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  1. The debate over the so-called reality of moral dilemmas.Daniel Statman - 1990 - Philosophical Papers 19 (3):191-211.
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  • Idealizing Morality.Lisa Tessman - 2010 - Hypatia 25 (4):797 - 824.
    Implicit in feminist and other critiques of ideal theorizing is a particular view of what normative theory should be like. Although I agree with the rejection of ideal theorizing that oppression theorists (and other theorists of justice) have advocated, the proposed alternative of nonideal theorizing is also problematic. Nonideal theorizing permits one to address oppression by first describing (nonideal) oppressive conditions, and then prescribing the best action that is possible or feasible given the conditions. Borrowing an insight from the "moral (...)
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  • Dilemmas and incommensurateness.Terrance C. McConnell - 1993 - Journal of Value Inquiry 27 (2):247-252.
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  • Moral dilemmas.Terrance McConnell - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • But what should I do?Sven Ove Hansson - 1999 - Philosophia 27 (3-4):433-440.
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  • (1 other version)The Logical Possibility of Moral Dilemmas in Expressivist Semantics: A Case Study.Ryo Tanaka - 2024 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 20 (1):55-85.
    In this paper, using Mark Schroeder’s (2008a) expressivist semantic framework for normative language as a case study, I will identify difficulties that even an expressivist semantic theory capable of addressing the Frege-Geach problem will encounter in handling the logical possibility of moral dilemmas. To this end, I will draw on a classical puzzle formulated by McConnell (1978) that the logical possibility of moral dilemmas conflicts with some of the prima facie plausible axioms of the standard deontic logic, which include obligation (...)
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  • Conceptual limitations, puzzlement, and epistemic dilemmas.Deigan Michael - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2771-2796.
    Conceptual limitations restrict our epistemic options. One cannot believe, disbelieve, or doubt what one cannot grasp. I show how, even granting an epistemic ought-implies-can principle, such restrictions might lead to epistemic dilemmas: situations where each of one’s options violates some epistemic requirement. An alternative reaction would be to take epistemic norms to be sensitive to one’s options in ways that ensure dilemmas never arise. I propose, on behalf of the dilemmist, that we treat puzzlement as a kind of epistemic residue, (...)
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  • “Ought” Implies “Can” but Does Not Imply “Must”: An Asymmetry between Becoming Infeasible and Becoming Overridden.Peter Vranas - 2018 - Philosophical Review 127 (4):487-514.
    The claim that (OIC) “ought” implies “can” (i.e., you have an obligation only at times at which you can obey it) entails that (1) obligations that become infeasible are lost (i.e., you stop having an obligation when you become unable to obey it). Moreover, the claim that (2) obligations that become overridden are not always lost (i.e., sometimes you keep having an obligation when you acquire a stronger incompatible obligation) entails that (ONIM) “ought” does not imply “must” (i.e., some obligations (...)
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  • Rights, Duties, and Moral Conflicts.Biasetti Pierfrancesco - 2014 - Etica E Politica (2):1042-1062.
    In this paper I would like to make a contribution to the debate on rights-talk and duties-talk relationship and priority by addressing the problem from a peculiar angle: that of moral conflicts and dilemma. My working hypothesis is that it should be possible to identify some basic and relevant normative features of rights-talk and duties-talk by observing how they modify the description of moral conflicts. I will try to show that both rights and duties posses original and irreducible normative features, (...)
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  • The Ethics of Climate Engineering: Solar Radiation Management and Non-Ideal Justice.Toby Svoboda - 2017 - Routledge.
    This book analyzes major ethical issues surrounding the use of climate engineering, particularly solar radiation management techniques, which have the potential to reduce some risks of anthropogenic climate change but also carry their own risks of harm and injustice. The book argues that we should approach the ethics of climate engineering via "non-ideal theory," which investigates what justice requires given the fact that many parties have failed to comply with their duty to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. Specifically, it argues that (...)
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  • Contributii la psihologia morala: evaluari ale rezultatelor si noi cercetari empirice.Bogdan Olaru & Andrei Holman (eds.) - 2015 - Bucuresti, Romania: Pro Universitaria.
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  • Psihologia morala si natura judecarii morale. O examinare critica a modelului social intuitionist.Emilian Mihailov - 2015 - In Bogdan Olaru & Andrei Holman (eds.), Contributii la psihologia morala: evaluari ale rezultatelor si noi cercetari empirice. Bucuresti, Romania: Pro Universitaria. pp. 61-74.
    În acest studiu, îmi propun să arăt că modelul social intuiţionist al judecăţii morale propus de Haidt este la rândul său prea restrictiv faţă de influenţa raţionării morale, poate tot aşa cum modelul raţionalist subestima influenţa emoţiilor morale. Mai întâi, voi prezenta modelul raţionalist despre natura judecăţii morale şi voi evidenţia rezultatele empirice care au contribuit la erodarea sa. Apoi, voi prezenta şi critica modelul social intuiţionist revigorat de revoluţia „afectivă” din psihologia morală, argumentând că rezultatele din psihologia experimentală, neuroştiinţă (...)
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  • Moral dilemmas.Shyam Nair - 2015 - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    A moral dilemma is a situation where an agent’s obligations conflict. Debate in this area focuses on the question of whether genuine moral dilemmas exist. This question involves considering not only the nature and significance of dilemmas, but also the connections between dilemmas, the logic of obligation and moral emotions.
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  • Moral Obligations: Actualist, Possibilist, or Hybridist?Travis Timmerman & Yishai Cohen - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):672-686.
    Do facts about what an agent would freely do in certain circumstances at least partly determine any of her moral obligations? Actualists answer ‘yes’, while possibilists answer ‘no’. We defend two novel hybrid accounts that are alternatives to actualism and possibilism: Dual Obligations Hybridism and Single Obligation Hybridism. By positing two moral ‘oughts’, each account retains the benefits of actualism and possibilism, yet is immune from the prima facie problems that face actualism and possibilism. We conclude by highlighting one substantive (...)
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  • Geoengineering, Agent-Regret, and the Lesser of Two Evils Argument.Toby Svoboda - 2015 - Environmental Ethics 37 (2):207-220.
    According to the “Lesser of Two Evils Argument,” deployment of solar radiation management (SRM) geoengineering in a climate emergency would be morally justified because it likely would be the best option available. A prominent objection to this argument is that a climate emergency might constitute a genuine moral dilemma in which SRM would be impermissible even if it was the best option. However, while conceiving of a climate emergency as a moral dilemma accounts for some ethical concerns about SRM, it (...)
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  • Sentimentalism and Moral Dilemmas.András Szigeti - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (1):1-22.
    It is sometimes said that certain hard moral choices constitute tragic moral dilemmas in which no available course of action is justifiable, and so the agent is blameworthy whatever she chooses. This paper criticizes a certain approach to the debate about moral dilemmas and considers the metaethical implications of the criticisms. The approach in question has been taken by many advocates as well as opponents of moral dilemmas who believe that analysing the emotional response of the agent is the key (...)
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  • Moral Dilemma and Moral Sense A Phenomenological Account.Bryan Lueck - 2015 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 29 (2):218-235.
    In this paper I argue that a phenomenological account of moral sense-bestowal can provide valuable insight into the possibility of moral dilemmas. I propose an account of moral sense-bestowal that is grounded in the phenomenology of expression that Maurice Merleau-Ponty developed throughout the course of his philosophical work, and most explicitly in the period immediately following the publication of Phenomenology of Perception. Based on this Merleau-Pontian account of moral sense-bestowal, I defend the view that there are genuine moral dilemmas, i.e., (...)
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  • The Job’s Dilemma: Fiat justitia, ruat caelum.Paolo Gomarasca - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (3):95--115.
    The aim of the paper is to examine the problem of suffering in the book of Job and the possible solution it offers. For this reason, it is structured as follows: In the first section, we will analyse Job’s evidential argument; the second section will delve into the ”friends’ and their failed attempt at a retributive theodicy; finally, we shall look into God’s argument and try to explain Job’s answer in terms of sceptical theism.
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  • modality and meaning.William G. Lycan - 1994 - Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    MEANING POSTULATES REINSTATED If I am right in agreeing with Cresswell that the "logicarrlexicaT distinction is one of degree rather than one of kind, that in turn impugns the distinction between the official truth-rules that define logical ...
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  • How Kant's View of Perfect and Imperfect Duties Resolves an Alleged Moral Dilemma for Judges.Lawrence Masek - 2005 - Ratio Juris 18 (4):415-428.
    I clarify Kant's classification of duties and criticize the apocryphal tradition that, according to Kant, perfect duties trump imperfect duties. I then use Kant's view to argue that judges who believe that an action is immoral and should be illegal need not set aside their beliefs in order to comply with binding precedents that permit the action. The same view of morality that causes some people to oppose certain actions, including abortion, requires lower–court judges to comply with binding precedents. Therefore, (...)
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  • Breaking ties: The significance of choice in symmetrical moral dilemmas.Carla Bagnoli - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (2):157–170.
    In symmetrical moral dilemmas, the agent faces a choice between two incompatible actions, which are equally justified on the basis of the same value. These cases are generally discounted as spurious or irrelevant on the assumption that, when there is no failure of commensurability, choice between symmetrical requirements is indifferent and can be determined by randomization. Alternatively, this article argues that the appeal to randomization allows the agent to overcome a deliberative impasse, but it does not really resolve the moral (...)
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  • Slote on rational dilemmas and rational supererogation.Joe Mintoff - 1997 - Erkenntnis 46 (1):111-126.
    The so-called optimising conception of rationality includes (amongst other things) the following two claims: (i) that it is irrational to choose an option if you know there is a better one, and (ii) there are no situations in which an agent, through no practical fault of her own, cannot avoid acting irrationally. As part of his ongoing attempt to explain why we need to go beyond the optimising conception, Michael Slote discusses a number of examples in which it seems that (...)
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  • Politische Verantwortung, moralische Integrität und die Bitte um Verzeihung. Überlegungen zum ‚Problem der Schmutzigen Hände’.Susanne Boshammer - 2018 - Zeitschrift Für Ethik Und Moralphilosophie 1 (1):5-26.
    ZusammenfassungEiner weit verbreiteten Auffassung zufolge sind politische Verantwortung und moralische Unschuld auf Dauer unvereinbar. Wer Macht hat, so der Gedanke, wird früher oder später Schuld auf sich laden und seine moralische Integrität riskieren. Diese „These von den schmutzigen Händen“ lässt mindestens drei verschiedene Lesarten zu, die im ersten Teil des Textes unterschieden werden. Eine davon besagt, dass das Problem der schmutzigen Hände daraus resultiert, dass im Feld der Politik Konfliktsituationen unausweichlich sind, die den Akteuren keine andere Wahl lassen, als jemandem (...)
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  • Reasons and Impossibility.Bart Streumer - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (3):351-384.
    Many philosophers claim that it cannot be the case that a person ought to perform an action if this person cannot perform this action. However, most of these philosophers do not give arguments for the truth of this claim. In this paper, I argue that it is plausible to interpret this claim in such a way that it is entailed by the claim that there cannot be a reason for a person to perform an action if it is impossible that (...)
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  • Normative conflicts and the logic of 'ought'.Lou Goble - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):450-489.
    On the face of it, normative conflicts are commonplace. Yet standard deontic logic declares them to be logically impossible. That prompts the question, What are the proper principles of normative reasoning if such conflicts are possible? This paper examines several alternatives that have been proposed for a logic of 'ought' that can accommodate normative conflicts, and finds all of them unsatisfactory as measured against three criteria of adequacy. It then introduces a new logic that does meet all three criteria, and (...)
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  • Moral Dilemmas and ‘Ought and Ought Not’.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1987 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):127-139.
    Although common sense and literature support the possibility of moral dilemmas, many traditional and contemporary philosophers deny this possibility because of several arguments. Probably the strongest argument against the possibility of moral dilemmas can be called the argument from ought and ought not. Various versions of this argument have been presented by McConnell, Hare, and Conee. Its basic form can be outlined as follows.If any agent is in any moral dilemma, then that agent ought to adopt each of two alternatives (...)
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  • Judith Jarvis Thomson, goodness and advice (princeton, NJ: Princeton university press, 2000), XVI + 188 pp. [REVIEW]Michael J. Zimmerman - 2004 - Noûs 38 (3):534–552.
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  • No Need to Get Emotional? Emotions and Heuristics.András Szigeti - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (4):845-862.
    Many believe that values are crucially dependent on emotions. This paper focuses on epistemic aspects of the putative link between emotions and value by asking two related questions. First, how exactly are emotions supposed to latch onto or track values? And second, how well suited are emotions to detecting or learning about values? To answer the first question, the paper develops the heuristics-model of emotions. This approach models emotions as sui generis heuristics of value. The empirical plausibility of the heuristics-model (...)
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  • Deontic logic and the possibility of moral conflict.Michael J. Almeida - 1990 - Erkenntnis 33 (1):57 - 71.
    Standard dyadic deontic logic (as well as standard deontic logic) has recently come under attack by moral philosophers who maintain that the axioms of standard dyadic deontic logic are biased against moral theories which generate moral conflicts. Since moral theories which generate conflicts are at least logically tenable, it is argued, standard dyadic deontic logic should be modified so that the set of logically possible moral theories includes those which generate such conflicts. I argue that (1) there are only certain (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Logical Possibility of Moral Dilemmas in Expressivist Semantics.Ryo Tanaka - 2024 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 20 (1):55-85.
    In this paper, using Mark Schroeder’s (2008a) expressivist semantic framework for normative language as a case study, I will identify difficulties that even an expressivist semantic theory capable of addressing the Frege-Geach problem will encounter in handling the logical possibility of moral dilemmas. To this end, I will draw on a classical puzzle formulated by McConnell (1978) that the logical possibility of moral dilemmas conflicts with some of the prima facie plausible axioms of the standard deontic logic, which include obligation (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Conflitos morais insolúveis e teorias normativas: uma abordagem preliminar sobre consistência moral.Lauren de Lacerda Nunes & Gabriel Garmendia da Trindade - 2011 - Princípios 18 (30):85-100.
    Normal 0 21 false false false MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Tabela normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language:#0400; mso-fareast-language:#0400; mso-bidi-language:#0400;} O presente artigo aborda dois tópicos específicos em ética: o problema dos conflitos morais em filosofia e a questáo da consistência em teorias morais. A relaçáo entre conflitos morais e consistência moral estabelecida neste trabalho foi realizada graças à natureza de alguns tipos de conflitos morais, a saber: os (...)
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  • Deep moral dilemmas.Douglas Odegard - 1987 - Theoria 53 (2-3):73-86.
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  • Moral Dilemmas that Matter.Kevin Kimble - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):29.
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  • Adolescents’ and young adults’ practical moral judgments on typical everyday-life moral dilemmas: Gender differences in approach to resolution.Yoko Takagi & Herbert D. Saltzstein - 2023 - Philosophical Psychology 36 (2):413-437.
    Adolescents’ and young adults’ practical moral judgments about two interpersonal moral dilemmas, which differed in their moral complexity, were examined using two philosophical frameworks (deontological and consequentialist principles) as tools for psychological analysis. A sample of 234 participants (ages 14–16, 18–19, and 20–21) reasoned about two moral dilemmas, which had been experienced by a subset of adolescents in a pilot study, in two forms: Participants 1) provided open-ended decisions and justification from the perspective of an imagined moral agent and 2) (...)
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  • Jefte w tarapatach: Moralne dylematy a teizm.William E. Mann - 2017 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 65 (4):351-381.
    Artykuł omawia zjawisko dylematów moralnych z perspektywy teistycznej. Teiści przyjmują często, że (1) opatrznościowy Bóg nigdy nie postawiłby stworzonej przez siebie istoty przed taką sytuacją wyboru, w której owa istota nie jest w stanie uniknąć czynu niesłusznego, bądź że (2)jeśli istota staje przed taką sytuacją wyboru, to jest to wynikiem pewnego niesłusznego działania, którego dokonałajuż wcześniej. Wielu komentatorów przypisuje tę drugą opcję Tomaszowi z Akwinu. Autor argumentuje, że taka interpretacjajest błędna, przytaczając między innymi przeprowadzoną przez Akwinatę analizę ślubowania Jeftego opisanego (...)
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  • O intuicicionismo moral e os dilemas morais.Ricardo Bins Di Napoli - 2012 - Dissertatio 35:79-98.
    Na história da filosofia moral, por um lado, de Platão, passando por Aristoteles, I. Kant, J. S. Mill, e mais recentemente incluindo racionalistas como J. Habermas, J. Rawls, R. M. Hare e C. Korsgaard, várias tentativas foram feitas para mostrar que a razão é o melhor guia para nossas ações e julgamentos. Por outro lado, outros filósofos como D. Hume, A. Smith, A. J. Ayer, P. F. Strawson and S. Blackburn ensinaram que a moralidade deve ser uma tarefa para nossos (...)
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  • Interpersonales Dilemma statt irrtumsfreie Nichtübereinstimmung: Ein anderer Blick auf das Phänomen, das den moralischen Relativismus motiviert.Peter Wiersbinski - 2018 - Zeitschrift Für Ethik Und Moralphilosophie 1 (2):237-261.
    ZusammenfassungRelativisten wollen erklären, wie es möglich ist, dass X urteilt „A soll vollzogen werden“ und Y urteilt „A soll nicht vollzogen werden“ und beide das Wahre urteilen. Sowohl indexikalistische Relativisten als auch Wahrheitsrelativisten gehen dabei vom Verhältnis der Negation zwischen den Urteilen aus. Wahrheitsrelativisten halten dafür, dass im ersten Urteil ein Inhalt akzeptiert wird, der im zweiten abgelehnt wird, und dass die Wahrheit beider Urteile durch verschiedene moralische Standards zu evaluieren ist. Indexikalisten denken, dass im ersten Urteil ein anderer Inhalt (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Conflitos morais insolúveis e teorias normativas: uma abordagem preliminar sobre consistência moral.Lauren de Lacerda Nunes & Gabriel Garmendia da Trindade - 2012 - Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (Ufrn) 18 (30):85-100.
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