Recent research shows that research programmes (quantitative, qualitative and mixed) in education are not displaced (as suggested by Kuhn) but rather lead to integration. The objective of this study is to present a rationale for mixed methods (integrative) research programs based on contemporary philosophy of science (Lakatos, Giere, Cartwright, Holton, Laudan). This historical reconstruction of episodes from physical science (spanning a period of almost 300 years, 17th to 20th century) does not agree with the positivist image of science. Quantitative data (...) (empirical evidence) by itself, does not facilitate progress (despite widespread belief to the contrary), neither in the physical sciences nor in the social sciences (education) A historical reconstruction shows that both Piaget and Pascual-Leone’s research programs in cognitive psychology, follow the Galilean idealisation quite closely, similar to the research programs of Newton, Mendeleev, Einstein, Thomson, Rutherford, Millikan and Perl in the physical sciences. This relationship does not imply that researchers in education have to emulate research in the physical sciences. A major argument in favor of mixed methods (integrative) research programs is that it provides a rationale for hypotheses, theories, guiding assumptions and presuppositions to compete and provide alternatives. Similar to the physical sciences, this proliferation of hypotheses leads to controversies and rivalries, and thus facilitates the decision making process of the scientific community. It is concluded that mixed methods research programs (not paradigms) in education can facilitate the construction of robust strategies, provided we let the problem situation (as studied by practicing researchers) decide the methodology. (shrink)

Mucho se ha escrito para analizar y dar sentido a dos términos que vienen intrínsecamente unidos, el nacionalismo y la nación. La principal consecuencia positiva de esto ha sido un vasto debate teórico sobre el nacionalismo y la nación que indudablemente los enriquece. La principal consecuencia negativa, por su parte, es que el desarrollo del propio debate, y cómo se ha ido formando, ha recibido poca atención. El objetivo de este artículo es exponer cómo este debate se ha sido desarrollado (...) alrededor de los cuatros paradigmas clásicos del nacionalismo. Para ello, se aplica el esquema kuhniano para saber cuándo, cómo, y por qué se articularon estos paradigmas clásicos en torno a estos dos términos. Con esto se pretende profundizar en la explicación histórica de Moreno Almendral (2015), pero desde la filosofía de la ciencia, desarrollando una visión mucho más detallada del debate en torno al nacionalismo y la nación. (shrink)

Recent research shows that research programmes (quantitative, qualitative and mixed) in education are not displaced (as suggested by Kuhn) but rather lead to integration. The objective of this study is to present a rationale for mixed methods (integrative) research programs based on contemporary philosophy of science (Lakatos, Giere, Cartwright, Holton, Laudan). This historical reconstruction of episodes from physical science (spanning a period of almost 300 years, 17 th to 20 th century) does not agree with the positivist image of science. (...) Quantitative data (empirical evidence) by itself, does not facilitate progress (despite widespread belief to the contrary), neither in the physical sciences nor in the social sciences (education) A historical reconstruction shows that both Piaget and Pascual-Leone's research programs in cognitive psychology, follow the Galilean idealisation quite closely, similar to the research programs of Newton, Mendeleev, Einstein, Thomson, Rutherford, Millikan and Perl in the physical sciences. This relationship does not imply that researchers in education have to emulate research in the physical sciences. A major argument in favor of mixed methods (integrative) research programs is that it provides a rationale for hypotheses, theories, guiding assumptions and presuppositions to compete and provide alternatives. Similar to the physical sciences, this proliferation of hypotheses leads to controversies and rivalries, and thus facilitates the decision making process of the scientific community. It is concluded that mixed methods research programs (not paradigms) in education can facilitate the construction of robust strategies, provided we let the problem situation (as studied by practicing researchers) decide the methodology. (shrink)

In the traditional debate on the dichotomy between dogmatism and criticism in scientific practice (the Popper-Kuhn debate), dogmatism is considered a psychological or ethical attitude of the individual scientist. In this paper, I propose a new interpretation of scientific dogmatism by means of a reconstruction of the pragmatist and Wittgensteinian heritage of Kuhn’s concept of dogmatism. My thesis is that such a revised concept accounts for both the stability of scientific knowledge (against scepticism and ceaseless scientific revolutions), and the importance (...) of doubt and criticism for scientific progress. This is possible only if we consider dogmatism from a social perspective that focuses on scientific communities as the main actors in the history of science. From this point of view, dogmatism is not the unjustified acceptance of particular beliefs, but the blind adherence to the “formal” normative structure of the paradigm. I argue that we have grounded this normative structure in the training process that physics students experience in their formative years, and that Kuhn describes in a similar way to Wittgenstein’s analysis of general linguistic training. Finally, dogmatism does not refer to a system of beliefs, but to a system of norms; not to the specific content of knowledge but to the way that scientific knowledge is authenticated, organised, and transmitted by scientific communities. The institutional structure of science, that is to say its social organisation trough training, textbooks, scientific communities and so on, is a precondition for the organisation of meaningful scientific discourse (i.e. for the production and organisation of empirically verifiable or falsifiable statements). That is the nature of the paradigm: it creates and constrains the possibilities of scientific practice. In normal circumstances, dogmatism and certainty are concerned with such pragmatic a priori, while criticism and doubt are concerned with the empirical statements articulated through it. (shrink)

In this paper I explore possibilities of bringing post-positivist philosophies of empirical science to bear on the dynamics of mathematical development. This is done by way of a convergent accommodation of a mathematical version of Lakatos's methodology of research programmes, and a version of Kuhn's account of scientific change that is made applicable to mathematics by cleansing it of all references to the psychology of perception. The resulting view is argued in the light of two case histories of radical conceptual (...) innovations. (shrink)

Koopman’s book revolves around the notion of transition, which he proposes is one of the central ideas of the pragmatist tradition but one which had not previously been fully articulated yet nevertheless shapes the pragmatist attitude in philosophy. Transition, according to Koopman, denotes “those temporal structures and historical shapes in virtue of which we get from here to there”. One of the consequences of transitionalism is the understanding of critique and inquiry as historical pro...

There are many calls for a definitions personhood, but also many logical and Wittgensteinian reasons to think fulfilling this is unimportant or impossible. I argue that we can consider many contexts as language-games and consider the person as the key player in each. We can then examine the attributes, presuppositions and implications of personhood in those contexts. I use law and therapeutic psychology as two examples of such contexts or language-games. Each correlates with one of the classic “theories” of ethics-deontology (...) and consequentialism. But each is a large enough cluster to consider them as paradigms in a sense related to Thomas Kuhn's notion in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Showing the presuppositions about and “takes” on personhood together with the connections involved in the paradigms deepens the dilemmas we already know to be present. (shrink)

The paper addresses the issue of human diagrammatic reasoning in the context of Euclidean geometry. It develops several philosophical categories which are useful for a description and an analysis of our experience while reasoning with diagrams. In particular, it draws the attention to the role of seeing-as; it analyzes its implications for proofs in Euclidean geometry and ventures the hypothesis that geometrical judgments are analytic and a priori, after all.

Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions is one of the most cited books of the twentieth century. Its iconic and controversial nature has obscured its message. What did Kuhn really intend with Structure and what is its real significance? -/- 1 Introduction -/- 2 The Central Ideas of Structure -/- 3 The Philosophical Targets of Structure -/- 4 Interpreting and Misinterpreting Structure -/- 4.1 Naturalism -/- 4.2 World-change -/- 4.3 Incommensurability -/- 4.4 Progress and the nature of revolutionary change -/- 4.5 (...) Relativism, rationality, and realism -/- 4.6 History and sociology of science -/- 4.7 Wittgenstein -/- 5 After Structure. (shrink)

In this article, I discuss Gadamer's hermeneutic account of understanding as an alternative to Kuhn's incommensurability thesis. After a brief account of Kuhn's aesthetic account and arguments against it, I argue that the linguistic account faces a paradox that results from Kuhn's objectivist account of understanding, and his lack of historical reflexivity. The statement 'Languages are incommensurable' is not a unique view of language, and is thus subject to contest by incommensurable readings. Resolving the paradox requires an account of incommensurability (...) that is self-referentially consistent, open-ended, and historically reflexive whereby we recognize that our very interest in incommensurability is historically conditioned. By meeting these conditions, Gadamer's account of historical understanding offers a middle ground between two extremes: on the one side is the claim that understanding involves becoming a native of an incommensurable language, and on the other side is the rejection of the prospect of understanding a contextually removed language altogether. Gadamer is discussed as a mediator between Kuhn's epistemic and historical projects, and thus paves the way for a new hermeneutics of science. The notions of traditional horizon, historically effected consciousness, the universality of interpretation, alienation, dialogical openness, and the fusion of horizons are also discussed. (shrink)

The main thrust of the argument of this thesis is to show the possibility of articulating a method of construction or of synthesis--as against the most common method of analysis or division--which has always been (so we shall argue) a necessary component of scientific theorization. This method will be shown to be based on a fundamental synthetic logical relation of thought, that we shall call inversion--to be understood as a species of logical opposition, and as one of the basic monadic (...) logical operators. Thus the major objective of this thesis is to This thesis can be viewed as a response to Larry Laudan's challenge, which is based on the claim that ``the case has yet to be made that the rules governing the techniques whereby theories are invented (if any such rules there be) are the sorts of things that philosophers should claim any interest in or competence at.'' The challenge itself would be to show that the logic of discovery (if at all formulatable) performs the epistemological role of the justification of scientific theories. We propose to meet this challenge head on: a) by suggesting precisely how such a logic would be formulated; b) by demonstrating its epistemological relevance (in the context of justification) and c) by showing that a) and b) can be carried out without sacrificing the fallibilist view of scientific knowledge. OBJECTIVES: We have set three successive objectives: one general, one specific, and one sub-specific, each one related to the other in that very order. (A) The general objective is to indicate the clear possibility of renovating the traditional analytico-synthetic epistemology. By realizing this objective, we attempt to widen the scope of scientific reason or rationality, which for some time now has perniciously been dominated by pure analytic reason alone. In order to achieve this end we need to show specifically that there exists the possibility of articulating a synthetic (constructive) logic/reason, which has been considered by most mainstream thinkers either as not articulatable, or simply non-existent. (B) The second (specific) task is to respond to the challenge of Larry Laudan by demonstrating the possibility of an epistemologically significant generativism. In this context we will argue that this generativism, which is our suggested alternative, and the simplified structuralist and semantic view of scientific theories, mutually reinforce each other to form a single coherent foundation for the renovated analytico-synthetic methodological framework. (C) The third (sub-specific) objective, accordingly, is to show the possibility of articulating a synthetic logic that could guide us in understanding the process of theorization. This is realized by proposing the foundations for developing a logic of inversion, which represents the pattern of synthetic reason in the process of constructing scientific definitions. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to discuss some consecuences of Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy on the respect of the normative and descriptive dimensions of the philosophy of science. By contradistinction to the normativism of neopositivist and popperian traditions, kuhnian’s premiss that the philosophy of science must reflect the real history of scientific practice, entails that the function of the discipline is to describe the historical developement of science, and not to impose a model of how science must be. From Steve (...) Fuller point of view, Kuhn has restricted the function of philosophy of science to the clarification of the conceptual bases of the dominant paradigms, and its defense from external attacks. Thus, the explanation of the historical developement of science it ends officiating as a conceptual legitimation of the decisions of the scientific elites. By counterpart, the premise that underlies Popper’s normativism is that science is a social product, whose implications trascend the internal structure of scientific communities. This justifies that the philosophy of science could put the scientific actions into question, even more when they are not free from the interference of extrascientific agents. The same way, if scientific commnnities are not free to autodeterminate themselves, as their aims involve extrascientific actors and interests, the philosophy of science should not be limited to describe and explain the historical developement of science, but it should reenable the consideration of the normative dimension. (shrink)