A common response to ongoing disagreement about abortion has been to look for overlap between the prolife and prochoice sides of the debate. In recent years, however, both opposing camps in the debate have claimed to be able to establish their respective positions on the basis of the same common ground. Faced with the apparent failure of philosophers to settle their differences about abortion by means of shared values, the question naturally arises: what should we do about this? It is (...) possible to discern two main options in the scholarly literature. The first is to keep doing what we are already doing: namely, trying to create consensus on the abortion issue by appealing to analogies designed to reveal common ground. One example of this approach comes from a recent attempt by Charles Camosy to find areas of agreement with Peter Singer and other defenders of abortion.See Charles Camosy, “Common Ground on Surgical Abortion?—Engaging Peter Singer on the Moral Status of Potential Persons,”. (shrink)

Which metaphysical theories are involved—whether presupposed or implied—in Marquis’ future-like-ours argument against abortion? Vogelstein has recently argued that the supporter of the FLO argument faces a problematic dilemma; in particular, Marquis, the main supporter of the argument, seems to have to either abandon diachronic universalism or acquiesce and declare that contraception is morally wrong. I argue that the premises of Marquis’ argument can be reasonably combined with a form of unrestricted composition and that the FLO argument is better viewed as (...) including animalism, i.e., the thesis that we are animals. (shrink)

Marquis’ future-like-ours argument against the morality of abortion assumes animalism—a family of theories according to which we are animals. Such an assumption is theoretically useful for various reasons, e.g., because it provides the theoretical underpinning for a reply to the contraception-abstinence objection. However, the connection between the future-like-ours argument and one popular version of animalism can prove lethal to the former, or so I argue in this paper.

The morality of embryonic stem cell research depends on the moral status of human embryos. I defend the interest view against some of Don Marquis's objections, and show that on his own Valuable Futures account, ESCR is morally permissible.