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  1. Moral Enhancement and Moral Freedom: A Critique of the Little Alex Problem.John Danaher - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 83:233-250.
    A common objection to moral enhancement is that it would undermine our moral freedom and that this is a bad thing because moral freedom is a great good. Michael Hauskeller has defended this view on a couple of occasions using an arresting thought experiment called the 'Little Alex' problem. In this paper, I reconstruct the argument Hauskeller derives from this thought experiment and subject it to critical scrutiny. I claim that the argument ultimately fails because (a) it assumes that moral (...)
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  • The Character Development Defense to the Argument From Evil Is Logically Inconsistent.Randall S. Firestone - 2018 - Open Journal of Philosophy 8 (5):444-465.
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  • Does Ordinary Morality Imply Atheism? A Reply to Maitzen.Rob Lovering - 2011 - Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 16 (2):83-98.
    Stephen Maitzen has recently argued that ordinary morality implies atheism. In the following, I argue that the soundness of Maitzen’s argument depends on a principle that is implausible, what I call the Recipient’s Benefit Principle: All else being equal, if an act A produces a net benefit for the individual on the receiving end of A, then one cannot have a moral obligation to prevent A. Specifically, the Recipient’s Benefit Principle (RBP) must be true if premise (2) of Maitzen’s argument (...)
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  • Skeptical Theism and Divine Permission - A Reply to Anderson.John Danaher - 2014 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 75 (2):101-118.
    Skeptical theism (ST) may undercut the key inference in the evidential argument from evil, but it does so at a cost. If ST is true, then we lose our ability to assess the all things considered (ATC) value of natural events and states of affairs. And if we lose that ability, a whole slew of undesirable consequences follow. So goes a common consequential critique of ST. In a recent article, Anderson has argued that this consequential critique is flawed. Anderson claims (...)
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  • Atheism and the Basis of Morality.Stephen Maitzen - 2013 - In A. W. Musschenga & Anton van Harskamp (eds.), What Makes Us Moral? Springer. pp. 257-269.
    People in many parts of the world link morality with God and see good ethical values as an important benefit of theistic belief. A recent survey showed that Americans, for example, distrust atheists more than any other group listed in the survey, this distrust stemming mainly from the conviction that only believers in God can be counted on to respect morality. I argue against this widespread tendency to see theism as the friend of morality. I argue that our most serious (...)
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  • Skeptical Theism and Value Judgments.David James Anderson - 2012 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 72 (1):27-39.
    One of the most prominent objections to skeptical theism in recent literature is that the skeptical theist is forced to deny our competency in making judgments about the all-things-considered value of any natural event. Some skeptical theists accept that their view has this implication, but argue that it is not problematic. I think that there is reason to question the implication itself. I begin by explaining the objection to skeptical theism and the standard response to it. I then identify an (...)
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  • Ordinary Morality Does Not Imply Atheism.T. Ryan Byerly - 2018 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 83 (1):85-96.
    Many theist as well as many atheist philosophers have maintained that if God exists, then every instance of undeserved, unwanted suffering ultimately benefits the sufferer. Recently, several authors have argued that this implication of theism conflicts with ordinary morality. I show that these arguments all rest on a common mistake. Defenders of these arguments overlook the role of merely potential instances of suffering in determining our moral obligations toward suffering.
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  • Egoism or the Problem of Evil: A Dilemma for Sceptical Theism.Benjamin T. Rancourt - 2013 - Religious Studies 49 (3):313-325.
    Sceptical theists undermine the argument from evil by claiming that our ability to distinguish between justified and unjustified evil is weak enough that we must take seriously the possibility that all evil is justified. However, I argue that this claim leads to a dilemma: either our judgements regarding unjustified evil are reliable enough that the problem of evil remains a problem, or our judgements regarding unjustified evil are so unreliable that it would be misguided to use them in our decision-making. (...)
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