Pour la phénoménologie de Jean-Luc Marion, Descartes est le philosophe ayant achevé la métaphysique. Mais il faut entendre toute la polyphonie de ce terme. D’un côté, il l’a achevée au sens où il l’a parachevée, la portant à son sommet en fixant ses concepts et ses enjeux pour la modernité à venir. De l’autre, il l’a achevée en montrant ses brisures, la rendant caduque par la mise au jour de son dépassement possible selon deux concepts qui déterminent aussi deux moments (...) cartésiens : l’infini puis la chair. Cette ambivalence eu égard à la métaphysique (fixation puis dépassement), résonne dans la phénoménologie de la donation puisqu’elle détermine la mise en place de la distinction entre les phénomènes saturés et les phénomènes de droit commun. Ainsi, Descartes est utilisé comme le philosophe qui fixe les frontières, non seulement entre philosophie et métaphysique, mais aussi celles qui passent au cœur même de la phénoménologie. Pourtant, à de nombreuses reprises, Marion montre que cette fixation des frontières n’est pas aussi aisée à opérer qu’il n’y paraît, et qu’il y a un brouillage essentiel et originaire de celles-là. Pour la phénoménologie de la donation, Descartes est donc à la fois un repoussoir et un aimant, ce qu’il faut dépasser et ce à partir de quoi on le dépasse, ce qui disparaît dans la mort de la métaphysique, mais aussi ce qui s’attarde dans ce qui lui survit. (shrink)

The main point for criticizing the Cartesians for Vico is the notion of method, interpreted as exceptionally discursive procedure, devoid of spontaneity and creative force which are necessary for discovering new truths. These qualities are embodied for Vico in the Latin term ingenium, loan translation of which is found in Italian (ingegno) and is absent in French. The criticism of Cartesianisn suggested by Vico does not consider the fundamental bilingualism of this philosophy and wide use of the term ingenium in (...) the corps of Descartes’ Latin works. The analysis of the latter proves that the early Descartes’ notion intuitus mentis, as well as the concept of natural light of mind are, in the end, based exactly on ingenium, but not on the discursive methodical procedures. Human soul, following Descartes, reveals its content in several hypostastes and each method of revelation corresponds to specific terminology. Soul as mens is not the same as soul as ingenium. But even the early Descartes’ study of soul is marked by peculiar nominalism, proclamation of the real existence of individual soul as a separate entity. Therefore later, stating his ego cogito, Descartes states exactly the individual substance, not thinking in general. The terminological couple ingenium/mens is not translatable already in the French texts of Descartes himself (both merge in the French esprit), however their Ukrainian translations do not consider neither this untranslatability nor obvious references of Descartes’ esprit to other Latin compliances which differ each time. The article also analyses frequency in usage of the terms ingenium and mens in early and late Descartes’ Latin works; it has been proved that the augmentation of the meaning of metaphysical problems gradually turned mens into the main subject of Descartes’ research and deactualised the problem of ingenium. (shrink)

What is early modern philosophy? Two interpretative trends have predominated in the related literature. One, with roots in the work of Hegel and Heidegger, sees early modern thinking either as the outcome of a process of gradual rationalization (leading to the principle of sufficient reason, and to "ontology" as distinct from metaphysics), or as a reflection of an inherent subjectivity or representational semantics. The other sees it as reformulations of medieval versions of substance and cause, suggested by, or leading to, (...) early modern scientific developments. -/- This book proposes a rather different kind of explanation. It suggests that the concept of relation, specifically that of dyadic, anti-symmetrical relations, can throw light on a wide variety of developments in early modern thought, such as those concerning causality, sense perception, temporality, and the mereological approach to substance. The book argues that these relations are grounded in an interpretation of causal influence, and not in semantic theories or subjectivity. -/- Furthermore, if it is correct that the problem of unity was, for most of classical antiquity, what the problems of motion, causality and perception were for early modern thinkers, then early modern thought is much closer to the thought of Aristotle than is commonly supposed. The genesis of early modern thought might instead be taken to have occurred in opposition to one aspect of the thought of Duns Scotus (an aspect that lives on in contemporary Neo-Aristotelianism), and that can be explained once the relational perspective examined here is taken into account. (shrink)

Descartes held that practicing mathematics was important for developing the mental faculties necessary for science and a virtuous life. Otherwise, he maintained that the proper uses of mathematics were extremely limited. This article discusses his reasons which include a theory of education, the metaphysics of matter, and a psychologistic theory of deductive reasoning. It is argued that these reasons cohere with his system of philosophy.

No processo do conhecimento a imaginação desempenha para Hegel o estágio no qual a mente humana dissocia o objeto em dois diferentes conteúdos, o conteúdo-coisa do mundo externo e o conteúdo interno da própria mente, de tal modo que ambas as versões do mesmo devem corroborar-se mutuamemente ao modo de uma síntese simples de elementos heterogéneos que apenas em seu cotejamento reconhecem sua identidade. Na atividade de compreensão, ao contrário, este dualismo é suprassumido e, com ele, o empirismo e a (...) teoria correspondista da verdade que, aos olhos de Hegel, está em sua base. (shrink)

As Roger Ariew shows, one of the most fascinating challenges for the authors trying to create a Cartesian complete course on philosophy was coming up with a Cartesian Logic based on the existing texts of the master. Were the few simple rules from the Discourse on Method the "logic" of Descartes? Were the Rules for the Direction of the Mind "logic"? How can we even have a logic without syllogism? When looking at the authors studied by Ariew one finds that (...) the best that they could come up was adding some Cartesian elements on what remains basically a traditional Aristotelian Logic. It seems that there was no Cartesian Logic after all.I want to show here that Cartesian Logic is something else, not exactly... (shrink)

the domain of Art critique and becoming a philosophical argument. How can we think of Perspective as symbolic Form? Is Perspective really a symbolic form? Why is Perspective so important? Because at the beginning of the Modern Age, Perspective as spiritual figure grounds many symbolic or even many scientific constructions. We could we say that perspective open the foundation of modern science as such. The “Geometrization” of Vision, beginning with perspective, will be for us the interpretative key in order to (...) understand the Modern Age as a whole. This understanding will allow us to understand the anthropologic dimension arising from the Modern Age, called „Perspectivism“. Assuming that perspective was neither only an invention of painting nor of geometry nor of philosophy, taken as singular fields of human inquiry, we will try to sketch the genesis of “perspective” from an interdisciplinary point of view. By doing so, we will also try to fix its deep significance for the anthropology of the Modern Age. Living and feeling in a perspectival world is the real invention of the Modern Age, one that overcame the closed Cosmos of the Middle Ages in order to reveal to mankind its own potential. Our interdisciplinary approach will proceed from many points of view and converge on the idea of a new kind of human experience. Such an interdisciplinary approach will open new questions about our present time. Are we justified in thinking of our experience today as perspectival? What does it mean today to think from perspectives in the manifold dimensions of our living and to face to the complexity of our times? (shrink)

¿Cómo debe entenderse que una de las innovaciones de mayor alcance epocal del pensamiento cartesiano, a saber, su duda metódica, no haya sido adoptada por la inmediata posteridad filosófica de Descartes? Este artículo investiga las razones de esta supuesta desaparición de la duda en las filosofías de Spinoza y Leibniz mediante una revisión del rol de la duda en las Meditaciones de Descartes. Partiendo de una caracterización del proyecto cartesiano como la búsqueda del fundamento, el artículo muestra que la interpretación (...) de Descartes de la realidad inmediata en términos de representación constituye en realidad la apoteosis de una concepción más antigua que percibe la totalidad de lo ente como contingente y vana. De este modo, la duda no es la suspensión libre del juicio, sino el inevitable estado de irresolución que se deriva de la falta de solidez ontológica que muestra la realidad inmediata entendida como imagen o representación. Se muestra entonces que el pensamiento postcartesiano propiamente no elimina la duda, sino que la incorpora como un supuesto básico, lo cual explica por qué no hay un lugar definido para la misma en el discurso. El desarrollo ulterior del pensamiento moderno puede ser explicado de modo decisivo por medio de esta asimilación implícita de la duda y sus consecuencias. (shrink)

This article presents a decades-long conflict in the upper echelons of postwar French academic philosophy between the self-identifying “Cartesian” Ferdinand Alquié, professor at the Sorbonne, and the “Spinozist” Martial Gueroult of the Collège de France. Tracking the development of this rivalry serves to illuminate the historical drama that occurred in France as phenomenology was integrated into the Cartesian tradition and resisted by a commitment to rationalism grounded in a specifically French understanding of Spinozism. Over the course of Alquié and Gueroult's (...) polemic, however, we nevertheless witness a shared concern to preserve philosophy from the reductive tendencies of historicism and its possible assimilation to theology. What is more, the ultimate impasse of this conflict continues to inform the most innovative projects in French thought in the wake of structuralism and the “theological turn” of French phenomenology. (shrink)

Descartes' image of the tree of knowledge from the preface to the French edition of the Principles of Philosophy is usually taken to represent Descartes' break with the past and with the fragmentation of knowledge of the schools. But if Descartes' tree of knowledge is analyzed in its proper context, another interpretation emerges. A series of contrasts with other classifications of knowledge from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries raises some puzzles: claims of originality and radical break from the past do (...) not seem warranted. Further contrasts with Descartes' unpublished writings and with school doctrines lead to the ironic conclusion that, in the famous passage, Descartes is attempting to appeal to conventional wisdom and trying to avoid sounding novel. (shrink)

In the recently discovered Cambridge manuscript, widely regarded as an early draft ofRules for the Direction of the Mind, Descartes does not describe the mind as a ‘purely spiritual’ force ‘distinct from the whole body’. This has led some readers to speculate that Descartes did not embrace mind-body dualism in the Cambridge manuscript. In this article, I offer a detailed interpretation of Descartes's mind-body dualism in the established Charles Adam and Paul Tannery edition ofRules, and argue that, while differences between (...) the Cambridge manuscript and the established version ofRulesare significant, the relevant passages in the Cambridge manuscript preclude interpretation along both materialist and hylomorphic lines. I then offer an account of the development of Descartes's mind-body dualism between the Cambridge manuscript and the established version ofRules. What the Cambridge manuscript reveals is not Descartes before dualism, but rather Cartesian dualism in its barest form. (shrink)

Table of Formal and Descriptivists Ontologists (PDF - from Bernard Bolzano to present time) Ontologists of the 19th and 20th Centuries (a selection of critical judgments about some of the greatest philosophers of the recent past) Living Ontologists (a list of authors with an interest in ontology, with synthetic bibliographies).

To address the theological turn in phenomenology, this paper sets out critical arguments opposing the theist phenomenology of Michel Henry and Gilles Deleuze’s philosophy of the event. Henry’s phenomenology has been overlooked in recent commentaries compared with, for example, Jean-Luc Marion’s work. It will be shown here that Henry’s philosophy presents a detailed novel turn in phenomenology structured according to critical moves against positions developed from Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. This demonstration is done through a strong contrast with Deleuze and (...) a short engagement with Quentin Meillassoux. The paper presents an argument against the theological turn on the grounds that it misunderstands the form of affectivity when compared to Deleuze’s work on affect and event. It will be argued that Henry’s search for a free-standing affect deduced as a condition for any appearance underplays the way any affect is included in many causal and transcendentally determined series such that any notion of the pure affect independent of other processes is a fiction. The loss of this pure affect entails the questioning of the theological turn in Henry. (shrink)

Review of Garrod, R., & Marr, A. (Eds.). (2021). Descartes and the ingenium: the embodied soul in Cartesianism. Leiden: Brill.

Method may be second only to substance-dualism as the best-known among Descartes's enthusiasms. But knowing that Descartes wants to promote good method is one thing; knowing what exactly he wants to promote is another. Two views seem fairly widespread. The first rests on the claim that Descartes endorses a purely procedural picture of reason, so that right reasoning is a matter of proprieties of operation, rather than respect for its objects. On this view, a method for regulating our reason would (...) offer general rules of procedure, abstracted as much as possible from the content of particular problems. Second is the view that Descartes maintains what we might call an ‘intellectualist’ approach to method, one that restricts right reasoning to operations internal to the mind, and allows the use of external bodily resources only as initial inputs or as helpful props— convenient, but marginal to the procedure and readily eliminated from it. (shrink)

The article focuses on one of the most serious accusations brought against Descartes and modern philosophy, namely “the dualism of substance”. The accusers claim that the human body and soul were viewed as completely separate; consequently, their relationship as such and the united being of man become incomprehensible. As has been shown above, the idea of the separation of the soul from the body did not originate with Descartes; it was formulated much earlier, and repeated by a disciple of Descartes’, (...) Henry Leroy, known as Regius. When Descartes became aware of this bizarre interpretation he was dismayed and sought to clarify the matter. He sought to distinguish between two terms, “distinction” and “separation” and to illuminate the relationship between body and soul at three different levels, i.e. ordinary experience, analytical mind and metaphysical meditation. Eventually, he embraced the paradox of the two natures – the double substantial make-up of the human being, a paradox of patristic inspiration. However, the later history of ideas was not sympathetic to Descartes: nowadays, when one looks up the term “metaphysical dualism” in dictionaries or glossaries, even in the studies of prestigious researchers, one will find views similar to those of the unfaithful disciple Regius. The resilience of this locus obscurus is explained both by the power of a new mode of interpreting discourse and by the ever more privileged position of the reader . Both attitudes are related to modern ideologies and to changes which have occurred in the intersubjective life-world, especially in the communication of the scholarly and academic world. (shrink)

ABSTRACT : On many accounts, Rule IV appears to be composed of two distinct texts, and this should be justified by the difference between the mathesis universalis and the Cartesian method. This article runs counter to the usual interpretation by showing that the discussion on mathematics in Rule IV has enabled the introduction of method constraining scientific research to operate on grounds of order and measurement. The mathesis universalis is not so much a science of higher mathematics as a universal (...) method by the means of which one can find truth. (shrink)

Review of Marion, J.-L.. Questions cartésiennes III: Descartes sous le masque du cartésianisme. Paris: PUF.

Ce texte a pour objet de comparer différentes lectures phénoménologiques de la théorie cartésienne de la connaissance, en montrant comment celle-ci est mobilisée pour répondre à certaines inquiétudes contemporaines. En premier lieu, nous pouvons constater une tension intéressante entre le modèle d’un « monde crépusculaire » de la science cartésienne développé par Jean-Luc Marion et celui d’un « monde de lumière » décrit par Emmanuel Levinas dans De l’existence à l’existant. Alors que le premier traduit l’emprise métaphysique d’une volonté de (...) puissance égologique, le second rend possible dans une certaine mesure la liberté d’un arrachement à l’être. Toutefois, ces deux modèles se rejoignent sur un point fondamental, à savoir le caractère à la fois égologique et carcéral du monde de l’objectivité. En outre, ces deux interprétations ne permettent pas de rendre justice à l’idée cartésienne que Dieu nous a donné une « bonne nature », du point de vue de la lumière naturelle, mais aussi des passions. C’est pourquoi nous proposons dans ce travail une lecture phénoménologique de Descartes qui prenne davantage en considération cette idée de « bonne nature ». Cette lecture devra prendre en compte la sensibilité humaniste de Descartes tout en respectant les enjeux contemporains liés à la phénoménologie. Cet autre modèle propose de repenser la métaphysique de l’objectivité à partir de notions et de perspectives qui ne renvoient pas à la solitude de l’ego, mais plutôt au cadre humaniste de la civilité, tout en respectant la valeur humaine du savoir. (shrink)

Descartes afirma que el cogito se "experimenta en uno" (apud se experiatur)o se "siente en uno mismo" ("il sent in lui-même"), pero también ha señalado que uno no siente sino a través del cuerpo. El problema es que, en las Meditaciones, el cogito fue caracterizado cuando todavía no se había demostrado la existencia del cuerpo. Pese a esto, Descartes parece haberse dejado influir por ciertas sensaciones internas de duda y certeza. En el trabajo se sostiene que esto fue posible porque (...) esas sensaciones internas son efecto de una ratio implícita: la existencia de un Dios no engañador. (shrink)