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Ascribing mental qualities to machines

In Martin Ringle (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives in Artificial Intelligence. Humanities Press (1979)

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  1. Are Language Models More Like Libraries or Like Librarians? Bibliotechnism, the Novel Reference Problem, and the Attitudes of LLMs.Harvey Lederman & Kyle Mahowald - forthcoming - Transactions of the Association for Computational Linguistics.
    Are LLMs cultural technologies like photocopiers or printing presses, which transmit information but cannot create new content? A challenge for this idea, which we call bibliotechnism, is that LLMs generate novel text. We begin with a defense of bibliotechnism, showing how even novel text may inherit its meaning from original human-generated text. We then argue that bibliotechnism faces an independent challenge from examples in which LLMs generate novel reference, using new names to refer to new entities. Such examples could be (...)
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  • (4 other versions)Philosophy and theory of artificial intelligence 2017.Vincent C. Müller (ed.) - 2017 - Berlin: Springer.
    This book reports on the results of the third edition of the premier conference in the field of philosophy of artificial intelligence, PT-AI 2017, held on November 4 - 5, 2017 at the University of Leeds, UK. It covers: advanced knowledge on key AI concepts, including complexity, computation, creativity, embodiment, representation and superintelligence; cutting-edge ethical issues, such as the AI impact on human dignity and society, responsibilities and rights of machines, as well as AI threats to humanity and AI safety; (...)
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  • Searle's and Penrose's Noncomputational Frameworks for Naturalizing the Mind.Napoleon M. Mabaquiao - unknown
    John Searle and Roger Penrose are two staunch critics of computationalism who nonetheIess believe that with the right framework the mind can be naturalized. while they may be successful in showing the shortcomings of computationalism, I argue that their alternative noncomputational frameworks equally fail to carry out the project to naturalize the mind. The main reason is their failure to resolve some fundamental incompatibilities between mind and science. Searle tries to resolve the incompatibility between the subjectivity of consciousness and the (...)
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  • (1 other version)Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings.David John Chalmers (ed.) - 2002 - New York: Oxford University Press USA.
    What is the mind? Is consciousness a process in the brain? How do our minds represent the world? Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings is a grand tour of writings on these and other perplexing questions about the nature of the mind. The most comprehensive collection of its kind, the book includes sixty-three selections that range from the classical contributions of Descartes to the leading edge of contemporary debates. Extensive sections cover foundational issues, the nature of consciousness, and the (...)
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  • Penrose's Platonism.James Higginbotham - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):667-668.
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  • Systematic, unconscious thought is the place to anchor quantum mechanics in the mind.Thomas Roeper - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):681-682.
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  • Algorithms and physical laws.Franklin Boyle - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):656-657.
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  • Lucas revived? An undefended flank.Jeremy Butterfield - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):658-658.
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  • Perceptive questions about computation and cognition.Jon Doyle - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):661-661.
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  • Where is the material of the emperor's mind?David L. Gilden & Joseph S. Lappin - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):665-666.
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  • Searle on what only brains can do.J. A. Fodor - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):431-432.
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  • Reductionism and religion.Douglas R. Hofstadter - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):433-434.
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  • Artificial intelligence—the real thing?John C. Marshall - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):435-437.
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  • Intentionality: Hardware, not software.Grover Maxwell - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):437-438.
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  • The primary source of intentionality.Thomas Natsoulas - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):440-441.
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  • The chess room: further demythologizing of strong AI.Roland Puccetti - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):441-442.
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  • Dennett's realisation theory of the relation between folk and scientific psychology.Adrian Cussins - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):508.
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  • (1 other version)Beliefs and Sentences in the Head.Ken Warmbrōd - 1989 - Synthese 79 (2):201 - 230.
    It is argued thatde dicto andde re beliefs are attitudes towards syntactically structured entities (sentences) in the head. In order to identify the content of ade dicto orde re belief, we must be able to match causal relations of belief states to natural language inferences. Such match-ups provide sufficient empirical justification for regarding those causal relations as syntactic transformations, that is, inferences. But only syntactically structured entities are capable of enjoying such inferential relations. Hence,de dicto andde re beliefs must be (...)
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  • Naturalizing intentions.R. J. Nelson - 1984 - Synthese 61 (2):173 - 203.
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  • Artificial intelligence and consciousness.Drew McDermott - 2007 - In Morris Moscovitch, Philip Zelazo & Evan Thompson (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 117--150.
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  • (1 other version)Minds, brains, and programs.John Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
    What psychological and philosophical significance should we attach to recent efforts at computer simulations of human cognitive capacities? In answering this question, I find it useful to distinguish what I will call "strong" AI from "weak" or "cautious" AI. According to weak AI, the principal value of the computer in the study of the mind is that it gives us a very powerful tool. For example, it enables us to formulate and test hypotheses in a more rigorous and precise fashion. (...)
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  • (1 other version)Why paramecia don't have mental representations.Jerry A. Fodor - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):3-23.
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  • Precis of the intentional stance.Daniel C. Dennett - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):495-505.
    The intentional stance is the strategy of prediction and explanation that attributes beliefs, desires, and other states to systems and predicts future behavior from what it would be rational for an agent to do, given those beliefs and desires. Any system whose performance can be thus predicted and explained is an intentional system, whatever its innards. The strategy of treating parts of the world as intentional systems is the foundation of but is also exploited in artificial intelligence and cognitive science (...)
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  • Betting your life on an algorithm.Daniel C. Dennett - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):660-661.
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  • The milk of human intentionality.Daniel Dennett - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):428-430.
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  • A dualist-interactionist perspective.John C. Eccles - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):430-431.
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  • Searle and the special powers of the brain.Richard Rorty - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):445-446.
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  • Intrinsic intentionality.John Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):450-457.
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  • Dennett's instrumentalism.William G. Lycan - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):518.
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  • The intentional stance and the knowledge level.Allen Newell - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):520.
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  • Logical adaptationism.Ron Amundson - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):505.
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  • The logic of Searle’s Chinese room argument.Robert I. Damper - 2006 - Minds and Machines 16 (2):163-183.
    John Searle’s Chinese room argument is a celebrated thought experiment designed to refute the hypothesis, popular among artificial intelligence scientists and philosophers of mind, that “the appropriately programmed computer really is a mind”. Since its publication in 1980, the CRA has evoked an enormous amount of debate about its implications for machine intelligence, the functionalist philosophy of mind, theories of consciousness, etc. Although the general consensus among commentators is that the CRA is flawed, and not withstanding the popularity of the (...)
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  • Physics of brain-mind interaction.John C. Eccles - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):662-663.
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  • Selecting for the con in consciousness.Deborah Hodgkin & Alasdair I. Houston - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):668-669.
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  • The thinker dreams of being an emperor.M. M. Taylor - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):685-686.
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  • Computing the thinkable.David J. Chalmers - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):658-659.
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  • The ‘causal power’ of machines.Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):442-444.
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  • Computers, cognition and philosophy.Robert Wilensky - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):449-450.
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  • Another “Just So” story: How the leopardguarders spot.Dorothy Cheney & Robert Seyfarth - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):506.
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  • Derived intentionality?Alvin I. Goldman - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):514.
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  • How to build a mind.H. L. Roitblat - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):525.
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  • The quest for artificial wisdom.David Casacuberta Sevilla - 2013 - AI and Society 28 (2):199-207.
    The term “Contemplative sciences” refers to an interdisciplinary approach to mind that aims at a better understanding of alternative states of consciousness, like those obtained trough deep concentration and meditation, mindfulness and other “superior” or “spiritual” mental states. There is, however, a key discipline missing: artificial intelligence. AI has forgotten its original aims to create intelligent machines that could help us to understand better what intelligence is and is more worried about pragmatical stuff, so almost nobody in the field seems (...)
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  • The indeterminacy of color vision.Richard Montgomery - 1996 - Synthese 106 (2):167-203.
    A critical survey of recent work on the ontological status of colors supports the conclusion that, while some accounts of color can plausibly be dismissed, no single account can yet be endorsed. Among the remaining options are certain forms of color realism according which familiar colors are instantiated by objects in our extra-cranial visual environment. Also still an option is color anti-realism, the view that familiar colors are, at best, biologically adaptive fictions, instantiated nowhere.I argue that there is simply no (...)
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  • (1 other version)Pictures, Plants, and Propositions.Alex Morgan - 2019 - Minds and Machines 29 (2):309-329.
    Philosophers have traditionally held that propositions mark the domain of rational thought and inference. Many philosophers have held that only conceptually sophisticated creatures like us could have propositional attitudes. But in recent decades, philosophers have adopted increasingly liberal views of propositional attitudes that encompass the mental states of various non-human animals. These views now sit alongside more traditional views within the philosophical mainstream. In this paper I argue that liberalized views of propositional attitudes are so liberal that they encompass states (...)
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  • Uncertainty about quantum mechanics.Mark S. Madsen - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):674-675.
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  • The discomforts of dualism.Bruce MacLennan - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):673-674.
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  • AI and the Turing model of computation.Thomas M. Breuel - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):657-657.
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  • Searle's argument is just a set of Chinese symbols.Robert P. Abelson - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):424-425.
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  • The thermostat and the philosophy professor.Donald O. Walter - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):449-449.
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  • Causes and intentions.Bruce J. MacLennan - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):519-520.
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