- The Omissions Account of the Knobe Effect and the Asymmetry Challenge.Katarzyna Paprzycka - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (5):550-571.details
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The Calendar Paradox.Sam Shpall - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):801-825.details
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Mind-wandering is unguided attention: accounting for the “purposeful” wanderer.Zachary C. Irving - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):547-571.details
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On Pereboom’s Disappearing Agent Argument.Alfred R. Mele - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (3):561-574.details
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Agency.Markus Schlosser - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Action Unified.Yair Levy - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (262):65-83.details
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Self-determination, self-transformation, and the case of Jean Valjean: a problem for Velleman.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2591-2598.details
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If Anyone Should Be an Agent-Causalist, then Everyone Should Be an Agent-Causalist.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2016 - Mind 125 (500):1101-1131.details
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Luck and Free Will.Alfred R. Mele - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):543-557.details
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Merleau-Ponty and the transcendental problem of bodily agency.Rasmus Thybo Jensen - 2013 - In Rasmus Thybo Jensen & Dermot Moran (eds.), The Phenomenology of Embodied Subjectivity, Contributions to Phenomenology 71. Springer. pp. 43-61.details
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Pluralists about Pluralism? Versions of Explanatory Pluralism in Psychiatry.Jeroen Van Bouwel - 2014 - In Thomas Uebel (ed.), New Directions in the Philosophy of Science. Cham: Springer. pp. 105-119.details
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Sculpting the space of actions. Explaining human action by integrating intentions and mechanisms.Machiel Keestra - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Amsterdamdetails
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Action, Deviance, and Guidance.Ezio Di Nucci - 2013 - Abstracta (2):41-59.details
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Self-control, motivational strength, and exposure therapy.Alfred R. Mele - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):359-375.details
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Intention.Sarah K. Paul - 2013 - International Encyclopedia of Ethics.details
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Hobartian Voluntarism and Epistemic Deontologism.Andrei Buckareff - 2006 - Disputatio 2 (21):1 - 17.details
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The Primacy of the Mental in the Explanation of Human Action.Andrei A. Buckareff & Jing Zhu - 2009 - Disputatio 3 (26):1 - 16.details
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Causalism and Intentional Omission.Joshua Shepherd - 2014 - American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (1):15-26.details
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The volitive and the executive function of intentions.Christoph Lumer - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):511-527.details
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Causation, Action, and Free Will.Alfred Mele - 2009 - In Helen Beebee, Christopher Hitchcock & Peter Menzies (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Causation. Oxford University Press UK.details
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How should libertarians conceive of the location and role of indeterminism?Christopher Evan Franklin - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):44 - 58.details
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Side-effect actions, acting for a reason, and acting intentionally.John Michael McGuire - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (3):317 - 333.details
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Brain, mind and machine: What are the implications of deep brain stimulation for perceptions of personal identity, agency and free will?Nir Lipsman & Walter Glannon - 2012 - Bioethics 27 (9):465-470.details
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The apparent illusion of conscious deciding.Joshua Shepherd - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):18 - 30.details
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Individualism and the metaphysics of actions.Matias Bulnes - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):113-132.details
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Distributed intentionality: A model of intentional behavior in humans.Marco Mazzone & Emanuela Campisi - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):267 - 290.details
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Slips.Santiago Amaya - 2011 - Noûs 47 (3):559-576.details
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Intralevel mental causation.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2011 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):402-425.details
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Action-Individuation and Doxastic Agency.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2011 - Theoria 77 (4):312-332.details
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Revamping Action Theory.Gordon Park Stevenson - 2004 - Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):427 - 451.details
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Taking aim at the truth.Masahiro Yamada - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (1):47-59.details
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Deviant Formal Causation.Sarah K. Paul - 2011 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 5 (3):1-24.details
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Divine Will Theory: Desires or Intentions?Christian Miller - 2013 - In L. Kvanvig Jonathan (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. Oxford University Press.details
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Endorsement and Autonomous Agency.François Schroeter - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):633-659.details
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Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will.Randolph Clarke & Justin Capes - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Causalisms Reconsidered.Andrei A. Buckareff & Jing Zhu - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (1):147-.details
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Des préférences individuelles aux préférences collectives: ambiguïtés du concept de préférence dans le contexte des théories du choix collectif.J. Nicolas Kaufmann - 1996 - Dialogue 35 (1):53-.details
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On the Nature of Testimony.Andrew Cullison - 2010 - Episteme 7 (2):114-127.details
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Farewell to the luck (and Mind) argument.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):199-230.details
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Action-oriented Perception.Bence Nanay - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):430-446.details
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Intentional omissions.Randolph Clarke - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):158-177.details
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Emotional Experience in the Computational Belief–Desire Theory of Emotion.Rainer Reisenzein - 2009 - Emotion Review 1 (3):214-222.details
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Dispositions, Abilities to Act, and Free Will: The New Dispositionalism.Randolph Clarke - 2009 - Mind 118 (470):323-351.details
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The Phenomenology of Action: A Conceptual Framework.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2008 - Cognition 107 (1):179 - 217.details
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Intention.Kieran Setiya - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Omissions and causalism.Carolina Sartorio - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):513-530.details
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On the principle of intention agglomeration.Jing Zhu - 2010 - Synthese 175 (1):89 - 99.details
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The conclusion of practical reason.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2007 - In New Trends in Philosophy: Moral Psychology. Rodopi. pp. 323-343.details
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Does rationality presuppose irrationality.Xavier Vanmechelen - 1998 - Philosophical Explorations 1 (2):126 – 139.details
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The Incompatibility of Omniscience and Intentional Action: A Reply to David P. Hunt.Tomis Kapitan - 1994 - Religious Studies 30 (1):55 - 66.details
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