It is our contention that an ontological commitment to propositions faces a number of problems; so many, in fact, that an attitude of realism towards propositions—understood the usual “platonistic” way, as a kind of mind- and language-independent abstract entity—is ultimately untenable. The particular worries about propositions that marshal parallel problems that Paul Benacerraf has raised for mathematical platonists. At the same time, the utility of “proposition-talk”—indeed, the apparent linguistic commitment evident in our use of 'that'-clauses (in offering explanations and making (...) predictions)—is also in need of explanation. We account for this with a fictionalist analysis of our use of 'that'-clauses. Our account avoids certain problems that arise for the usual error-theoretic versions of fictionalism because we apply the notion of semantic pretense to develop an alternative, pretense-involving, non-error-theoretic, fictionalist account of proposition-talk. (shrink)

يُعالج هذا المقال آلية التطور اللُغوي بصفة عامة، وملامح هذا التطور في أوقات الأزمات النوعية التي تكتنف البشر من حين إلى آخر، سواء أكانت أزمات مجتمعية أو سياسية أو اقتصادية أو علمية، مع التركيز على أبرز الابتكارات والإضافات اللغوية المُعجمية في دول العالم الناطق بالإنجليزية خلال جائحة كورونا، وذلك انطلاقًا من فرضٍ رئيس مؤداه ضرورة مشاركة علماء اللغة في مواجهة الأزمة ابتغاءً للوضوح والشفافية.

Todd (2016) proposes an analysis of future-directed sentences, in particular sentences of the form 'will(φ)', that is based on the classic Russellian analysis of definite descriptions. Todd's analysis is supposed to vindicate the claim that the future is metaphysically open while retaining a simple Ockhamist semantics of future contingents and the principles of classical logic, i.e. bivalence and the law of excluded middle. Consequently, an open futurist can straightforwardly retain classical logic without appeal to supervaluations, determinacy operators, or any further (...) controversial semantical or metaphysical complication. In this paper, we will show that this quasi-Russellian analysis of 'will' both lacks linguistic motivation and faces a variety of significant problems. In particular, we show that the standard arguments for Russell's treatment of definite descriptions fail to apply to statements of the form 'will(φ)'. (shrink)

This essay expands Johanna Hartelius? rhetorical understanding of expertise by probing the concept?s ontological and epistemological grounds. Viewed through the lens of a realist-based theory of rhetoric, we contend that notions of being, consciousness, meaning, and knowing are essential to understanding expertise. Applying our theory of rhetorical perspectivism to link these concepts to expertise permits coherent distinctions between genuine expertise and faux expertise. The theory also suggests a philosophy of education centered on the preparation of experts who are ?intellectual entrepreneurs.? (...) With a diversified yet integrated portfolio of theoretical and practical knowledge, these citizen-scholars discover solutions to challenges affecting communities and stakeholders, transcending traditional disciplinary boundaries. (shrink)

I modify Grice's theory of conversational implicature so as to accommodate acts of implicating propositions by asking questions, acts of implicating questions by asserting propositions, and acts of implicating questions by asking questions. I describe the relations between a declarative sentence's semantic content (the proposition it semantically expresses), on the one hand, and the propositions that a speaker locutes, asserts, and implicates by uttering that sentence, on the other. I discuss analogous relations between an interrogative sentence's semantic content (the question (...) it semantically expresses), and the questions that a speaker locutes, asks, and implicates by uttering that sentence. (shrink)