This paper is a sequel to Beall (2011), in which I both give and discuss the philosophical import of a result for the propositional (multiple-conclusion) logic LP+. Feedback on such ideas prompted a spelling out of the first-order case. My aim in this paper is to do just that: namely, explicitly record the first-order result(s), including the collapse results for K3+ and FDE+.

This paper argues for the thesis that, roughly put, it is impossible to talk about absolutely everything. To put the thesis more precisely, there is a particular sense in which, as a matter of semantics, quantifiers always range over domains that are in principle extensible, and so cannot count as really being ‘absolutely everything’. The paper presents an argument for this thesis, and considers some important objections to the argument and to the formulation of the thesis. The paper also offers (...) an assessment of just how implausible the thesis really is. It argues that the intuitions against the thesis come down to a few special cases, which can be given special treatment. Finally, the paper considers some metaphysical ideas that might surround the thesis. Particularly, it might be maintained that an important variety of realism is incompatible with the thesis. The paper argues that this is not the case. (shrink)

This presentation traces an historical root of the reductio ad absurdum mode of argumentation in Greek philosophy. I propose a new understanding of the liar paradox as an instance of this mode of argumentation. I show that the paradox was crea ted as part of a refutational argument in the controversy over the justification of realism and the realists concepts of truth and certainty. The paradox was part of the dialectical style of Greek scepticism, which was characterized, inter alia, by (...) the u se of the reductio ad absurdum. The paradox turns out to be a metaphysical and epistemological argument. (shrink)

This is a collection of eighteen solicited papers on the topics of the title: circularity, definition, and truth. The papers are loosely connected in subject matter, but present a great variety of issues, theories, and approaches. Amongst the many subjects discussed are: the revision theory of truth and applications of revision rules, partiality and fixed point constructions, substitutional quantification, fuzzy logic, negation, belief revision, context dependence, hierarchies, Tarski on truth, deflationism, correspondence theories of truth, and normative aspects of truth. The (...) Liar paradox figures prominently in this collection, but is not alone. Other familiar paradoxes are also discussed, including paradoxes of definability, the Sorites paradox, and the Surprise Exam paradox. So-called paradoxes of rationality, such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, receive attention as well. (shrink)