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Mathematical Epistemology

The Monist 67 (1):46-55 (1984)

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  1. Non-ontological Structuralism†.Michael Resnik - 2019 - Philosophia Mathematica 27 (3):303-315.
    ABSTRACT Historical structuralist views have been ontological. They either deny that there are any mathematical objects or they maintain that mathematical objects are structures or positions in them. Non-ontological structuralism offers no account of the nature of mathematical objects. My own structuralism has evolved from an early sui generis version to a non-ontological version that embraces Quine’s doctrine of ontological relativity. In this paper I further develop and explain this view.
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  • Mathematics. A science of patterns?Gianluigi Oliveri - 1997 - Synthese 112 (3):379-402.
    The present article aims at showing that it is possible to construct a realist philosophy of mathematics which commits one neither to dream the dreams of Platonism nor to reduce the word ''realism'' to mere noise. It is argued that mathematics is a science of patterns, where patterns are not objects (or properties of objects), but aspects, or aspects of aspects, etc. of objects. (The notion of aspect originates from ideas sketched by Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations.).
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  • Benacerraf, Field, and the agreement of mathematicians.Eileen S. Nutting - 2020 - Synthese 197 (5):2095-2110.
    Hartry Field’s epistemological challenge to the mathematical platonist is often cast as an improvement on Paul Benacerraf’s original epistemological challenge. I disagree. While Field’s challenge is more difficult for the platonist to address than Benacerraf’s, I argue that this is because Field’s version is a special case of what I call the ‘sociological challenge’. The sociological challenge applies equally to platonists and fictionalists, and addressing it requires a serious examination of mathematical practice. I argue that the non-sociological part of Field’s (...)
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  • To bridge Gödel’s gap.Eileen S. Nutting - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2133-2150.
    In “Mathematical Truth,” Paul Benacerraf raises an epistemic challenge for mathematical platonists. In this paper, I examine the assumptions that motivate Benacerraf’s original challenge, and use them to construct a new causal challenge for the epistemology of mathematics. This new challenge, which I call ‘Gödel’s Gap’, appeals to intuitive insights into mathematical knowledge. Though it is a causal challenge, it does not rely on any obviously objectionable constraints on knowledge. As a result, it is more compelling than the original challenge. (...)
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  • (1 other version)Epistemic logicism & Russell's regressive method.A. D. Irvine - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 55 (3):303 - 327.
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