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Attitudinal Ambivalence: Moral Uncertainty for Non-Cognitivists

Nicholas Makins

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (3):580-594 (2022)

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Can Moral Anti-Realists Theorize?Michael Zhao - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (3):693-709.details Call ‘radical moral theorizing’ the project of developing a moral theory that not only tries to conform to our existing moral judgments, but also manifests various theoretical virtues: consistency, simplicity, explanatory depth, and so on. Many moral philosophers assume that radical moral theorizing does not require any particular metaethical commitments. In this paper, I argue against this assumption. The most natural justification for radical moral theorizing presupposes moral realism, broadly construed; in contrast, there may be no justification for radical moral (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Empirical evidence for moral Bayesianism.Haim Cohen, Ittay Nissan-Rozen & Anat Maril - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (4):801-830.details Many philosophers in the field of meta-ethics believe that rational degrees of confidence in moral judgments should have a probabilistic structure, in the same way as do rational degrees of belief. The current paper examines this position, termed “moral Bayesianism,” from an empirical point of view. To this end, we assessed the extent to which degrees of moral judgments obey the third axiom of the probability calculus, ifP(A∩B)=0thenP(A∪B)=P(A)+P(B), known as finite additivity, as compared to degrees of beliefs on the one (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
The balance and weight of reasons.Nicholas Makins - 2023 - Theoria 89 (5):592-606.details The aim of this paper is to provide a detailed characterisation of some ways in which our preferences reflect our reasons. I will argue that practical reasons can be characterised along two dimensions that influence our preferences: their balance and their weight. This is analogous to a similar characterisation of the way in which probabilities reflect the balance and weight of evidence in epistemology. In this paper, I will illustrate the distinction between the balance and weight of reasons, and show (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Uncertainty for Uncertain Decision-Makers.Malvina Ongaro - 2023 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 16 (1):aa–aa.details Download Export citation Bookmark
Metaethical intuitions in lay concepts of normative uncertainty.Maximilian Theisen - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.details Even if we know all relevant descriptive facts about an act, we can still be uncertain about its moral acceptability. Most literature on how to act under such normative uncertainty operates on moral realism, the metaethical view that there are objective moral facts. Lay people largely report anti-realist intuitions, which poses the question of how these intuitions affect their interpretation and handling of normative uncertainty. Results from two quasi-experimental studies (total N = 365) revealed that most people did not interpret (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Uncertain Facts or Uncertain Values? Testing the Distinction Between Empirical and Normative Uncertainty in Moral Judgments.Maximilian Theisen & Markus Germar - 2024 - Cognitive Science 48 (3):e13422.details People can be uncertain in their moral judgments. Philosophers have argued that such uncertainty can either refer to the underlying empirical facts (empirical uncertainty) or to the normative evaluation of these facts itself (normative uncertainty). Psychological investigations of this distinction, however, are rare. In this paper, we combined factor-analytical and experimental approaches to show that empirical and normative uncertainty describe two related but different psychological states. In Study 1, we asked N = 265 participants to describe a case of moral (...) Download Export citation Bookmark

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