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  1. Consciousness and accessibility.Ned Block - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):596-598.
    This is my first publication of the distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness, though not using quite those terms. It ends with this: "The upshot is this: If Searle is using the access sense of "consciousness," his argument doesn't get to first base. If, as is more likely, he intends the what-it-is-like sense, his argument depends on assumptions about issues that the cognitivist is bound to regard as deeply unsettled empirical questions." Searle replies: "He refers to what he calls (...)
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  • Understanding and integration.Jerry Samet - 1982 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (2):341-342.
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  • Oscilações entre o reducionismo e o fisicalismo não-redutivo no naturalismo biológico de John Searle.Tárik de Athayde Prata & Maxwell Morais de Lima Filho - 2013 - Trans/Form/Ação 36 (2):195-218.
    O artigo examina a concepção de Searle sobre a redução da consciência (em especial a sua teoria acerca de seus poderes causais), que se mostra obscura e incoerente. Porém, essa incoerência não é inevitável, pois o naturalismo biológico possui elementos que permitiriam a articulação de uma teoria mais clara a respeito das capacidades causais. O exame da teoria de Pereboom e Kornblith possibilita entender por que a afirmação de identidade das capacidades causais leva a um reducionismo. Essa teoria aponta um (...)
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  • The Mystery of Capital and the Construction of Social Reality.Barry Smith, David M. Mark & Isaac Ehrlich (eds.) - 2008 - Open Court.
    John Searle’s The Construction of Social Reality and Hernando de Soto’s The Mystery of Capital shifted the focus of current thought on capital and economic development to the cultural and conceptual ideas that underpin market economies and that are taken for granted in developed nations. This collection of essays assembles 21 philosophers, economists, and political scientists to help readers understand these exciting new theories.
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  • Debunking Corporate Moral Responsibility.Manuel Velasquez - 2003 - Business Ethics Quarterly 13 (4):531-562.
    I address three topics. First, I argue that the issue of corporate moral responsibility is an important one for business ethics.Second, I examine a core argument for the claim that the corporate organization is a separate moral agent and show it is based on anunnoticed but elementary mistake deriving from the fallacy of division. Third, I examine the assumptions collectivists make about whatit means to say that organizations act and that they act intentionally and show that these assumptions are mistaken (...)
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  • The Nature of Appearance in Kant’s Transcendentalism: A Seman- tico-Cognitive Analysis.Sergey L. Katrechko - 2018 - Kantian Journal 37 (3):41-55.
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  • Language as a cognitive tool.Marco Mirolli & Domenico Parisi - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (4):517-528.
    The standard view of classical cognitive science stated that cognition consists in the manipulation of language-like structures according to formal rules. Since cognition is ‘linguistic’ in itself, according to this view language is just a complex communication system and does not influence cognitive processes in any substantial way. This view has been criticized from several perspectives and a new framework (Embodied Cognition) has emerged that considers cognitive processes as non-symbolic and heavily dependent on the dynamical interactions between the cognitive system (...)
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  • Symmetry between the intentionality of minds and machines? The biological plausibility of Dennett’s account.Bence Nanay - 2006 - Minds and Machines 16 (1):57-71.
    One of the most influential arguments against the claim that computers can think is that while our intentionality is intrinsic, that of computers is derived: it is parasitic on the intentionality of the programmer who designed the computer-program. Daniel Dennett chose a surprising strategy for arguing against this asymmetry: instead of denying that the intentionality of computers is derived, he endeavours to argue that human intentionality is derived too. I intend to examine that biological plausibility of Dennett’s suggestion and show (...)
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  • What’s Really Going On in Searle’s “Chinese room‘.Georges Rey - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 50 (September):169-85.
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  • Other bodies, other minds: A machine incarnation of an old philosophical problem. [REVIEW]Stevan Harnad - 1991 - Minds and Machines 1 (1):43-54.
    Explaining the mind by building machines with minds runs into the other-minds problem: How can we tell whether any body other than our own has a mind when the only way to know is by being the other body? In practice we all use some form of Turing Test: If it can do everything a body with a mind can do such that we can't tell them apart, we have no basis for doubting it has a mind. But what is (...)
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  • Intentionality and information processing: An alternative model for cognitive science.Kenneth M. Sayre - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (1):121-38.
    This article responds to two unresolved and crucial problems of cognitive science: (1) What is actually accomplished by functions of the nervous system that we ordinarily describe in the intentional idiom? and (2) What makes the information processing involved in these functions semantic? It is argued that, contrary to the assumptions of many cognitive theorists, the computational approach does not provide coherent answers to these problems, and that a more promising start would be to fall back on mathematical communication theory (...)
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  • Intrinsic content, active memory and the extended mind.Andy Clark - 2005 - Analysis 65 (1):1-11.
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  • Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology.Ned Block - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):615-678.
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  • Intentionality: No mystery.William T. Powers - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (1):152-153.
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  • The Chinese room revisited.J. R. Searle - 1982 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (2):345-348.
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  • Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence: John Preston and Mark Bishop, eds., Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002, xvi + 410, ISBN 0-19-925277-7. [REVIEW]Reese M. Heitner - 2005 - Minds and Machines 15 (1):97-106.
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  • Supervenience and neuroscience.Pete Mandik - 2011 - Synthese 180 (3):443 - 463.
    The philosophical technical term "supervenience" is frequently used in the philosophy of mind as a concise way of characterizing the core idea of physicalism in a manner that is neutral with respect to debates between reductive physicalists and nonreductive physicalists. I argue against this alleged neutrality and side with reductive physicalists. I am especially interested here in debates between psychoneural reductionists and nonreductive functionalist physicalists. Central to my arguments will be considerations concerning how best to articulate the spirit of the (...)
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  • The roles of philosophy in cognitive science.Tim Van Gelder - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (2):117-36.
    When the various disciplines participating in cognitive science are listed, philosophy almost always gets a guernsey. Yet, a couple of years ago at the conference of the Cognitive Science Society in Boulder (USA), there was no philosophy or philosopher with any prominence on the program. When queried on this point, the organizer (one of the "superstars" of the field) claimed it was partly an accident, but partly also due to an impression among members of the committee that philosophy is basically (...)
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  • Notationality and the information processing mind.Vinod Goel - 1991 - Minds and Machines 1 (2):129-166.
    Cognitive science uses the notion of computational information processing to explain cognitive information processing. Some philosophers have argued that anything can be described as doing computational information processing; if so, it is a vacuous notion for explanatory purposes.An attempt is made to explicate the notions of cognitive information processing and computational information processing and to specify the relationship between them. It is demonstrated that the resulting notion of computational information processing can only be realized in a restrictive class of dynamical (...)
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  • Computation is just interpretable symbol manipulation; cognition isn't.Stevan Harnad - 1994 - Minds and Machines 4 (4):379-90.
    Computation is interpretable symbol manipulation. Symbols are objects that are manipulated on the basis of rules operating only on theirshapes, which are arbitrary in relation to what they can be interpreted as meaning. Even if one accepts the Church/Turing Thesis that computation is unique, universal and very near omnipotent, not everything is a computer, because not everything can be given a systematic interpretation; and certainly everything can''t be givenevery systematic interpretation. But even after computers and computation have been successfully distinguished (...)
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  • A cognitive analysis of the chinese room argument.Norman Y. Teng - 2000 - Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):313-24.
    Searle's Chinese room argument is analyzed from a cognitive point of view. The analysis is based on a newly developed model of conceptual integration, the many space model proposed by Fauconnier and Turner. The main point of the analysis is that the central inference constructed in the Chinese room scenario is a result of a dynamic, cognitive activity of conceptual blending, with metaphor defining the basic features of the blending. Two important consequences follow: (1) Searle's recent contention that syntax is (...)
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  • (1 other version)Subsymbolic computation and the chinese room.David J. Chalmers - 1992 - In John Dinsmore (ed.), The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap. Lawrence Erlbaum. pp. 25--48.
    More than a decade ago, philosopher John Searle started a long-running controversy with his paper “Minds, Brains, and Programs” (Searle, 1980a), an attack on the ambitious claims of artificial intelligence (AI). With his now famous _Chinese Room_ argument, Searle claimed to show that despite the best efforts of AI researchers, a computer could never recreate such vital properties of human mentality as intentionality, subjectivity, and understanding. The AI research program is based on the underlying assumption that all important aspects of (...)
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  • Communication theory and intentionality.John G. Daugman - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (1):140-141.
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  • Intentionality and information theory.David P. Ellerman - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (1):143-144.
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  • Computation without representation.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (2):205-241.
    The received view is that computational states are individuated at least in part by their semantic properties. I offer an alternative, according to which computational states are individuated by their functional properties. Functional properties are specified by a mechanistic explanation without appealing to any semantic properties. The primary purpose of this paper is to formulate the alternative view of computational individuation, point out that it supports a robust notion of computational explanation, and defend it on the grounds of how computational (...)
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  • Wittgenstein on language and artificial intelligence: The Chinese-room thought experiment revisited.Klaus K. Obermeier - 1983 - Synthese 56 (September):339-50.
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  • Artificial intelligence, biology, and intentional states.Terrell Ward Bynum - 1985 - Metaphilosophy 16 (4):355-77.
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  • Language and the deep unconscious mind: Aspectualities of the theory of syntax.B. Elan Dresher & Norbert Hornstein - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):602-603.
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  • Does cognitive science need “real” intentionality?Robert J. Matthews - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):616-617.
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  • Information, causality, and intentionality.David Kelley - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (1):147-147.
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  • Intentionally: A problem of multiple reference frames, specificational information, and extraordinary boundary conditions on natural law.M. T. Turvey - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (1):153-155.
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  • Searle's demon and the brain simulator.Steven F. Savitt - 1982 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (2):342-343.
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  • (1 other version)É o naturalismo biológico uma concepção fisicalista?Tárik de Athayde Prata - 2012 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 16 (2):255-276.
    http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n2p255 O artigo investiga se o naturalismo biológico (a solução de John Searle para o problema mente-corpo) pode ser considerado uma concepção fisicalista acerca da mente. Apesar de defender um fisicalismo a respeito dos particulares (seção 2), Searle adere ao argumento básico dos dualistas para a irredutibilidade das propriedades mentais (seção 3), e não consegue fundamentar sua alegação de que tal irredutibilidade é compatível com o fisicalismo (seção 4). Desse modo, sua teoria da mente se revela como um dualismo de (...)
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  • Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Questions: Thomas Metzinger ; Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000, x + 350 pp., $52.00 , ISBN 0-262-13370-9. [REVIEW]Kenneth Williford - 2005 - Minds and Machines 15 (1):106-112.
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  • How Authentic Intentionality can be Enabled: a Neurocomputational Hypothesis. [REVIEW]Matteo Colombo - 2010 - Minds and Machines 20 (2):183-202.
    According to John Haugeland, the capacity for “authentic intentionality” depends on a commitment to constitutive standards of objectivity. One of the consequences of Haugeland’s view is that a neurocomputational explanation cannot be adequate to understand “authentic intentionality”. This paper gives grounds to resist such a consequence. It provides the beginning of an account of authentic intentionality in terms of neurocomputational enabling conditions. It argues that the standards, which constitute the domain of objects that can be represented, reflect the statistical structure (...)
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  • Cognitivism and explanatory relativity.Jeffrey Hershfield - 1998 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (4):505-526.
    In much of his writing in the philosophy of mind, John Searle has been highly critical of what N. Block refers to as ‘The Computer Model of the Mind’ — the approach that treats the mind as a symbol-manipulating device akin in spirit, if not detail, to the modem computer. Searle refers to this philosophical approach as ‘cognitivism.’ The extent of his skepticism and animus toward the computer model of the mind is plainly apparent in the following quotation from Searle: (...)
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  • Searle's Chinese Box: Debunking the Chinese Room Argument. [REVIEW]Larry Hauser - 1997 - Minds and Machines 7 (2):199-226.
    John Searle's Chinese room argument is perhaps the most influential andwidely cited argument against artificial intelligence (AI). Understood astargeting AI proper – claims that computers can think or do think– Searle's argument, despite its rhetorical flash, is logically andscientifically a dud. Advertised as effective against AI proper, theargument, in its main outlines, is an ignoratio elenchi. It musterspersuasive force fallaciously by indirection fostered by equivocaldeployment of the phrase "strong AI" and reinforced by equivocation on thephrase "causal powers" (at least) equal (...)
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  • The curious case of the chinese gym.B. Jack Copeland - 1993 - Synthese 95 (2):173-86.
    Searle has recently used two adaptations of his Chinese room argument in an attack on connectionism. I show that these new forms of the argument are fallacious. First I give an exposition of and rebuttal to the original Chinese room argument, and then a brief introduction to the essentials of connectionism.
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  • Reaping the whirlwind: Reply to Harnad's Other Bodies, Other Minds[REVIEW]Larry Hauser - 1993 - Minds and Machines 3 (2):219-37.
    Harnad''s proposed robotic upgrade of Turing''s Test (TT), from a test of linguistic capacity alone to a Total Turing Test (TTT) of linguisticand sensorimotor capacity, conflicts with his claim that no behavioral test provides even probable warrant for attributions of thought because there is no evidence of consciousness besides private experience. Intuitive, scientific, and philosophical considerations Harnad offers in favor of his proposed upgrade are unconvincing. I agree with Harnad that distinguishing real from as if thought on the basis of (...)
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  • Chinese Rooms and Program Portability.Mark D. Sprevak - 2007 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (4):755-776.
    I argue in this article that there is a mistake in Searle's Chinese room argument that has not received sufficient attention. The mistake stems from Searle's use of the Church-Turing thesis. Searle assumes that the Church-Turing thesis licences the assumption that the Chinese room can run any program. I argue that it does not, and that this assumption is false. A number of possible objections are considered and rejected. My conclusion is that it is consistent with Searle's argument to hold (...)
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  • Matter, levels, and consciousness.Jerry R. Hobbs - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):610-611.
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  • Who is computing with the brain?John R. Searle - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):632-642.
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  • Consciousness, historical inversion, and cognitive science.Andrew W. Young - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):630-631.
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  • Consciousness as physiological self-organizing process.Walter J. Freeman - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):604-605.
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  • Semantic information: Inference rules + memory.Michael Lebowitz - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (1):147-148.
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  • Reasoning as a source of justification.Magdalena Balcerak Jackson & Brendan Balcerak Jackson - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):113-126.
    In this essay we argue that reasoning can sometimes generate epistemic justification, rather than merely transmitting justification that the subject already possesses to new beliefs. We also suggest a way to account for it in terms of the relationship between epistemic normative requirements, justification and cognitive capacities.
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  • Virtual symposium on virtual mind.Patrick Hayes, Stevan Harnad, Donald Perlis & Ned Block - 1992 - Minds and Machines 2 (3):217-238.
    When certain formal symbol systems (e.g., computer programs) are implemented as dynamic physical symbol systems (e.g., when they are run on a computer) their activity can be interpreted at higher levels (e.g., binary code can be interpreted as LISP, LISP code can be interpreted as English, and English can be interpreted as a meaningful conversation). These higher levels of interpretability are called "virtual" systems. If such a virtual system is interpretable as if it had a mind, is such a "virtual (...)
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  • J. R. Searle ve çin odası argümanı.Ferhat Onur - 2016 - Ethos: Dialogues in Philosophy and Social Sciences 9 (1).
    John R. Searle’nin Çin Odası Argümanı oldukça ilgi çekici ve üzerinde çokça tartışılmış bir argümandır. Argümanın ilgi çekiciliğini günümüzün en baskın zihin kuramlarından biri olan kompütasyonalizmi hedef almasına, üzerinde çokça tartışılmasını ise felsefi implikasyonlarının hayli zengin olmasına bağlayabiliriz. Searle, argümanının beynin kelimenin tam anlamıyla bir bilgisayar, zihnin de bir bilgisayar programı olduğunu ileri süren kompütasyonalizmin kesin ve net bir reddi olarak görse de, bize ve birçoklarına göre argüman onun düşündüğü kadar ikna edici değildir. Bu çalışmada Çin Odası Argümanı Searle’nin genel (...)
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  • Searle's Freudian slip.Hubert L. Dreyfus - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):603-604.
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  • Intentionality as internality.Don Perlis & Rosalie Hall - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (1):151-152.
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