The study of vegetables represents one of the main topics in Bacon’s Sylva sylvarum. Not only in quantitative terms, because plants occupy about a third of the entire book, but the centuries on plants are among the most structured, and this reveals Bacon’s particular interest for the topic. The key to understanding Bacon’s interest can be found in both his Sylva sylvarum and the Historia vitae et mortis, where Bacon explains how the results of studying certain processes in plants can (...) be later transferred and applied to animals and humans. In the context of his discussion of nourishing foods and drinks, Bacon addresses the question of how nourishment gets assimilated in the body. One of the ways in which the... (shrink)

Resumen: Ante las críticas insistentes a la distinción entre el empirismo y el racionalismo, se han propuesto alternativas para comprender de manera más adecuada el quehacer de los filósofos modernos. Entre ellas está la distinción entre filosofía especulativa y experimental. Intentaré evaluar la validez de esta distinción para la filosofía moral experimental del siglo XVIII y, en particular, para la propuesta de Hume. Mostraré que si la distinción se entiende en términos excluyentes, resulta inapropiada porque el mismo Hume plantea que (...) la especulación es lo que define a la filosofía. Además, antes que considerarlas como excluyentes, el filósofo escocés propone una conciliación entre la práctica de la experimentación y la teorización. Por último, sostendré que aquello que Hume considera como “falsa filosofía” no puede entenderse como sinónimo de filosofía especulativa.: A persistent criticism of the distinction between empiricism and ra-tionalism has provoked the emergence of new distinctions in order to under-stand modern philosophy in a more adequate way. One of those distinctions is that between speculative and experimental philosophy. My aim is to evalu-ate the validity of this distinction for eighteenth-century experimental moral philosophy in general and for Hume’s thought in particular. I will show that if this distinction is understood in exclusive terms, then it cannot be adequate because Hume himself states that speculation is what defines philoso-phy. Hume also proposes a reconciliation between experimental practice and theoretical activity instead of considering that they are mutually exclusive. Finally, I will make clear that what Hume condemns as “false philosophy” is not a synonym for speculative philosophy. (shrink)

. The purpose of this paper is to assess Bacon’s proclamation of the novelty of his Novum Organum. We argue that in the Novum Organum, Bacon reshapes the traditional representation of logic as providing tools for the building of philosophical discourse. For he refuses both an understanding of logic in terms of an ars disserendi, and an approach to philosophy in terms of a discourse of a certain type of necessity and universality. How can Bacon articulate a logic, that is, (...) a set of rules with formal features, on the basis of a distrust of the paradigm of discourse? This seemingly paradoxical definition of logic follows from Bacon’s rejection of the conception of the scientific reasoning provided by the Organon. It also stems from his reworking of Aristotle’s semiotics, in an effort to deal with the gap between what reality consists in and what the mind perceives of it. (shrink)