Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. What's it like to be a gutbrain?John Limber - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):614-615.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Unconscious mental states do have an aspectual shape.Howard Shevrin - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):624-625.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Consciousness and accessibility.Ned Block - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):596-598.
    This is my first publication of the distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness, though not using quite those terms. It ends with this: "The upshot is this: If Searle is using the access sense of "consciousness," his argument doesn't get to first base. If, as is more likely, he intends the what-it-is-like sense, his argument depends on assumptions about issues that the cognitivist is bound to regard as deeply unsettled empirical questions." Searle replies: "He refers to what he calls (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   126 citations  
  • The Chinese room revisited.J. R. Searle - 1982 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (2):345-348.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • Reasoning as a source of justification.Magdalena Balcerak Jackson & Brendan Balcerak Jackson - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):113-126.
    In this essay we argue that reasoning can sometimes generate epistemic justification, rather than merely transmitting justification that the subject already possesses to new beliefs. We also suggest a way to account for it in terms of the relationship between epistemic normative requirements, justification and cognitive capacities.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • (1 other version)What Is Nature-Like Computation? A Behavioural Approach and a Notion of Programmability.Hector Zenil - 2013 - Philosophy and Technology (3):1-23.
    The aim of this paper is to propose an alternative behavioural definition of computation (and of a computer) based simply on whether a system is capable of reacting to the environment—the input—as reflected in a measure of programmability. This definition is intended to have relevance beyond the realm of digital computers, particularly vis-à-vis natural systems. This will be done by using an extension of a phase transition coefficient previously defined in an attempt to characterise the dynamical behaviour of cellular automata (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Mystery of Capital and the Construction of Social Reality.Barry Smith, David M. Mark & Isaac Ehrlich (eds.) - 2008 - Open Court.
    John Searle’s The Construction of Social Reality and Hernando de Soto’s The Mystery of Capital shifted the focus of current thought on capital and economic development to the cultural and conceptual ideas that underpin market economies and that are taken for granted in developed nations. This collection of essays assembles 21 philosophers, economists, and political scientists to help readers understand these exciting new theories.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Morally Contentious Technology-Field Intersections: The Case of Biotechnology in the United States. [REVIEW]Benjamin M. Cole & Preeta M. Banerjee - 2013 - Journal of Business Ethics 115 (3):555-574.
    Technologies can be not only contentious—overthrowing existing ways of doing things—but also morally contentious—forcing deep reflection on personal values and societal norms. This article investigates that what may impede the acceptance of a technology and/or the development of the field that supports or exploits it, the lines between which often become blurred in the face of morally contentious content. Using a unique dataset with historically important timing—the United States Biotechnology Study fielded just 9 months after the public announcement of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Beyond Simon’s Means-Ends Analysis: Natural Creativity and the Unanswered ‘Why’ in the Design of Intelligent Systems for Problem-Solving. [REVIEW]Dongming Xu - 2010 - Minds and Machines 20 (3):327-347.
    Goal-directed problem solving as originally advocated by Herbert Simon’s means-ends analysis model has primarily shaped the course of design research on artificially intelligent systems for problem-solving. We contend that there is a definite disregard of a key phase within the overall design process that in fact logically precedes the actual problem solving phase. While systems designers have traditionally been obsessed with goal-directed problem solving, the basic determinants of the ultimate desired goal state still remain to be fully understood or categorically (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Nature of Appearance in Kant’s Transcendentalism: A Seman- tico-Cognitive Analysis.Sergey L. Katrechko - 2018 - Kantian Journal 37 (3):41-55.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Supervenience and neuroscience.Pete Mandik - 2011 - Synthese 180 (3):443 - 463.
    The philosophical technical term "supervenience" is frequently used in the philosophy of mind as a concise way of characterizing the core idea of physicalism in a manner that is neutral with respect to debates between reductive physicalists and nonreductive physicalists. I argue against this alleged neutrality and side with reductive physicalists. I am especially interested here in debates between psychoneural reductionists and nonreductive functionalist physicalists. Central to my arguments will be considerations concerning how best to articulate the spirit of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • What’s Really Going On in Searle’s “Chinese room‘.Georges Rey - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 50 (September):169-85.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   55 citations  
  • (1 other version)Subsymbolic computation and the chinese room.David J. Chalmers - 1992 - In John Dinsmore (ed.), The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap. Lawrence Erlbaum. pp. 25--48.
    More than a decade ago, philosopher John Searle started a long-running controversy with his paper “Minds, Brains, and Programs” (Searle, 1980a), an attack on the ambitious claims of artificial intelligence (AI). With his now famous _Chinese Room_ argument, Searle claimed to show that despite the best efforts of AI researchers, a computer could never recreate such vital properties of human mentality as intentionality, subjectivity, and understanding. The AI research program is based on the underlying assumption that all important aspects of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • The curious case of the chinese gym.B. Jack Copeland - 1993 - Synthese 95 (2):173-86.
    Searle has recently used two adaptations of his Chinese room argument in an attack on connectionism. I show that these new forms of the argument are fallacious. First I give an exposition of and rebuttal to the original Chinese room argument, and then a brief introduction to the essentials of connectionism.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Other bodies, other minds: A machine incarnation of an old philosophical problem. [REVIEW]Stevan Harnad - 1991 - Minds and Machines 1 (1):43-54.
    Explaining the mind by building machines with minds runs into the other-minds problem: How can we tell whether any body other than our own has a mind when the only way to know is by being the other body? In practice we all use some form of Turing Test: If it can do everything a body with a mind can do such that we can't tell them apart, we have no basis for doubting it has a mind. But what is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   89 citations  
  • (1 other version)Against naive mentalism.Hugh Wilder - 1991 - Metaphilosophy (October) 281 (October):281-291.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Kripke’s paradox and the Church–Turing thesis.Mark D. Sprevak - 2008 - Synthese 160 (2):285-295.
    Kripke (1982, Wittgenstein on rules and private language. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press) presents a rule-following paradox in terms of what we meant by our past use of “plus”, but the same paradox can be applied to any other term in natural language. Many responses to the paradox concentrate on fixing determinate meaning for “plus”, or for a small class of other natural language terms. This raises a problem: how can these particular responses be generalised to the whole of natural language? (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Intentionality and information processing: An alternative model for cognitive science.Kenneth M. Sayre - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (1):121-38.
    This article responds to two unresolved and crucial problems of cognitive science: (1) What is actually accomplished by functions of the nervous system that we ordinarily describe in the intentional idiom? and (2) What makes the information processing involved in these functions semantic? It is argued that, contrary to the assumptions of many cognitive theorists, the computational approach does not provide coherent answers to these problems, and that a more promising start would be to fall back on mathematical communication theory (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   75 citations  
  • Against neural chauvinism.Tom Cuda - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (July):111-27.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • (1 other version)Consciousness, explanatory inversion and cognitive science.John R. Searle - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (1):585-642.
    Cognitive science typically postulates unconscious mental phenomena, computational or otherwise, to explain cognitive capacities. The mental phenomena in question are supposed to be inaccessible in principle to consciousness. I try to show that this is a mistake, because all unconscious intentionality must be accessible in principle to consciousness; we have no notion of intrinsic intentionality except in terms of its accessibility to consciousness. I call this claim the The argument for it proceeds in six steps. The essential point is that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   289 citations  
  • Emotional Valence Precedes Semantic Maturation of Words: A Longitudinal Computational Study of Early Verbal Emotional Anchoring.José Á Martínez-Huertas, Guillermo Jorge-Botana & Ricardo Olmos - 2021 - Cognitive Science 45 (7):e13026.
    We present a longitudinal computational study on the connection between emotional and amodal word representations from a developmental perspective. In this study, children's and adult word representations were generated using the latent semantic analysis (LSA) vector space model and Word Maturity methodology. Some children's word representations were used to set a mapping function between amodal and emotional word representations with a neural network model using ratings from 9‐year‐old children. The neural network was trained and validated in the child semantic space. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology.Ned Block - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):615-678.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   352 citations  
  • Does cognitive science need “real” intentionality?Robert J. Matthews - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):616-617.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Conscious and unconscious representation of aspectual shape in cognitive science.Geoffrey Underwood - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):628-629.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Aspects and algorithms.Andy Clark - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):601-602.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Matter, levels, and consciousness.Jerry R. Hobbs - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):610-611.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • On the nature of programs, simulations, and organisms.R. J. Harvey - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):741-742.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence: John Preston and Mark Bishop, eds., Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002, xvi + 410, ISBN 0-19-925277-7. [REVIEW]Reese M. Heitner - 2005 - Minds and Machines 15 (1):97-106.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Language as a cognitive tool.Marco Mirolli & Domenico Parisi - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (4):517-528.
    The standard view of classical cognitive science stated that cognition consists in the manipulation of language-like structures according to formal rules. Since cognition is ‘linguistic’ in itself, according to this view language is just a complex communication system and does not influence cognitive processes in any substantial way. This view has been criticized from several perspectives and a new framework (Embodied Cognition) has emerged that considers cognitive processes as non-symbolic and heavily dependent on the dynamical interactions between the cognitive system (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Life and mind.Margaret A. Boden - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (4):453-463.
    It’s sometimes said, and even more often assumed, that life is necessary for mind. If so, and if A-Life promises to throw light on the nature of life as such, then A-Life is in principle highly relevant to the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. However, very few philosophers have attempted to argue for the relation between life and mind. It’s usually taken for granted. Even those (mostly in the Continental tradition, including some with a following in A-Life) who have (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Symmetry between the intentionality of minds and machines? The biological plausibility of Dennett’s account.Bence Nanay - 2006 - Minds and Machines 16 (1):57-71.
    One of the most influential arguments against the claim that computers can think is that while our intentionality is intrinsic, that of computers is derived: it is parasitic on the intentionality of the programmer who designed the computer-program. Daniel Dennett chose a surprising strategy for arguing against this asymmetry: instead of denying that the intentionality of computers is derived, he endeavours to argue that human intentionality is derived too. I intend to examine that biological plausibility of Dennett’s suggestion and show (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • On doing research on consciousness without being aware of it.Daniel Holender - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):612-614.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Constituent causation and the reality of mind.Georges Rey - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):620-621.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Computing as a Science: A Survey of Competing Viewpoints. [REVIEW]Matti Tedre - 2011 - Minds and Machines 21 (3):361-387.
    Since the birth of computing as an academic discipline, the disciplinary identity of computing has been debated fiercely. The most heated question has concerned the scientific status of computing. Some consider computing to be a natural science and some consider it to be an experimental science. Others argue that computing is bad science, whereas some say that computing is not a science at all. This survey article presents viewpoints for and against computing as a science. Those viewpoints are analyzed against (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • The roles of philosophy in cognitive science.Tim Van Gelder - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (2):117-36.
    When the various disciplines participating in cognitive science are listed, philosophy almost always gets a guernsey. Yet, a couple of years ago at the conference of the Cognitive Science Society in Boulder (USA), there was no philosophy or philosopher with any prominence on the program. When queried on this point, the organizer (one of the "superstars" of the field) claimed it was partly an accident, but partly also due to an impression among members of the committee that philosophy is basically (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Intrinsic content, active memory and the extended mind.Andy Clark - 2005 - Analysis 65 (1):1-11.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   81 citations  
  • A Pragmatic Approach to the Intentional Stance Semantic, Empirical and Ethical Considerations for the Design of Artificial Agents.Guglielmo Papagni & Sabine Koeszegi - 2021 - Minds and Machines 31 (4):505-534.
    Artificial agents are progressively becoming more present in everyday-life situations and more sophisticated in their interaction affordances. In some specific cases, like Google Duplex, GPT-3 bots or Deep Mind’s AlphaGo Zero, their capabilities reach or exceed human levels. The use contexts of everyday life necessitate making such agents understandable by laypeople. At the same time, displaying human levels of social behavior has kindled the debate over the adoption of Dennett’s ‘intentional stance’. By means of a comparative analysis of the literature (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Chinese Rooms and Program Portability.Mark D. Sprevak - 2007 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (4):755-776.
    I argue in this article that there is a mistake in Searle's Chinese room argument that has not received sufficient attention. The mistake stems from Searle's use of the Church-Turing thesis. Searle assumes that the Church-Turing thesis licences the assumption that the Chinese room can run any program. I argue that it does not, and that this assumption is false. A number of possible objections are considered and rejected. My conclusion is that it is consistent with Searle's argument to hold (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Searle's vision of psychology.James Higginbotham - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):608-610.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Intentionality and information theory.David P. Ellerman - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (1):143-144.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Understanding and integration.Jerry Samet - 1982 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (2):341-342.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Minds, brains, programs, and persons.Drew McDermott - 1982 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (2):339-341.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Computation is just interpretable symbol manipulation; cognition isn't.Stevan Harnad - 1994 - Minds and Machines 4 (4):379-90.
    Computation is interpretable symbol manipulation. Symbols are objects that are manipulated on the basis of rules operating only on theirshapes, which are arbitrary in relation to what they can be interpreted as meaning. Even if one accepts the Church/Turing Thesis that computation is unique, universal and very near omnipotent, not everything is a computer, because not everything can be given a systematic interpretation; and certainly everything can''t be givenevery systematic interpretation. But even after computers and computation have been successfully distinguished (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Virtual symposium on virtual mind.Patrick Hayes, Stevan Harnad, Donald Perlis & Ned Block - 1992 - Minds and Machines 2 (3):217-238.
    When certain formal symbol systems (e.g., computer programs) are implemented as dynamic physical symbol systems (e.g., when they are run on a computer) their activity can be interpreted at higher levels (e.g., binary code can be interpreted as LISP, LISP code can be interpreted as English, and English can be interpreted as a meaningful conversation). These higher levels of interpretability are called "virtual" systems. If such a virtual system is interpretable as if it had a mind, is such a "virtual (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Artificial intelligence, biology, and intentional states.Terrell Ward Bynum - 1985 - Metaphilosophy 16 (4):355-77.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Reaping the whirlwind: Reply to Harnad's Other Bodies, Other Minds[REVIEW]Larry Hauser - 1993 - Minds and Machines 3 (2):219-37.
    Harnad''s proposed robotic upgrade of Turing''s Test (TT), from a test of linguistic capacity alone to a Total Turing Test (TTT) of linguisticand sensorimotor capacity, conflicts with his claim that no behavioral test provides even probable warrant for attributions of thought because there is no evidence of consciousness besides private experience. Intuitive, scientific, and philosophical considerations Harnad offers in favor of his proposed upgrade are unconvincing. I agree with Harnad that distinguishing real from as if thought on the basis of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • The Mark of the Cognitive and the Coupling-Constitution Fallacy: A Defense of the Extended Mind Hypothesis.Giulia Piredda - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Unintended thought and nonconscious inferences exist.James S. Uleman & Jennifer K. Uleman - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):627-628.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Ontogeny and intentionality.Philip David Zelazo & J. Steven Reznick - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):631-632.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   66 citations  
  • The ability versus intentionality aspects of unconscious mental processes.Maria Czyzewska, Thomas Hill & Pawel Lewicki - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):602-602.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark