- Statistical significance and its critics: practicing damaging science, or damaging scientific practice?Deborah G. Mayo & David Hand - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-33.details
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Conceptual challenges for interpretable machine learning.David S. Watson - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-33.details
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How (not) to measure replication.Samuel C. Fletcher - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (2):1-27.details
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(1 other version)How experimental algorithmics can benefit from Mayo’s extensions to Neyman–Pearson theory of testing.Thomas Bartz-Beielstein - 2008 - Synthese 163 (3):385-396.details
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Model Verification and the Likelihood Principle.Samuel C. Fletcher - unknowndetails
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On the Jeffreys-Lindley Paradox.Christian P. Robert - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (2):216-232,.details
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Evidence and Justification in Groups with Conflicting Background Beliefs.Kent W. Staley - 2010 - Episteme 7 (3):232-247.details
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(2 other versions)Rejoinder error in economics. Towards a more evidence-based methodology , Julian Reiss, Routledge, 2007, XXIV + 246 pages. [REVIEW]Julian Reiss - 2009 - Economics and Philosophy 25 (2):210-215.details
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Severe testing as a basic concept in a neyman–pearson philosophy of induction.Deborah G. Mayo & Aris Spanos - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2):323-357.details
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Error-statistical elimination of alternative hypotheses.Kent Staley - 2008 - Synthese 163 (3):397 - 408.details
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(2 other versions)Rejoinder: Reviews Symposium.Julian Reiss - 2009 - Economics and Philosophy 25 (2):210-215.details
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Computer simulation through an error-statistical lens.Wendy S. Parker - 2008 - Synthese 163 (3):371-384.details
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A frequentist interpretation of probability for model-based inductive inference.Aris Spanos - 2013 - Synthese 190 (9):1555-1585.details
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Internalist and externalist aspects of justification in scientific inquiry.Kent Staley & Aaron Cobb - 2011 - Synthese 182 (3):475-492.details
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Two ways to rule out error: Severity and security.Kent Staley - unknowndetails
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Tackling Duhemian Problems: An Alternative to Skepticism of Neuroimaging in Philosophy of Cognitive Science.Emrah Aktunc - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (4):449-464.details
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Science without (parametric) models: the case of bootstrap resampling.Jan Sprenger - 2011 - Synthese 180 (1):65-76.details
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Securing reliable evidence.Kent W. Staley - unknowndetails
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(1 other version)How experimental algorithmics can benefit from Mayo’s extensions to Neyman–Pearson theory of testing.Thomas Bartz-Beielstein - 2008 - Synthese 163 (3):385 - 396.details
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A Categorical Solution to the Grue Paradox.Tatsuya Yoshii & Jun Otsuka - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
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The safe, the sensitive, and the severely tested: a unified account.Georgi Gardiner & Brian Zaharatos - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-33.details
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Severity and Trustworthy Evidence: Foundational Problems versus Misuses of Frequentist Testing.Aris Spanos - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (2):378-397.details
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Revisiting Haavelmo's structural econometrics: bridging the gap between theory and data.Aris Spanos - 2015 - Journal of Economic Methodology 22 (2):171-196.details
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Objective evidence and rules of strategy: Achinstein on method: Peter Achinstein: Evidence and method: Scientific strategies of Isaac Newton and James Clerk Maxwell. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2013, 177pp, $24.95 HB.William L. Harper, Kent W. Staley, Henk W. de Regt & Peter Achinstein - 2014 - Metascience 23 (3):413-442.details
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Some surprising facts about surprising facts.D. Mayo - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 45:79-86.details
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Philosophical Scrutiny of Evidence of Risks: From Bioethics to Bioevidence.Deborah G. Mayo & Aris Spanos - 2006 - Philosophy of Science 73 (5):803-816.details
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Error statistical modeling and inference: Where methodology meets ontology.Aris Spanos & Deborah G. Mayo - 2015 - Synthese 192 (11):3533-3555.details
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Science is judgement, not only calculation: a reply to Aris Spanos’s review of The cult of statistical significance.Stephen T. Ziliak & Deirdre Nansen McCloskey - 2008 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 1 (1):165-170.details
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The error statistical philosopher as normative naturalist.Deborah Mayo & Jean Miller - 2008 - Synthese 163 (3):305 - 314.details
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Detection of unfaithfulness and robust causal inference.Jiji Zhang & Peter Spirtes - 2008 - Minds and Machines 18 (2):239-271.details
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Extrapolating from experiments, confidently.Donal Khosrowi - 2023 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 13 (2):1-28.details
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Who Should Be Afraid of the Jeffreys-Lindley Paradox?Aris Spanos - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (1):73-93.details
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Curve Fitting, the Reliability of Inductive Inference, and the Error‐Statistical Approach.Aris Spanos - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (5):1046-1066.details
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Tackling Duhemian Problems: An Alternative to Skepticism of Neuroimaging in Philosophy of Cognitive Science.M. Emrah Aktunç - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (4):449-464.details
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Strategies for securing evidence through model criticism.Kent W. Staley - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (1):21-43.details
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Is frequentist testing vulnerable to the base-rate fallacy?Aris Spanos - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (4):565-583.details
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The discovery of argon: A case for learning from data?Aris Spanos - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (3):359-380.details
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(1 other version)How to discount double-counting when it counts: Some clarifications.Deborah G. Mayo - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):857-879.details
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