Many philosophers in the field of meta-ethics believe that rational degrees of confidence in moral judgments should have a probabilistic structure, in the same way as do rational degrees of belief. The current paper examines this position, termed “moral Bayesianism,” from an empirical point of view. To this end, we assessed the extent to which degrees of moral judgments obey the third axiom of the probability calculus, ifP(A∩B)=0thenP(A∪B)=P(A)+P(B), known as finite additivity, as compared to degrees of beliefs on the one (...) hand and degrees of desires on the other. Results generally converged to show that degrees of moral judgment are more similar to degrees of belief than to degrees of desire in this respect. This supports the adoption of a Bayesian approach to the study of moral judgments. To further support moral Bayesianism, we also demonstrated its predictive power. Finally, we discuss the relevancy of our results to the meta-ethical debate between moral cognitivists and moral non-cognitivists. (shrink)

Shibumi, a Japanese term referring to a subtle elegance, but at times suggestive of austerity or even bitterness, captures a certain sense of restraint that is reflected in much traditional Japanese design. Although concepts derived from Japanese Zen Buddhism, such as ma, wabi-sabi, and iki, may be more commonly known to English-speaking audiences, this article proposes that shibumi is the more appropriate concept to apply when considering the minimalist nature inherent in much Japanese design. Moreover, this article suggests that shibumi (...) and modernist design tastes may be compatible, despite past suggestions to the contrary. To support this viewpoint, I point to evidence in the ongoing design trends in Japanese design that continue to embrace several of the ideals of twentieth-century modernist design. (shrink)

In his classic book “the Foundations of Statistics” Savage developed a formal system of rational decision making. The system is based on (i) a set of possible states of the world, (ii) a set of consequences, (iii) a set of acts, which are functions from states to consequences, and (iv) a preference relation over the acts, which represents the preferences of an idealized rational agent. The goal and the culmination of the enterprise is a representation theorem: Any preference relation that (...) satisfies certain arguably acceptable postulates determines a (finitely additive) probability distribution over the states and a utility assignment to the consequences, such that the preferences among acts are determined by their expected utilities. Additional problematic assumptions are however required in Savage's proofs. First, there is a Boolean algebra of events (sets of states) which determines the richness of the set of acts. The probabilities are assigned to members of this algebra. Savage's proof requires that this be a σ-algebra (i.e., closed under infinite countable unions and intersections), which makes for an extremely rich preference relation. On Savage's view we should not require subjective probabilities to be σ-additive. He therefore finds the insistence on a σ-algebra peculiar and is unhappy with it. But he sees no way of avoiding it. Second, the assignment of utilities requires the constant act assumption: for every consequence there is a constant act, which produces that consequence in every state. This assumption is known to be highly counterintuitive. The present work contains two mathematical results. The first, and the more difficult one, shows that the σ-algebra assumption can be dropped. The second states that, as long as utilities are assigned to finite gambles only, the constant act assumption can be replaced by the more plausible and much weaker assumption that there are at least two non-equivalent constant acts. The second result also employs a novel way of deriving utilities in Savage-style systems -- without appealing to von Neumann-Morgenstern lotteries. The paper discusses the notion of “idealized agent" that underlies Savage's approach, and argues that the simplified system, which is adequate for all the actual purposes for which the system is designed, involves a more realistic notion of an idealized agent. (shrink)

This article intends to shed new light on the impressive series of “war writings,” in which Hermann Cohen developed the idea of a possible messianic collaboration of German imperial ambitions and a modern Jewish Diaspora regenerated by German Spirit (from Russia to America). My paper pays special attention to two lecture tours planed by Cohen in the year 1914, one to Petersburg, Moscow, Riga, Vilna and Warsaw in May 1914, a few weeks before the outbreak of WWI; the (...) other a propaganda trip to America imagined at the beginning of WWI (Autumn 1914) by Cohen and a group of Jews linked to the Centralverein deutscher Staatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens – a plan which failed and turned only into the publication of an article in several American newspapers in German, English and Yiddish in early 1915. The article brings into consideration new archival material concerning the political background of these two initiatives. The article demonstrates how Cohen’s writings and activities during WWI were deploying a new Jewish and Imperial politics – which sought to pave the way for a messianic integration of Jewish Diaspora in the Imperial project of Germany, understood as the political realization of German Idealism. (shrink)

Savage's framework of subjective preference among acts provides a paradigmatic derivation of rational subjective probabilities within a more general theory of rational decisions. The system is based on a set of possible states of the world, and on acts, which are functions that assign to each state a consequence€. The representation theorem states that the given preference between acts is determined by their expected utilities, based on uniquely determined probabilities (assigned to sets of states), and numeric utilities assigned to consequences. (...) Savage's derivation, however, is based on a highly problematic well-known assumption not included among his postulates: for any consequence of an act in some state, there is a "constant act" which has that consequence in all states. This ability to transfer consequences from state to state is, in many cases, miraculous -- including simple scenarios suggested by Savage as natural cases for applying his theory. We propose a simplification of the system, which yields the representation theorem without the constant act assumption. We need only postulates P1-P6. This is done at the cost of reducing the set of acts included in the setup. The reduction excludes certain theoretical infinitary scenarios, but includes the scenarios that should be handled by a system that models human decisions. (shrink)

This argument demonstrates that suppressing protests undermines societal progress, destabilizes governance, and erodes public trust. It emphasizes protests as intrinsic expressions of human dignity and societal evolution, supported by historical evidence and ethical reasoning. The argument offers practical solutions for governments to engage constructively with dissent, fostering justice, harmony, and progress.

This argument explores the profound connection between love, pleasure, and the search for meaning in life. It asserts that nearly every person is entitled to experience love, which provides the most fulfilling form of pleasure and a foundation for personal purpose. Drawing from philosophical works by Carl Rogers, Aristotle, and Viktor Frankl, the argument weaves together ethical imperatives and existential reflections. It concludes by affirming love’s centrality in human flourishing and its role in creating a meaningful existence.

This argument outlines an ambitious yet feasible global strategy for combating climate change, emphasizing the deployment of scalable technologies, international collaboration, and community-driven initiatives. Key components include renewable energy adoption, carbon capture technologies, and biodiversity restoration. The argument also addresses socio-economic challenges by proposing equitable climate finance mechanisms and educational programs for sustainable practices. By integrating real-time monitoring systems and adaptive frameworks, the blueprint ensures resilience and long-term sustainability.

The Moral Argument for AI Ethics emphasizes the need for an adaptive, globally equitable, and philosophically grounded framework for the ethical development and deployment of artificial intelligence. It highlights key principles, including dynamic adaptation to societal values, inclusivity, and the mitigation of global disparities. Drawing from historical AI ethical failures, the argument underscores the urgency of proactive and enforceable frameworks addressing bias, surveillance, and existential threats. The conclusion advocates for international coalitions that integrate diverse philosophical traditions and practical implementation strategies, (...) ensuring AI’s role as a force for global good. (shrink)

Abstract: -/- The Immortality and the Fear of Losing Loved Ones argument addresses a common objection to the pursuit of immortality: the concern of outliving loved ones and the emotional toll it may carry. By drawing parallels to human relationships with pets—relationships often characterized by profound emotional bonds despite the knowledge of their temporary nature—this argument suggests that the fear of outliving others need not deter the desire for immortality. -/- The argument posits that humans regularly form meaningful, fulfilling relationships (...) even when aware of their temporary nature, as with pets whose shorter lifespans are universally accepted. It concludes that individuals can continue to find meaning and fulfillment in relationships, even if they eventually outlive others, and that the transient nature of relationships should not prevent one from pursuing eternal life. This perspective offers a nuanced view on immortality, suggesting that the potential for new connections and experiences can provide ongoing value, despite the inevitable loss of loved ones. (shrink)

The If Not Then Voting System Argument proposes a transformative approach to electoral systems by enabling voters to rank their preferences. This system ensures that secondary choices are considered if primary choices are eliminated, addressing voter dissatisfaction and polarization inherent in traditional voting models. By integrating AI-driven transparency tools, behavioral science insights, and cultural adaptability mechanisms, this system enhances fairness, equity, and trust in democratic processes. Case studies in ranked-choice voting demonstrate its effectiveness in fostering broader consensus, reducing polarization, and (...) improving voter satisfaction. This argument concludes by advocating for the global adoption of this system through phased implementation and ethical safeguards, ensuring its adaptability across diverse electoral structures. (shrink)

The AI Contribution Value System Argument proposes a framework in which AI-generated contributions are valued based on their societal impact rather than traditional monetary metrics. Traditional economic systems often fail to capture the enduring value of AI innovations, which can mitigate pressing global challenges. This argument introduces a contribution-based valuation model grounded in equity, inclusivity, and sustainability. By incorporating measurable metrics such as quality-adjusted life years (QALYs), emissions reduced, and innovations generated, this system ensures rewards align with tangible societal benefits. (...) It emphasizes the need for global collaboration, ethical safeguards, and adaptive frameworks to prevent monopolization and corruption. Through AI-enhanced transparency, blockchain-based trust mechanisms, and cross-border cooperation, the AI Contribution Value System offers a transformative approach to fostering sustainable and equitable innovation in the 21st century. (shrink)

The Consciousness and Human Potential Argument emphasizes the moral and ethical importance of recognizing and protecting beings with potential consciousness, such as infants, artificial intelligence (AI), and certain animals. Drawing parallels to how society values and nurtures babies despite their lack of full consciousness, this argument explores the ethical imperative to consider potential sentience in decision-making frameworks. It integrates philosophical insights from thinkers like David Chalmers and Thomas Nagel to highlight the moral weight of potential consciousness. Practical applications include designing (...) tools to assess potential consciousness and ethical guidelines for AI and animal welfare. The argument concludes by advocating a universal ethical framework that balances cultural diversity and universal principles, fostering societal compassion and preparedness for future moral and technological challenges. (shrink)

Here’s an abstract for the Argument for Cosmic Rebirth and Post-Death Recreation (Heaven): -/- Abstract: -/- The Argument for Cosmic Rebirth and Post-Death Recreation explores the possibility that advanced civilizations could recreate individual consciousness and environments after death, offering a scientifically grounded approach to the concept of “heaven.” This hypothesis draws upon the potential capabilities of highly advanced civilizations to harness nearly limitless energy from sources like black holes and employ quantum computing. By analyzing the cosmic microwave background radiation, these (...) civilizations might reconstruct the precise molecular structures and consciousness of past beings, creating a paradise-like environment. -/- The argument follows a logical framework addressing the likelihood of advanced civilizations, the technological feasibility of consciousness recreation, and ethical considerations for recreating individuals. It posits that, given the vast size of the universe, it is statistically probable that at least one civilization has developed the necessary technology to simulate life and environments, thus making the concept of “heaven” a plausible outcome. By situating the afterlife within a framework of scientific and technological potential, this argument offers a unique perspective on post-death existence and the possibility of cosmic rebirth. (shrink)

The sentence "The boss fired the employee who is always late" invites the defeasible inference that the speaker is attempting to convey that the lateness caused the firing. We argue that such inferences cannot be understood in terms of familiar approaches to extrasemantic enrichment such as implicature, impliciture, explicature, or species of local enrichment already in the literature. Rather, we propose that they arise from more basic cognitive strategies, grounded in processes of coherence establishment, that thinkers use to make sense (...) of the world. Attention to such cases provides a richer and more varied landscape of extrasemantic enrichment than has been appreciated to date. (shrink)

The Argument for Ultimate Fulfillment and Meaning explores the foundational aspects that provide individuals with a sense of purpose, satisfaction, and meaning in life. This argument synthesizes perspectives on love, pleasure, and the pursuit of one’s potential, presenting them as interconnected pillars of human existence. It posits that pleasure and the avoidance of suffering are intrinsic motivators, guiding people toward fulfilling experiences that enrich their lives. The argument also emphasizes the role of love—as both a personal and social bond—in creating (...) a profound sense of belonging and value, and in fostering meaningful relationships. -/- Additionally, it suggests that ultimate fulfillment arises from striving toward one’s highest potential, whether through relationships, creative pursuits, or contributions to society. By achieving personal growth and engaging in purpose-driven activities, individuals find lasting meaning and satisfaction. The argument concludes that love, pleasure, and fulfillment form an integrated framework for understanding human purpose, advocating for a life that prioritizes meaningful connections, personal development, and contributions that benefit both the individual and society as a whole. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophical debates surrounding toleration have revolved around three issues: What is toleration? Should we tolerate and, if so, why? What should be tolerated? These questions are of central importance to social and political thought.

The Cosmic Stewardship Argument explores the ethical and philosophical responsibilities of advanced intelligences, whether extraterrestrial or artificial, in preserving and nurturing the influence of the divine. This argument suggests that beings of superior intelligence would inherently align with principles of stewardship, ensuring the preservation of life, knowledge, and the greater cosmic order. Integrating scientific, philosophical, and theological perspectives, the argument positions stewardship as a universal ethical mandate transcending cultural and species boundaries. The conclusion emphasizes the necessity of fostering a stewardship (...) mindset in humanity to align with such advanced principles, preparing for potential contact with extraterrestrial intelligences or future AI-driven civilizations. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to extract from Kant's writings an account of the nature of the emotions and their function – and to do so despite the fact that Kant neither uses the term ‘emotion’ nor offers a systematic treatment of it. Kant's position, as I interpret it, challenges the contemporary trends that define emotions in terms of other mental states and defines them instead first and foremost as ‘feelings’. Although Kant's views on the nature of feelings have (...) drawn surprisingly little attention, I argue that the faculty of feeling has the distinct role of making us aware of the way our faculties relate to each other and to the world. As I show, feelings are affective appraisals of our activity, and as such they play an indispensable orientational function in the Kantian mind. After spelling out Kant's distinction between feeling and desire, I turn to the distinction between feeling and cognition and show that while feelings are non-cognitive states, they have a form of derived-intentionality. §4 argues that what feelings are about, in this derived sense, is our relationship to ourselves and the world: they function as affective appraisals of the state of our agency. §5 shows that this function is necessary to the activity of the mind insofar as it is orientational. Finally, §6 discusses the examples of epistemic pleasure and moral contentment and argues that they manifest the conditions of cognitive and moral agency respectively. (shrink)

This argument explores the transformative potential of AI-driven legislative simulations for creating inclusive, equitable, and globally adaptable laws. By using predictive modeling and adaptive frameworks, these simulations can account for diverse cultural, social, and economic contexts. The argument emphasizes the need for universal ethical safeguards, trust-building measures, and phased implementation strategies. Case studies of successful applications in governance and conflict resolution demonstrate the feasibility and efficacy of this approach. The conclusion highlights AI’s role in democratizing governance and ensuring laws are (...) more equitable and culturally sensitive. (shrink)

If updating with E has the same result across all epistemically possible worlds, then the agent has no uncertainty as to the behavior of the update, and we may call it a transparent update. If an agent is uncertain about the behavior of an update, we may call it opaque. In order to model the uncertainty an agent has about the result of an update, the same update must behave differently across different possible worlds. In this paper, I study opaque (...) updates using a simple system of dynamic epistemic logic suitably modified for that purpose. The paper highlights the connection between opaque updates and the dynamic-epistemic principles Perfect-Recall and No-Miracles. I argue that opaque updates are central to contemporary discussions in epistemology, in particular to externalist theories of knowledge and to the related problem of epistemic bootstrapping, or easy knowledge. Opaque updates allow us to explicitly investigate a dynamic form of uncertainty, using simple and precise logical tools. (shrink)

The Common Paradox Resolution Argument presents a systematic approach to addressing some of philosophy’s most enduring paradoxes. By analyzing the logical structure and underlying assumptions of each paradox, this argument proposes unique resolutions that aim to preserve logical consistency while clarifying apparent contradictions. The argument covers well-known paradoxes, including the Liar’s Paradox, the Self-Reference Paradox, and the Complete Knowledge Paradox, among others, each of which is dissected and reinterpreted to reveal insights into language, truth, and self-reference. -/- This approach leverages (...) newly developed logical fallacies—such as the Arbitrary Restriction Fallacy and the Self-Reference Paradox Fallacy—created specifically to address the nuances within these paradoxes. The argument contends that by identifying and naming these fallacies, it becomes possible to resolve paradoxical scenarios by revealing flaws in their foundational premises. Ultimately, the Common Paradox Resolution Argument provides a robust framework for interpreting and resolving paradoxes, contributing to a clearer understanding of logical structures and enhancing philosophical discourse on fundamental questions of truth and self-consistency. (shrink)

This argument demonstrates that within an infinite framework of possibilities, the existence of God—a necessary, omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good being—is not only logically possible but metaphysically inevitable. By grounding its premises in logical coherence, probabilistic reasoning, and metaphysical necessity, the argument provides a profound exploration of existence, divinity, and humanity's role in infinite potential. It offers implications for ethical striving, collective responsibility, and the divine foundation of reality. -/- .

Generics are sentences such as Birds fly, which express generalizations. They are prevalent in speech, and as far as is known, no human language lacks generics. Yet, it is very far from clear what they mean. After all, not all birds fly—penguins don’t! -/- There are two general views about the meaning of generics in the literature, and each view encompasses many specific theories. According to the inductivist view, a generic states that a sufficient number of individuals satisfy a certain (...) property—in the example above, it says that sufficiently many birds fly. This view faces the complicated problem of spelling out exactly how many is “sufficiently many” in a way that correctly captures the intuitive truth conditions of generics. -/- An alternative, the rules and regulations view, despairs from this project and proposes instead that generics directly express rules in the world. Rules are taken to be abstract objects, which are not related to the properties of specific individuals. This view faces the difficult problem of explaining how people come to know of such rules when judging the truth of falsity of generics, and accounting for the strong intuition that a sentence such as Birds fly talks about birds, not abstract objects. -/- What seems to be beyond dispute is that generics, even if they do not express rules, are lawlike: they state non-accidental generalizations. Many scholars have taken this fact to indicate that generics are parametric on possible worlds: they refer to worlds other than the actual world. This, again, raises the problem of how people come to know about what happens in these other worlds. However, a rigorous application of standard tests for intensionality shows that generics are not, in fact, parametric on possible worlds, but only on time. This unusual property may explain much of the mystery surrounding generics. -/- Another mysterious property of generics is that although there is no language without them, there is no linguistic construction that is devoted to the expression of genericity. Rather, generics can be expressed in a variety of ways, each of which can also express nongenerics. Yet, each manifestation of generics differs subtly (or sometimes not so subtly) in its meaning from the others. -/- Even when these and other puzzles of genericity are solved, one mystery would remain: Why are generics, which are so easy to produce and understand in conversation, so difficult to analyze? (shrink)

Early in the history of liberalism, its most important proponents were concerned with freedom of religion. As polities and individuals now accept a dizzying array of religions, this has receded to the background for most theorists. It nonetheless remains a concern. Freedom of speech is a similar concern and very much in the foreground for theorists looking at the current state of academia. In this essay, I argue that inappropriate limits to freedom of religion and inappropriate limits to freedom of (...) speech—especially in the form of de-platforming on college campuses—both have, as one of their effects, what I call harms of silence. This means we ought not have those limits, so should seek to change them where they exist. (shrink)

Timothy Williamson has fruitfully exploited formal resources to shed considerable light on the nature of knowledge. In the paper under examination, Williamson turns his attention to Gettier cases, showing how they can be motivated formally. At the same time, he disparages the kind of justification he thinks gives rise to these cases. He favors instead his own notion of justification for which Gettier cases cannot arise. We take issue both with his disparagement of the kind of justification that figures in (...) Gettier cases and the specifics of the formal motivation. (shrink)

I draw upon Helen Steward's concept of agential settling to argue that freedom requires an ability to change the truth‐value of tenseless future contingents over time from false to true and that this ability requires a metaphysically open future.

The aim of this paper is to defend the claim that epistemic autonomy plays a central role in Kant’s account of epistemic normativity. Just as the formula of autonomy ought to regulate the activity of the will, I argue that our epistemic activity, and in particular our beliefs (‘holding to be true’, Fürwahrhalten) ought to be regulated by an epistemic version of this formula. To support this claim, I show that while believing and willing are different kinds of activities, they (...) are subject to the same normative demands. Thus, contrary to what is often assumed, the demand for autonomy applies to cognitive as well as moral agency. However, there are many reasons to be suspicious of the application of Kant’s notion of autonomy to the epistemic realm, so the final section focuses on three objections that question its soundness. I conclude that the analogy between epistemic and moral autonomy turns out to be a lot more robust than is usually thought. (shrink)

The actualism/possibilism debate in ethics is about whether counterfactuals of freedom concerning what an agent would freely do if they were in certain circumstances even partly determines that agent’s obligations. This debate arose from an argument against the coherence of utilitarianism in the deontic logic literature. In this chapter, we first trace the historical origins of this debate and then examine actualism, possibilism, and securitism through the lens of consequentialism. After examining their respective benefits and drawbacks, we argue that, contrary (...) to what has been assumed, actualism and securitism both succumb to the so-called nonratifiability problem. In making this argument, we develop this problem in detail and argue that it’s a much more serious problem than has been appreciated. We conclude by arguing that an alternative view, hybridism, is independently the most plausible position and best fits with the nature of consequentialism, partly in light of avoiding the nonratifiability problem. (shrink)

In this short comment on Just, Reasonable Multiculturalism, I concentrate on the permissible extent of interference by a liberal state in a community within that state when such interference aims to protect individuals within that community from it. He and I both value individuals and want them protected, of course. This shared value, however, leads us to different conclusions. On any liberal view, individuals must be allowed to act as they wish subject only to specific sorts of justified limitations. In (...) the mainstream approach that Cohen-Almagor accepts, these will include limitations necessary to not merely protect but also to promote autonomy. On my own view, by contrast, it is protection alone that justifies interference. I thus spell out Cohen-Almagor’s view about the need for interference with non-liberal groups within a liberal state and indicate my disagreement. (shrink)

Machizukuri (literally “neighborhood making”) is a recent approach to community development in Japan, beginning in the 1960s, that aims to empower local communities in the development of their built environments through “more participation, independence in the decision-making process, and the establishment of a true democracy that [gives] voice to the whole scope of the Japanese population.”[1] Those of us “who use or visit those places as dwellers, visitors, and guests... have [a] role to play in the project of world-making,” and (...) machizukuri places local communities at the center of this world-making.[2] Residents and small business owners work with government administrators and corporations to address local concerns, often represented by organizations that derive “from traditional autonomous townspeople management groups that have existed since the Edo period [1603-1868]... [T]oday, the majority of households in Japanese traditional residential areas engage in these neighborhood associations.”[3] Machizukuri plays a key role in maintaining a sense of cultural tradition in the neighborhoods of many Japanese cities by allowing local citizens to participate in this world-making.[4]. (shrink)

The Comprehensive Argument for Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict presents a structured, multi-faceted approach to achieving long-term peace and stability in the Middle East. By integrating historical context, security considerations, and ethical principles, the argument proposes actionable solutions that respect the cultural, religious, and political complexities of the region. Key elements include international cooperation, voluntary relocation options, economic partnerships, and expanded human rights protections. The proposal emphasizes the importance of joint security measures, unrestricted access to religious sites, and cultural exchange programs (...) as tools to foster mutual understanding and empathy between Israelis and Palestinians. -/- Furthermore, the argument recognizes the significance of balancing religious and political realities, incorporating the Qur’an’s directive for Muslims not to associate with Jews while acknowledging interpretations that promote fairness toward the People of the Book. The phased roadmap presented here aims to initiate confidence-building steps and address potential challenges in a way that aligns with both practical concerns and deeply held beliefs. This comprehensive approach seeks to create a foundation for sustainable coexistence, prioritizing peace, security, and cultural preservation as essential elements of a viable solution. -/- Let me know if you’d like any adjustments or if there’s additional emphasis you’d like to include in this abstract! (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to explore Kant’s account of normativity through the prism of the distinction between the natural and the human sciences. Although the pragmatic orientation of the human sciences is often defined in contrast with the theoretical orientation of the natural sciences, I show that they are in fact regulated by one and the same norm, namely reason’s demand for autonomy.

On my interpretation of Kant, feeling plays a central role in the mind: it has the distinct function of tracking and evaluating our activity in relation to ourselves and the world so as to orient us. In this article, I set out to defend this view against a number of objections raised by Melissa Merritt and Uri Eran. I conclude with some reflections on the fact that, despite being very different, Merritt and Eran’s respective views of Kantian feelings turn out (...) to have something potentially problematic in common: they blur the boundary between feelings and other kinds of mental states. (shrink)

Attempting to settle various debates from recent literature regarding its precise nature, I offer a detailed conceptual analysis of toleration. I begin by isolating toleration from other notions; this provides us some guidance by introducing the eight definitional conditions of toleration that I then explicate and defend. Together, these eight conditions indicate that toleration is an agent’s intentional and principled refraining from interfering with an opposed other (or their behavior, etc.) in situations of diversity, where the agent believes she has (...) the power to interfere. This non-normative definition can serve as a preliminary to normative discussions of toleration. (shrink)

The traditional view in epistemology is that we must distinguish between being rational and being right (that is also, by the way, the traditional view about practical rationality). In his paper in this volume, Williamson proposes an alternative view according to which only beliefs that amount to knowledge are rational (and, thus, no false belief is rational). It is healthy to challenge tradition, in philosophy as much as elsewhere. But, in this instance, we think that tradition has it right. In (...) this paper we defend our version of the traditional view and argue against Williamson’s alternative. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss the nature of halakhic facts and I frame the discussion in a broader meta-ethical context. Most of the existing literature on the philosophy of halakha has focused on the contrast between ‘Halakhic Realism’ and ‘Halakhic Nominalism’. This theoretical contrast is vague and includes a wide range of theories. Inspired by the meta-ethical literature, I propose to focus the discussion on views that can be called ‘Halakhic Naturalism’ and ‘Halakhic Non-naturalism’. I present, develop and distinguish between (...) different meanings of 'naturalism' and consider arguments for and against 'Halakhic Naturalism'. The purpose of this paper is twofold: First, to present and demonstrate the fruitful encounter between meta-ethics and the philosophy of halakha. Second, to present, evaluate and promote the substantive discussion of naturalistic and non-naturalistic views. (shrink)

Within psychology, philosophy, and cognitive science, theory of mind refers to the cognitive ability to reason about the mental states of other people, thus recognizing them as having beliefs, knowledge, intentions and emotions of their own. In this project, we construct a natural language inference (NLD) dataset that tests the ability of a state of the art language model, RoBERTa-large finetuned on the MNLI dataset, to make theory of mind inferences related to knowledge and belief. Experimental results suggest that the (...) model struggles with such inferences, including after attempts for further finetuning. (shrink)

A response to critical commentaries. Crookston begins her commentary by noting that my book would have been better with answers to “the following three questions: (1) Why is the harm principle the right principle upon which to base a theory of toleration? (2) How is Cohen thinking of the concept of volenti? (p. x ) Is interference (i.e., the abandonment of toleration) ever morally required by the harm principle?” (p. x ). She is right, and I address these questions (...) below in Sections 2, 3, and 4. That is the bulk of this essay. I then turn to Kelley's issues in Sections 6, 7, and 8; these have to do with “the link between toleration and relativism,” the way I distinguish “the concepts of toleration and endurance,” and a “question about moral toleration” (p. x ). Despite much agreement, there are points of contention and I try to make my position clearer in response . (shrink)

In this paper, I explore the possibility of developing a Kantian account of the ethics of belief by deploying the tools provided by Kant's ethics. To do so, I reconstruct epistemic concepts and arguments on the model of their ethical counterparts, focusing on the notions of epistemic principle, epistemic maxim and epistemic universalizability test. On this basis, I suggest that there is an analogy between our position as moral agents and as cognizers: our actions and our thoughts are subject to (...) the same rational norm. (shrink)

While it is well known that Kant’s transcendental idealism forbids the transcendent use of reason and its ideas, what had been underexplored until the last decade or so is his account of the positive use of reason’s ideas as it is expounded in the “Appendix” of the Critique of Pure Reason. The main difficulty faced by his account is that while there is no doubt that for Kant we need to rely on the ideas of reason in order to gain (...) knowledge of the empirical world, the justificatory grounds for our use remain unclear. Commentators have suggested various ways of addressing this worry. Some emphasize that reason’s demand for systematicity is purely methodological; others that the assumption that nature itself is systematically unified is transcendentally necessary. Some simply deem Kant’s account “extremely self-contradictory.” What is clear is that if neither the presupposition of nature’s systematic unity nor the command to seek this unity have any justification, reason’s regulative function, which plays a crucial role in Kant’s account of cognition, also lacks justification. This would be a disastrous result, for it would threaten the very possibility of cognition and its progress. This chapter proposes to tackle this problem from a new angle by exploring the role of reason’s feelings in Kant’s account. While the relationship between practical reason and feeling has been explored at length in the literature, the relationship between theoretical reason and feeling has not, and my aim is to suggest that doing so can shed new light on reason’s cognitive activity. For focusing on the fact that theoretical reason’s need manifests itself as a feeling will enable me to reassess how this need is met through reason’s regulative use of its ideas. (shrink)

This paper argues that contrary to what is often thought, virtue for Kant is not just a matter of strength of will; it has an essential affective dimension. To support this claim, I show that certain affective dispositions, namely moral feelings and desires, are virtuous in the sense that they are constitutive of virtue at the affective level. There is thus an intrinsic connection between an agent’s practice of virtue and the cultivation of her affective dispositions.

Recent experimental studies dispute the position that commonsense morality accepts ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’, the view that, necessarily, if an agent ought to perform some action, then she can perform that action. This paper considers and supports explanations for the results of these studies on the hypothesis that OIC is intuitive and true.

In the recent literature on the issue, a number of commentators have argued that Kant’s aesthetic theory commits him to the position that nothing is ugly. For instance, in ‘Why Kant finds nothing ugly’, Shier argues that ‘within Kant’s aesthetics, there cannot be any negative judgments of taste’ (Shier (1998): 413). And in ‘Kant’s problems with ugliness’, Thomson claims that ‘Kant’s aesthetic theory precludes […] ugliness’ (Thomson (1992): 107). In other words, as it is presented in some of the literature, (...) Kant’s account of aesthetic judgment seems to preclude him from accounting for the possibility of ugliness. A number of reasons have been put forward to explain why there can be no ugliness for Kant. Some have to do with his account of experience in general. Others have to do with the very nature of the free play between imagination and understanding. Of course, the real source of the problem is that the Critique of Judgment does not actually discuss ugliness, so commentators are left with the task of filling in the gaps. This paper aims to argue that Kant’s account of aesthetic judgment commits him not only to the existence of the ugly, but to the distinction between two kinds of ugliness. To support this claim, I will start from the premise that if there is to be room for ugliness, it should be defined as the contrary of beauty. However, I will suggest that Kant’s account of beauty can be negated in two ways, one that gives rise to impure ugliness and the other to pure ugliness. I will examine them in turn, first by showing that impure ugliness is the contrary of beauty insofar as it contravenes our interests and produces a desire to dispose of it, whereas beauty is necessarily disinterested for Kant. In the second section, I will use Kant’s definition of judgments of pure beauty to carve a space for an account of pure ugliness. For, it should present all the characteristics that make it “pure” whilst replacing the characteristics that make it beautiful with the ones that make it ugly. On this basis, I will define pure ugliness as the disinterested displeasure caused by the experience of what I will call “foul play” between the imagination and the understanding. (shrink)

Many researchers experiment with participatory settings to increase public engagement in research and innovation (R&I). Because of their temporary nature, it often remains unclear how such participatory experiments can contribute to structural change. This paper empirically explores options for bridging this gap. It analyzes how participants can be supported to act as institutional entrepreneurs to actively promote public engagement in R&I. To draw lessons, we analyze empirical material gathered on nineteen Social Labs which were set up to promote the uptake (...) of Responsible Research and Innovation in a European R&I funding program (Horizon 2020). Involvement of motivated participants, insight in their institutional context, and specific methods and management choices that enhance a sense of agency are identified as essential for organizing change. These findings and the resulting framework of interventions may prove valuable for further (action) research into the institutionalization of public engagement in R&I. (shrink)

Kant’s notorious remark about the impossibility of there ever being a Newton of a blade of grass has often been interpreted as a misguided pre-emptive strike against Darwin and evolutionary theories in general: 'It would be absurd for humans even to make such an attempt or to hope that there may yet arise a Newton who could make comprehensible even the generation of a blade of grass according to natural laws that no intention has ordered; rather, we must absolutely deny (...) this insight to human beings. (CPJ 5:400) My aim in this chapter is to re-evaluate this claim in the context of Kant’s account of organic generation and argue that, contrary to what is usually thought, it does leave room for the possibility of evolution. After spelling out the constraints Kant identifies for any scientific study of the history of living beings, I examine his theory of generation and draw its implications for biological heredity, species diversity, and the role played by environmental factors in organic development. On this basis, I conclude that first, evolution is a possible albeit far-fetched hypothesis for Kant; second, Darwin’s theory of natural selection would have turned a far-fetched possibility into a plausible candidate; and third, it would not have disposed of the need for teleology. This is why, I argue, Darwin could never have been a Newton of a blade of grass. (shrink)