Lógica positiva : plenitude, potencialidade e problemas (do pensar sem negação)

Dissertation, Universidade Estadual de Campinas (2004)
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Abstract
This work studies some problems connected to the role of negation in logic, treating the positive fragments of propositional calculus in order to deal with two main questions: the proof of the completeness theorems in systems lacking negation, and the puzzle raised by positive paradoxes like the well-known argument of Haskel Curry. We study the constructive com- pleteness method proposed by Leon Henkin for classical fragments endowed with implication, and advance some reasons explaining what makes difficult to extend this constructive method to non-classical fragments equipped with weaker implications (that avoid Curry's objection). This is the case, for example, of Jan Lukasiewicz's n-valued logics and Wilhelm Ackermann's logic of restricted implication. Besides such problems, both Henkin's method and the triviality phenomenon enable us to propose a new positive tableau proof system which uses only positive meta-linguistic resources, and to mo- tivate a new discussion concerning the role of negation in logic proposing the concept of paratriviality. In this way, some relations between positive reasoning and infinity, the possibilities to obtain a ¯first-order positive logic as well as the philosophical connection between truth and meaning are dis- cussed from a conceptual point of view.
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Archival date: 2014-01-15
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References found in this work BETA
Many-Valued Logics.Malinowski, Grzegorz
The Philosophy of Language.Martinich, Aloysius (ed.)
Many-Valued Logic.Rescher, Nicholas

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Citations of this work BETA
Tableaux sin refutación.Barrero, Tomás & Carnielli, Walter

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