might be through the philosophy of science and a deeper understanding of causation. (shrink)

List of Illustrations Introduction 1 The Didactic and the Elegant: Some Thoughts on Scientific and Technological Illustrations in the Middle Ages and Renaissance 3 2 Temples of the Body and Temples of the Cosmos: Vision and Visualization in the Vesalian and Copernican Revolutions 40 3 Descartes’s Scientific Illustrations and ’la grande mecanique de la nature’ 86 4 Illustrating Chemistry 135 5 Representations of the Natural System in the Nineteenth Century 164 6 Visual Representation in Archaeology: Depicting the Missing-Link in Human (...) Origins 184 7 Towards an Epistemology of Scientific Illustration 215 8 Illustration and Inference 250 9 Visual Models and Scientific Judgment 269 10 Are Pictures Really Necessary? The Case of Sewall Wright’s ’Adaptive Landscapes’ 303 Bibliography 339 Notes on Contributors 373 Index 377. (shrink)

The unique role of the second derivative of position with respect to time in classical mechanics is investigated. It is indicated that mechanics might have been developed around other order derivatives. Examples based on $\overset \ldots \to{x}$ and $\overset....\to{x}$ are presented. Kirchhoff's argument for using ẍ is given and generalized.

What were the true reasons of the second scientific revolution? – To answer the question, the epistemic model is applied, according to which radical breakthroughs in science were not due to the fanciful excogitation of new ideas ‘ex nihilo’, but rather to the tedious, long-term and troublesome processes of the mutual lapping, reconciliation, interpenetration and intertwinement of ‘old’ research traditions preceding such breaks. It is contended that Einstein's 'annus mirabilis' constituted an acme of the second scientific revolution. To fathom in (...) what felicitous ways Einstein's 1905 writings hang together one is bound to pay special tribute to his longed strive for unity evinced in incessant attempts to coordinate the profound research traditions of classical physics. Though Einstein's efforts sprung out of Max Planck's pioneering attempts to comprehend electromagnetic phenomena through the lenses of conceptual structures of statistical thermodynamics . It was Planck, who clearly realized the cross-contradiction between 'the physics of material bodies’ and ‘the physics of the ether' and outlined the sketch of its withdrawal: the paradigms 'must be modified to remain compatible'. And it was Planck who took the first step in modifying the physics of the ether and contending that 'not only matter itself but also the effects radiated from matter' possess discontinuous properties, which can be characterized by a new natural constant: the elementary quantum of action. Einstein's part consisted in that he took the second step in modifying the second component of the encounter – the physics of material bodies. Einstein’s foolhardy light quanta hypothesis and distinctive special theory of relativity turn out to be mere milestones of the unwinding of Maxwellian electrodynamics and statistical thermodynamics reconcilement research program. The notorious conception of luminiferous ether was a substantial obstacle for Einstein’s wayward statistical thermodynamics in which the pivotal lead was played by flagrant light quanta paper. Einstein was aware that his enticing light quanta hypothesis was too audacious to be taken literally and he laid out his version of 'electrodynamics of moving bodies' in a markedly Machian/ Duhemian, phenomenological way. As a result of the revision of the second scientific revolution key episode, the arguments are exhibited in favor of the necessity to modify the history of the genesis of general relativity; correspondingly, the process of unification of electromagnetic and weak interactions that took place in the second half of the XX-th century is scrutinized. Eventually, the encounter and interpenetration of the two dominating research traditions of modern physics – that of general relativity and quantum field theory – is elicited. (shrink)

semantic minimalism and moderte contextualism.

I set out the factors which tempt people into reading Ernst Mach's book The Analysis of Sensations as putting forward either a version of phenomenalism or a version of neutral monism, and then assess the strengths and weaknesses of these two readings. I present an ‘internal’ view of that text, showing that it by no means mandates the phenomenalist reading, and that a case for something more like the neutral monist reading can be made from within that book, indeed largely (...) from within its famous first chapter. (shrink)

The paper compares dispositionalism about laws of nature with primitivism. It argues that while the distinction between these two positions can be drawn in a clear-cut manner in classical mechanics, it is less clear in quantum mechanics, due to quantum non-locality. Nonetheless, the paper points out advantages for dispositionalism in comparison to primitivism also in the area of quantum mechanics, and of contemporary physics in general.

This inaugural handbook documents the distinctive research field that utilizes history and philosophy in investigation of theoretical, curricular and pedagogical issues in the teaching of science and mathematics. It is contributed to by 130 researchers from 30 countries; it provides a logically structured, fully referenced guide to the ways in which science and mathematics education is, informed by the history and philosophy of these disciplines, as well as by the philosophy of education more generally. The first handbook to cover the (...) field, it lays down a much-needed marker of progress to date and provides a platform for informed and coherent future analysis and research of the subject. -/- The publication comes at a time of heightened worldwide concern over the standard of science and mathematics education, attended by fierce debate over how best to reform curricula and enliven student engagement in the subjects There is a growing recognition among educators and policy makers that the learning of science must dovetail with learning about science; this handbook is uniquely positioned as a locus for the discussion. -/- The handbook features sections on pedagogical, theoretical, national, and biographical research, setting the literature of each tradition in its historical context. Each chapter engages in an assessment of the strengths and weakness of the research addressed, and suggests potentially fruitful avenues of future research. A key element of the handbook’s broader analytical framework is its identification and examination of unnoticed philosophical assumptions in science and mathematics research. It reminds readers at a crucial juncture that there has been a long and rich tradition of historical and philosophical engagements with science and mathematics teaching, and that lessons can be learnt from these engagements for the resolution of current theoretical, curricular and pedagogical questions that face teachers and administrators. (shrink)

My research into Virtual Reality technology and its central property of immersion has indicated that immersion in Virtual Reality (VR) electronic systems is a significant key to the understanding of contemporary culture as well as considerable aspects of previous culture as detected in the histories of philosophy and the visual arts. The fundamental change in aesthetic perception engendered by immersion, a perception which is connected to the ideal of total-immersion in virtual space, identifies certain shifts in ontology which are relevant (...) to a better understanding of the human being. This understanding was achieved through a broad inquiry into the histories of Virtual Reality, philosophy, and the visual arts and has lead to the formulation of an aesthetic theory of immersive consciousness indicative of immersive culture. The primary subject of this discourse is immersion then: an experience which will be identified within the dissertation as the indispensable characteristic of Virtual Reality. The understanding of immersion arrived at here will be used to fashion a synchronous theory of art particularly informed by encounters and concepts of immersion into virtuality. To sufficiently address this subject in a scholarly fashion, I have researched, found and accumulated aesthetic and philosophic examples of immersive tendencies, as found within the histories of art and philosophy, which subsequently contributed towards the articulation of what I have come to call immersive consciousness. As a result of formulating such an immersive consciousness, a good deal of the basis for the questioning of the Western ontological tradition has been found in the Western tradition itself when we look with new eyes and ask new uncertain questions. Moreover, this immersive consciousness will be used to propose some abstract questions encircling today's electronic-based culture. Through the structuring of the argument within the thesis - and overtly within the conclusion - I have articulated a non-teleological creative strategy which provides the basis for an unconstraining integration of noologies (ways of semblancing the thinking process). This strategy provides a means of exemplifying - and for honoring - various methods of thinking. This structuring strategy is consistent with the 'hacker ethic' as defined by Steven Levy, as a demand that access to computers - and anything which might teach us something about the way the world works - should be unlimited and total. To follow this strategy, this dissertation has set out to understand how topical conceptions of virtual immersion connect to pre-existing systems of thought as revealed in art as they have extended out of antecedent ontological self-understandings, historical human self-understandings which have evidenced themselves in the elaboration of technological objectives. To do this I have forged a certain rhizomatic paternity/maternity for Virtual Reality within this dissertation by joining choice immersive examples of simulacra technology into mental connections with the relevant examples culled from the histories of art, architecture, information-technology, sex, myth, space, consciousness and philosophy. (shrink)

This book proposes to identify three long-term structures in causal reasoning - in particular, in terms of the relationship between cause and identity - that appear to be of value in categorizing and organizing various trends in philosophical thought.<br>Such conceptual schemes involve a host of philosophical dilemmas (such as the problem of relativism), which are examined in the first chapter. A number of naturalistic and transcendental approaches to this problem are also analysed.<br>In particular, the book attempts to construct a theoretical (...) basis for Foucault's tripartite classification of epistemological structures in European thought.<br>The final chapter attempts to buttress the above schema by extending the analysis from cause and identity to growth, change, and stability, critiquing certain ideas of Foucault and Heidegger, as well as examining the contemporary thought of process philosophy and complexity theory.<br><br>Contents<br><br>Contents: Plurality and Causality - What is a Paradigm? - Paradigms and Causal Structure - Universality and Mathesis Universalis - Temporality and Visibility - Classical and Modern Probability Theory - The Environment and Non-Monotonicity - The Marburg School and the Limit Concept; Foucault's concept of 'Man' - Nineteenth Century Philosophy of Science - A Dynamic Model - Foucault and the Birth of the Clinic - Process, Growth and Complexity - Time and History. (shrink)

The concept of time is examined using the second law of thermodynamics that was recently formulated as an equation of motion. According to the statistical notion of increasing entropy, flows of energy diminish differences between energy densities that form space. The flow of energy is identified with the flow of time. The non-Euclidean energy landscape, i.e. the curved space–time, is in evolution when energy is flowing down along gradients and levelling the density differences. The flows along the steepest descents, i.e. (...) geodesics are obtained from the principle of least action for mechanics, electrodynamics and quantum mechanics. The arrow of time, associated with the expansion of the Universe, identifies with grand dispersal of energy when high-energy densities transform by various mechanisms to lower densities in energy and eventually to ever-diluting electromagnetic radiation. Likewise, time in a quantum system takes an increment forwards in the detection-associated dissipative transformation when the stationary-state system begins to evolve pictured as the wave function collapse. The energy dispersal is understood to underlie causality so that an energy gradient is a cause and the resulting energy flow is an effect. The account on causality by the concepts of physics does not imply determinism; on the contrary, evolution of space–time as a causal chain of events is non-deterministic. (shrink)

It is often said that the best system account of laws needs supplementing with a theory of perfectly natural properties. The ‘strength’ and ‘simplicity’ of a system is language-relative and without a fixed vocabulary it is impossible to compare rival systems. Recently a number of philosophers have attempted to reformulate the BSA in an effort to avoid commitment to natural properties. I assess these proposals and argue that they are problematic as they stand. Nonetheless, I agree with their aim, and (...) show that if simplicity is interpreted as ‘compression’, algorithmic information theory provides a framework for system comparison without the need for natural properties. (shrink)

Our goal is to investigate the biological correlates of the first-person experience of time or phenomenal time. ‘Time’ differs in various domains, such as (i) physical time (e.g., clock time), (ii) biological time, such as the suprachiasmatic nucleus, and (iii) the perceptual rate of time. One psychophysical-measure of the perceptual rate is the critical flicker frequency (CFF), in which a flashing light is perceived as unchanging. Focusing on the inability to detect change, as in CFF, may give us insight into (...) phenomenal time. CFF varies from 24 Hz for dim light and 60 Hz in bright light and is lower for colored lights. We propose that problem of the phenomenal time can be addressed using two contrasting but complementary approaches (inability to detect changes vs. ability to detect changes): (1) The soliton-catalytic model that entails invariant quantum coherent state for temporal frequencies (TFs) >= CFF, where flickering light is perceived as unchanging, similar to a Bose-Einstein condensate (BEC). (2) Temporal frequency tuned mechanisms model, which starts with ability to detect changes for TFs < CFF and then their sensitivities decreases to zero at CFF. For a subject who has CFF of 60 Hz, the duration of one cycle or time-period of the flickering light is approximately 16.7 ms. Phenomenal time may be quantized into ‘subjective occasions of experience’ (SE), which arise out of the interaction of the individual with situation (environment). Pioneering work examining the complex interaction of neurons suggests the possibility that macroscopic quantum states similar to a BEC may also occur in the brain (Davia, 2006; Freeman & Vitiello, 2006; Georgiev, 2004; Vimal & Davia, 2008) . (shrink)

Peter Dear ha proporcionado recientemente un análisis de la transformación que sufrió el recurso a la experiencia en la filosofía natural del siglo XVll. De la experiencia de lo cotidiano se pasa a la descripción detallada de una experiencia artificial irrepetible, localizada espacio-temporalmente y producida por instrumentos más o menos complejos. EI artículo explora dicha interpretación en referencia a la construcción de la ciencia del movimiento de Galileo, mediante un análisis dcl experimento del plano inclinado que se describe en los (...) Discorsi y un manuscrito, y concluye que la interpretacion de Dear dificulta considerablemente la caracterización de la práctica de Galileo.Peter Dear has recently put forward an analysis of th transformation underwent by the appeal to experience in Seventeenth-Century natural philosophy. According to Dear, this transformation lies in the change from common experience to the detailed description of an unrepeatable artificial experience space temporally located and produced by more or less sophisticated instruments. This paper explores Dear’s interpretation with regard to the construction of Galileo’s science of motion, by analyzing the celebrated inclined plane experiment described in the Discorsi as well as one of Galileo's manuscripts and concludes that Dear’s interpretation makes very difficult the characterization of Galileo’s practice. (shrink)

Düşünce deneylerine bilimlerde sıkça rastlanmaktadır. Bu deneylerin kullanımı her ne kadar Sokrates öncesi döneme kadar götürülebilse de, on yedinci yüzyılın başından itibaren Galileo, Newton ve Leibniz gibi bilim adamları bu zihinsel araçların önemini kavramıştır. Günümüzde ise, şüphesiz görelilik fiziği ve kuantum mekaniğinde düşünce deneyleri merkezi bir role sahiptir. Bu makalenin amacı bilimsel akılyü-rütmenin bu önemli aracını felsefi bir noktadan hareketle incelemektir. İlk olarak düşünce deneylerine ilişkin kısa bir tarihsel arka plan sağlayarak, bilimlerde kullanımı ele alacağım. Daha sonra iyi bilinen bir (...) düşünce deneyi örneği üzerinden bu deneylerin sergilediği temel özellikleri göstereceğim. Son olarak, düşünce deneylerinin sahip olduğu birçok temel işlevi bazı örnekler üzerinden inceleyeceğim. (shrink)

One of the challenges faced by philosophers throughout history of philosophical thoughts, has always been and is to find an adequate answer to the question of quiddity and existence of time and space. Thus, the present study aims to elaborate on the question of space and time in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy and its relationship with outcomes of modern physics. The study also intends to conduct an analytical comparison between these two views and clarify newer aspects of this complicated and vague (...) question. According to principles of his thought system in his ontology and particularly his theory of substantial motion, Mulla Sadra’s view toward time has a closer concordance with findings of modern physicists like Albert Einstein. One of the most noticeable achievements of the present paper, considering ontological view of Mulla Sadra toward time, is to reach a comprehensive and vast view of the question of space and time covering space-time approach of theory of relativity and having the common issue of time in mind, develops an image of unity and connectivity of the world of nature with the four dimensions. The present study uses a documentary analysis research and uses library resources. The prominent works of Mulla Sadra and Einstein’ works on the Theory of Relativity were the main sources for this study. It is hoped that this view not only reveals further philosophical aspects of the issue of time but also help uncover newer approaches for physicists. (shrink)

The paper provides a thorough account of the relationship between Ernst Mach’s thought and that of an apparently more intellectually distant near-contemporary, Friedrich Nietzsche. The consistency of their views is in fact substantial, as I try to show within the paper. Despite their interests being different, both Mach and Nietzsche were concerned with the same issues about our intellectual relationship with the external world, dealing with the same questions and pursuing a common aim of eliminating worn-out philosophical conceptions. Moreover, it (...) can be argued that both Mach and Nietzsche converged on what we now know as the problem of realism versus anti-realism in the philosophy of science, and that they both rejected ‘representational’ (realist) conceptions of science in favour of a certain sort of pragmatic anti-realism, whose focus was on the role science plays as a means of orientation. (shrink)

The objective of this dissertation is to write the first pages of the biography of paleobiological data. I will focus on i) the genesis of this kind of data as it emerged in German stratigraphy and paleontology between the mid 19th and the early 20th centuries and ii) how the conceptualization of the paleontological data was reformulated and taken as the starting point for studying the patterns of the diversity of life in deep time between the 1940s and 70s. This (...) is the turning point that marks the ‘coming into being’ of specifically paleobiological data. I will reconstruct in detail how it was possible to transform an incomplete and misleading material object — the fossil record that can be admired in a museum —into a no longer misleading source of knowledge. I will namely describe the genesis of the paleobiological practice by retracing the encounter of two different approaches to the fossil record between the mid 19th and early 20th centuries in German academia and their later diffusion into English-speaking countries. (shrink)

This dissertation aims at a systemic presentation of Neurath’s thinking as a coherent and sui generis whole. In order to satisfy this desideratum, the main idea put forth in this dissertation is that a specific two-way relation holds between two of Neurath’s main philosophical theses: Semantic Coherentism: a sentence is true if, and only if, it belongs to, or can be deduced from, a coherent set of sentences. Sociological Relativism: the value of a social change depends on how it influences (...) the living conditions of a certain group of individuals. The two-way relation is the following: from the reconstructive point of view, Neurathian semantic coherentism entails his sociological relativism; but, from the point of view of the conceptual structure underlying Neurath’s thinking, it is his sociological relativism that entails his semantic coherentism. We thus arrive at a virtuous circle. On the one hand, the appeal to sociological relativism (together with Neurath’s first order sociological commitments) allows us to explain his view of science; on the other hand, only once we have acquired a justification for sociological relativism, via his theory of truth, are we entitled to explain his view of science in this way. The exposition will be guided by the attempt to find an answer to the three following questions: (i) Does Neurath accept the standard threefold definition of knowledge? (ii) What kind of coherentism is endorsed by Neurath? (iii) Is Neurath’s coherentism compatible with empiricism? The answer to the first question will be negative. It will be argued that radical physicalism (i.e. the conjunction between physicalism and epistemic naturalism) entails the rejection of this definition. The answer to the second question will amount to showing that Neurath’s endorsement of semantic coherentism does not entail, as it is sometimes stated, the endorsement of epistemic coherentism. Finally, the third question will be answered negatively by showing that, given Neurath’s theory of protocol sentences, his coherentism and his empiricism are compatible. The exegetical work prompted by the need to answer these questions will provide us with the elements we need in order to substantiate the main idea mentioned above. (shrink)

This paper serves to introduce the papers from the symposium by the same title, by describing the sort of work done in philosophy of psychology conceived as a branch of the philosophy of science, distinguishing it from other discussions of psychology in philosophy, and criticizing the claims to set limits on scientific psychology in the largely psychologically uninformed literatures concerning "folk psychology' and "wide" and "narrow" content. Philosophy of psychology as philosophy of science takes seriously and analyzes the explanatory structures, (...) conceptual problems, and evidentiary practices of extant scientific psychology. (shrink)