Services of ethics committees are nowadays commonly used in such various spheres of life as health care, public administration, business, law, engineering, and scientific research. It is taken that as their members have expertise in ethics, these committees can have valuable contributions to make in solving practical moral problems. It has, however, also been maintained that it is simply absurd to claim that one has some special knowledge and skills in moral matters; in connection with moral questions there is no (...) expertise to be had. In this paper, I assess this criticism of the use of ethics committees and ethics consultants. I argue that there is no sufficient reason to reject the possibility of ethical expertise. (shrink)

Services of ethics committees are nowadays commonly used in such various spheres of life as health care, public administration, business, law, engineering, and scientific research. It is taken that as their members have expertise in ethics, these committees can have valuable contributions to make in solving practical moral problems. It has, however, also been maintained that it is simply absurd to claim that one has some special knowledge and skills in moral matters; in connection with moral questions there is no (...) expertise to be had. In this paper, I assess this criticism of the use of ethics committees and ethics consultants. I argue that there is no sufficient reason to reject the possibility of ethical expertise. (shrink)

Services of ethics consultants are nowadays commonly used in such various spheres of life as engineering, public administration, business, law, health care, journalism, and scientific research. It has however been maintained that use of ethics consultants is incompatible with personal autonomy; in moral matters individuals should be allowed to make their own decisions. The problem this criticism refers to can be conceived of as a conflict between the professional autonomy of ethics experts and the autonomy of the persons they serve. (...) This paper addresses this conflict and maintains that when the nature of both ethics consultation and individual autonomy is properly understood, the professional autonomy of ethics experts is compatible with the autonomy of the persons they assist. (shrink)

Should we always engage in critical thinking about issues of public policy, such as health care, gun control, and LGBT rights? Michael Huemer (2005) has argued for the claim that in some cases it is not epistemically responsible to engage in critical thinking on these issues. His argument is based on a reliabilist conception of the value of critical thinking. This article analyzes Huemer's argument against the epistemic responsibility of critical thinking by engaging it critically. It presents an alternative account (...) of the value of critical thinking that is tied to the notion of forming and deploying a critical identity. And it develops an account of our epistemic responsibility to engage in critical thinking that is not dependent on reliability considerations alone. The primary purpose of the article is to provide critical thinking students, or those that wish to reflect on the value of critical thinking, with an opportunity to think metacritically about critical thinking by examining an argument that engages the question of whether it is epistemically responsible for one to engage in critical thinking. (shrink)

This paper explores the relevance of the debate about ethical expertise for the practice of clinical ethics. We present definitions, explain three theories of ethical expertise, and identify arguments that have been brought up to either support the concept of ethical expertise or call it into question. Finally, we discuss four theses: the debate is relevant for the practice of clinical ethics in that it (1) improves and specifies clinical ethicists' perception of their expertise; (2) contributes to improving the perception (...) of moral competence of non-ethicists; (3) gives insight into complementary styles of argumentation of ethicists and non-ethicists; and (4) contributes to the awareness of the problem of profession-building of (clinical) ethicists. (shrink)

Recent sociological/philosophical treatments of expertise, best represented by the work of Steve Fuller, attempt to (1) reduce displays of expertise to sophistic exercises of discretionary power, and (2) refute the claim that because laypeople are epistemically inferior to experts, it is rational to defer to an expert's opinion rather than making up one's own mind. But upon inspection, Fuller fails to provide reasonable grounds for liberating laypeople from the tyranny of cognitive authoritarianism. Rather, he presents a patronizing description of the (...) expert‐lay relation, one that actually makes the public seem more ignorant than is warranted. (shrink)

Ever since Kant, moral philosophers have been more or less animated by the mission of discovering inescapable law-like rules that would provide a binding justification for morality. Recently, however, many have started to question whether this is possible and what, after all, this project could achieve. An alternative vision of the task of moral philosophy starts from the pragmatist idea that philosophizing begins and ends in human experiencing. It leads to a view where morality is seen as a “social technology” (...) that aims to make living together possible, and strengthens people's capability to live a good life within a society. The role of moral philosophy is, accordingly, to develop our moral tools further. Moral philosophers become ethical engineers who use their expertise in ethical topics to criticize existing “moral technology” and construct new concepts, tools, and theories that better answer the current challenges for living a good life. (shrink)

The purpose of this thesis is to provide a robust epistemological justification for Evidence Based Medicine (EMB), and thereby to demonstrate the epistemological short comings of Complementary and Alternative Medicine (CAM). CAM has received support from both philosophers, such as Rorty and Feyerband, and the Sociology and Anthropology of Medicine. The thesis will thus review both the internal coherence and the application of non-realist arguments, and counter non-realism with the realist epistemology and philosophy of science that is represented by C.S. (...) Peirce’s pragmatism. Rorty and Feyerabend and others have developed radical forms of scientific antirealism in the latter 20th century. Subsequently, sociologists developed even more intractable forms of anti-realism, which they applied to the social study of science. This approach served to challenge the legitimacy of orthodox scientific practice (including EMB). A practical expression of this controversy was immediately identified in the question of the role of scientific authority in a democratic society. That question was immediately applied to the status of alternative medical systems and their legitimacy vis-a-vis EBM in terms of the controversy over what has come to be termed "medical pluralism": If scientific medicine has no particular authority, should other, medical systems, epistemically incompatible with EBM, be made available as well? The thesis will suggest that non-realism is in fact a marginal position within the philosophy of science. Scientists, medical researchers and medical practitioners may thus appeal to the philosophy of science in order to justify their authority in the face of challenges from CAM. However, it will be suggested that they are frequently ill-served by a reliance on a simplistic understanding of the philosophy of Karl Popper. An alternative will be proposed in the philosophy of C. S. Peirce. His pragmatism offers to medical research and medical practice a way of understanding and justifying the scientific process, a justification of realism in the face of non-realism, and a resource for the criticism of CAM and medical pluralism, as at once epistemologically ill grounded and potentially dangerous to patients and the general public. (shrink)