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A Gate‐Based Account of Intentions.Stéphane Lemaire - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (1):45-67.details
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Distributed intentionality: A model of intentional behavior in humans.Marco Mazzone & Emanuela Campisi - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):267 - 290.details
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Action.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2012 - In Keith Frankish & William Ramsey (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 92--111.details
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Deciding: how special is it?Alfred R. Mele - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (3):359-375.details
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Meaning and Emotion: The Extended Gricean Model and What Emotional Signs Mean.Constant Bonard - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Geneva and University of Antwerpdetails
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Merleau-Ponty and the transcendental problem of bodily agency.Rasmus Thybo Jensen - 2013 - In Rasmus Thybo Jensen & Dermot Moran (eds.), The Phenomenology of Embodied Subjectivity, Contributions to Phenomenology 71. Springer. pp. 43-61.details
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Free Will, Causality, and Neuroscience.Bernard Feltz, Marcus Missal & Andrew Sims (eds.) - 2019 - Leiden: Brill.details
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Frankfurt-style counterexamples and begging the question.Stewart Goetz - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):83-105.details
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Intentions and self-referential content.Tomis Kapitan - 1995 - Philosophical Papers 24 (3):151-166.details
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Socratic akratic action.Alfred R. Mele - 1996 - Philosophical Papers 25 (3):149-159.details
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Luck, the Range of Obligations, and Frankfurt Examples.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2014 - Philosophical Papers 43 (3):317-344.details
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Skilled activity and the causal theory of action.Randolph Clarke - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):523-550.details
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In Defence of State-Based Reasons to Intend.James Morauta - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (2):208-228.details
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Moral Judgment and Volitional Incapacity.Antti Kauppinen - 2010 - In J. Campbell, M. O'Rourke & H. Silverstein (eds.), Action, Ethics and Responsibility: Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, Vol. 7. MIT Press.details
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Écueils des théories de la rationalité.J. Nicolas Kaufmann - 1999 - Dialogue 38 (4):801-826.details
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Präferenzen, Nutzen und ihre Aggregation.Christoph Lumer - 2021 - In Christian Hiebaum (ed.), Interdisziplinäres Handbuch "Gemeinwohl". Springer Fachmedien. pp. 177-193.details
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Agency and Mistakes.Santiago Amaya - 2022 - In Luca Ferrero (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Agency. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 149-150.details
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Divine Will Theory: Desires or Intentions?Christian Miller - 2013 - In L. Kvanvig Jonathan (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. Oxford University Press.details
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Intending, Settling, and Relying.Facundo M. Alonso - 2017 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 4. Oxford University Press. pp. 50-74.details
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Wohin führt die kausale Handlungstheorie?Georg Gasser - 2008 - In Bruno Niederbacher & Edmund Runggaldier (eds.), Was Sind Menschliche Personen?: Ein Akttheoretischer Zugang. Onto Verlag. pp. 181-208.details
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Emotional Experience in the Computational Belief–Desire Theory of Emotion.Rainer Reisenzein - 2009 - Emotion Review 1 (3):214-222.details
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Actions, Reasons, and Intentions: Overcoming Davidson's Ontological Prejudice.John Michael McGuire - 2007 - Dialogue 46 (3):459-479.details
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Agent-Causation Revisited: Origination and Contemporary Theories of Free Will.Thad Botham - 2008 - Berlin, Germany: Verlag D Müller.details
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Actions, thought-experiments and the 'principle of alternate possibilities'.Maria Alvarez - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):61 – 81.details
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On the principle of intention agglomeration.Jing Zhu - 2010 - Synthese 175 (1):89 - 99.details
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Passive action and causalism.Jing Zhu - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 119 (3):295-314.details
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Intentions are mental states.Jing Zhu & Andrei A. Buckareff - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (2):235 – 242.details
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Is conscious will an illusion?Jing Zhu - 2004 - Disputatio 1 (16):59 - 70.details
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Is conscious will an illusion?Jing Zhu - 2004 - Disputatio 1 (16):58-70.details
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Explaining Synchronic Self-Control.Jing Zhu - 2005 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (3):475-492.details
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Good old supervenience: Mental causation on the cheap.Nick Zangwill - 1996 - Synthese 106 (1):67-101.details
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Taking aim at the truth.Masahiro Yamada - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (1):47-59.details
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Experts and Deviants: The Story of Agentive Control.Wayne Wu - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):101-26.details
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On the Significance of Bodily Awareness for Bodily Action.Hong Yu Wong - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (261):790-812.details
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Non‐Relativist Contextualism about Free Will.Marcus Willaschek - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 18 (4):567-587.details
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Emotions, Actions and Inclinations to Act.Christiana Werner - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (6):2571-2588.details
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The Communication Argument and the Pluralist Challenge.Shawn Tinghao Wang - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (5):384-399.details
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Weighing in on decisions in the brain: neural representations of pre-awareness practical intention.Robyn Repko Waller - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):5175-5203.details
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Owning Intentions and Moral Responsibility.Tillmann Vierkant - 2005 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (5):507-534.details
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Does rationality presuppose irrationality.Xavier Vanmechelen - 1998 - Philosophical Explorations 1 (2):126 – 139.details
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Thinking by doing: Rylean regress and the metaphysics of action.Markos Valaris - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3395-3412.details
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Jaka teoria działania? O Mechanice działań Michała Barcza.Maciej Tarnowski - 2020 - Filozofia Nauki 28 (4):83-102.details
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Practical reasoning and practical knowledge.Rowland Stout - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (4):564-579.details
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Anti-intellectualism, instructive representations, and the intentional action argument.Alison Ann Springle & Justin Humphreys - 2021 - Synthese (3):7919-7955.details
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Folk concepts of intentional action in the contexts of amoral and immoral luck.Paulo Sousa & Colin Holbrook - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3):351-370.details
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Does moral responsibility require mental time travel? Considerations about guidance control.Beatriz Sorrentino Marques - 2018 - Filosofia Unisinos 19 (1).details
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Considering Causalisms.Andrew Sneddon - 2001 - Dialogue 40 (2):343.details
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The Calendar Paradox.Sam Shpall - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):801-825.details
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Deciding as Intentional Action: Control over Decisions.Joshua Shepherd - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):335-351.details
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