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  1. Assimilations and Rollbacks: Two Arguments Against Libertarianism Defended.Seth Shabo - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (1):151-172.
    The Assimilation Argument purports to show that libertarians cannot plausibly distinguish supposed exercises of free will from random outcomes that nobody would count as exercises of free will. If this argument is sound, libertarians should either abandon their position or else concede that free will is a mystery. Drawing on a parallel with the Manipulation Argument against compatibilism, Christopher Franklin has recently contended that the Assimilation Argument is unsound. Here I defend the Assimilation Argument and the Rollback Argument, a second (...)
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  • ACT-Endorsing Libertarianism, Constitutive Luck, and Basic Moral Responsibility.Christopher P. Taggart - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (4):707-716.
    Because an agent’s constitutive luck may seem to preclude free will, it may seem to preclude moral responsibility. An agent is basically morally responsible for performing actionAat timetonly if there is another possible world with the same past up totand the same laws of nature in which the agent does not performAatt. A compatibilist can solve the constitutive luck problem for moral responsibility without worrying about basic moral responsibility. According to compatibilism, if determinism is true, then agents can be morally (...)
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  • Have Compatibilists Solved the Luck Problem for Libertarians?Stephen Kearns & Alfred R. Mele - 2014 - Philosophical Inquiries 2 (2):9-36.
    A pair of compatibilists, John Fischer (2012: ch. 6; n.d.) and Manuel Vargas (2012) have responded to a problem about luck that Alfred Mele (2005, 2006) posed for incompatibilist believers in free will and moral responsibility. They offer assistance to libertarians - at least on this front. In this paper, we assess their responses and explain why what they offer is inadequate for libertarian purposes.
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  • Free Will and Luck: Compatibilism versus Incompatibilism.Alfred R. Mele - 2020 - The Monist 103 (3):262-277.
    Compatibilists about free will maintain that free will is compatible with determinism, and incompatibilists disagree. Incompatibilist believers in free will have been challenged to solve a problem that luck poses for them—the problem of present luck. This article articulates that challenge and then explores a novel compatibilist view recently proposed by Christian List. It is argued that List’s view, unlike standard compatibilist views, faces a very similar problem about luck.
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  • Constitutive Moral Luck and Strawson's Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility.Robert J. Hartman - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (2):165-183.
    Galen Strawson’s Basic Argument is that because self-creation is required to be truly morally responsible and self-creation is impossible, it is impossible to be truly morally responsible for anything. I contend that the Basic Argument is unpersuasive and unsound. First, I argue that the moral luck debate shows that the self-creation requirement appears to be contradicted and supported by various parts of our commonsense ideas about moral responsibility, and that this ambivalence undermines the only reason that Strawson gives for the (...)
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  • The Two‐Stage Luck Objection.Seth Shabo - 2020 - Noûs 54 (1):3-23.
    The Luck Objection is an influential family of challenges to libertarianism. In recent years, discussions of the Luck Objection have reached an impasse of sorts. On one hand, existing responses to the objection have failed to satisfy libertarianism’s many critics. On the other hand, a growing number of libertarians seem unimpressed by existing formulations of the objection. To break the impasse, I present a two-stage version of the objection. The first stage has the limited objective of showing that supposed exercises (...)
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  • Moral Responsibility, Luck, and Compatibilism.Taylor W. Cyr - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (1):193-214.
    In this paper, I defend a version of compatibilism against luck-related objections. After introducing the types of luck that some take to be problematic for moral responsibility, I consider and respond to two recent attempts to show that compatibilism faces the same problem of luck that libertarianism faces—present luck. I then consider a different type of luck—constitutive luck—and provide a new solution to this problem. One upshot of the present discussion is a reason to prefer a history-sensitive compatibilist account over (...)
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  • Free Will and Moral Responsibility: Manipulation, Luck, and Agents’ Histories.Alfred R. Mele - 2019 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43 (1):75-92.
    Midwest Studies In Philosophy, EarlyView.
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  • Indeterministic Choice and Ability.Ishtiyaque Haji & Ryan Hebert - 2018 - The Journal of Ethics 22 (2):191-203.
    The problem of luck is advanced and defended against libertarian theories of responsibility-enabling ability. An outline of an account of ability is articulated to explore some features of the sort of ability moral responsibility requires. The account vindicates the luck objection and suggests a novel puzzle: Libertarianism is structurally barred from answering the problem of luck because responsibility requires, but inherently lacks, an explanation from reason states to actions that preserves reliability of connection between responsibility-grounding reasons-sensitivity and action.
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  • Weighing in on decisions in the brain: neural representations of pre-awareness practical intention.Robyn Repko Waller - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):5175-5203.
    Neuroscientists have located brain activity that prepares or encodes action plans before agents are aware of intending to act. On the basis of these findings and broader agency research, activity in these regions has been proposed as the neural realizers of practical intention. My aim in this paper is to evaluate the case for taking these neural states to be neural representations of intention. I draw on work in philosophy of action on the role and nature of practical intentions to (...)
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  • Diana and Ernie return: on Carolina Sartorio’s Causation and Free Will.Alfred R. Mele - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (6):1525-1533.
    In the final chapter of her Causation and Free Will, Carolina Sartorio offers a novel reply to an original-design argument for the thesis that determinism is incompatible with free will and moral responsibility, an argument that resembles Alfred Mele’s zygote argument in Free Will and Luck. This article assesses the merits of her reply. It is concluded that Sartorio has more work to do if she is to lay this style of argument to rest.
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  • Luck, Compatibilism, and Libertarianism.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2015 - Dialogue 54 (4):611-631.
    Plusieurs ont soutenu par le passé que les descriptions libertariennes de l’action libre achoppent sur le problème de la chance. Il a récemment été proposé que les descriptions compatibilistes, selon lesquelles l’action libre et le déterminisme sont compatibles, sont affaiblies par un problème similaire. Dans cet article, je soutiens que le problème de la chance compatibiliste n’est pas nouveau, dans la mesure où il s’agit d’une manifestation d’une question plus générale à laquelle les compatibilistes et les libertariens ont répondu. En (...)
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  • Libertarianism, Compatibilism, and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2015 - The Journal of Ethics 19 (1):1-21.
    The “problem of present luck” targets a standard libertarian thesis about free will. It has been argued that there is an analogous problem about luck for compatibilists. This article explores similarities and differences between the alleged problems.
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  • Manipulation, Moral Responsibility, and Bullet Biting.Alfred R. Mele - 2013 - The Journal of Ethics 17 (3):167-184.
    This article’s guiding question is about bullet biting: When should compatibilists about moral responsibility bite the bullet in responding to stories used in arguments for incompatibilism about moral responsibility? Featured stories are vignettes in which agents’ systems of values are radically reversed by means of brainwashing and the story behind the zygote argument. The malady known as “intuition deficit disorder” is also discussed.
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  • On Pereboom’s Disappearing Agent Argument.Alfred R. Mele - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (3):561-574.
    This article is a critical discussion of Derk Pereboom’s “disappearing agent objection” to event-causal libertarianism in his Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life. This objection is an important plank in Pereboom’s argument for free will skepticism. It is intended to knock event-causal libertarianism, a leading pro-free-will view, out of contention. I explain why readers should not find the objection persuasive.
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  • Luck’s Extended Reach.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):191-218.
    Something is a matter of luck if it is beyond our control. In this paper, I argue for the primary thesis that luck can undermine varieties of obligation, such as moral and prudential obligation, as well as judgments that are best from an agent’s own point of view. Among the considerations invoked to defend this thesis is a prevalent form of libertarianism, event-causal libertarianism. Arguments for the primary thesis that call on event-causal libertarianism raise concerns with this variety of libertarianism.
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  • (1 other version)Luck and Free Will.Alfred R. Mele - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):543-557.
    This essay sketches a problem about luck for typical incompatibilist views of free will posed in Alfred Mele, Free Will and Luck , and examines recent reactions to that problem. Reactions featuring appeals to agent causation receive special attention. Because the problem is focused on decision making, the control that agents have over what they decide is a central topic. Other topics discussed include the nature of lucky action and differences between directly and indirectly free actions.
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  • Agency incompatibilism, luck, and intelligibility.Bradford Stockdale - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    The problem of luck is one of the most formidable obstacles currently facing libertarian theories of free will. Some have argued that there is no problem, while others have argued that the problem is not a unique one for libertarians. Still others acknowledge the problem and aim to address it with their preferred libertarian theory. Steward (2012) takes the latter strategy with her agency incompatibilism. She develops a version of the problem of present luck and argues that agents who possess (...)
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  • Alternative Possibilities and a Dogma on Freedom Debate選択可能性と「自由論のドグマ」.Taehee Lee - 2018 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 51 (1):19-40.
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