- An empirical solution to the puzzle of weakness of will.Julia Haas - 2018 - Synthese (12):1-21.details
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Seeing what I am Doing.Thor Grünbaum - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):295-318.details
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What is the Difference between Weakness of Will and Compulsion?August Gorman - 2023 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 9 (1):37-52.details
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Reasons explanations (of actions) as structural explanations.Megan Fritts - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12683-12704.details
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Intention at the Interface.Ellen Fridland - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (3):481-505.details
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Doing Things with Thoughts: Brain-Computer Interfaces and Disembodied Agency.Steffen Steinert, Christoph Bublitz, Ralf Jox & Orsolya Friedrich - 2019 - Philosophy and Technology 32 (3):457-482.details
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The assimilation argument and the rollback argument.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (3):395-416.details
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Self-determination, self-transformation, and the case of Jean Valjean: a problem for Velleman.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2591-2598.details
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If Anyone Should Be an Agent-Causalist, then Everyone Should Be an Agent-Causalist.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2016 - Mind 125 (500):1101-1131.details
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How should libertarians conceive of the location and role of indeterminism?Christopher Evan Franklin - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):44 - 58.details
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Farewell to the luck (and Mind) argument.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):199-230.details
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Bratman on identity over time and identification at a time.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (1):1-14.details
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Agent-Causation, Explanation, and Akrasia: A Reply to Levy’s Hard Luck. [REVIEW]Christopher Evan Franklin - 2015 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 9 (4):753-770.details
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Mental Actions and Mental Agency.Anika Fiebich & John Michael - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):683-693.details
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Habitual Actions, Propositional Knowledge, Motor Representations and Intentionality.Gabriele Ferretti & Silvano Zipoli Caiani - 2021 - Topoi 40 (3):623-635.details
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Reasons explanations and pure agency.Richard H. Feldman & Andrei A. Buckareff - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 112 (2):135-145.details
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Habit and Intention.Christos Douskos - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (3):1129-1148.details
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Reasons, causes, and contrasts.Jason Dickenson - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):1–23.details
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The Priority of Intentional Action: From Developmental to Conceptual Priority.Yair Levy - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.details
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Self-control, Attention, and How to live without Special Motivational Powers.Sebastian Watzl - 2022 - In M. Brent & Lisa Miracchi (eds.), Mental Action and the Conscious Mind. Routledge. pp. 272-300.details
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Introduction: through contexts to actions.Anton Leist - 2007 - In .details
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Pluralists about Pluralism? Versions of Explanatory Pluralism in Psychiatry.Jeroen Van Bouwel - 2014 - In M. C. Galavotti, D. Dieks, W. J. Gonzalez, S. Hartmann, Th Uebel & M. Weber (eds.), New Directions in Philosophy of Science (The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective Series). Springer. pp. 105-119.details
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Slip-Proof Actions.Santiago Amaya - 2016 - In Roman Altshuler & Michael J. Sigrist (eds.), Time and the Philosophy of Action. Routledge. pp. 21-36.details
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Action.George Wilson - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Action.Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock & Sergio Tenenbaum - 2023 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Free will.Timothy O'Connor & Christopher Evan Franklin - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will.Randolph Clarke & Justin Capes - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Intention.Sarah K. Paul - 2013 - International Encyclopedia of Ethics.details
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Action.Alfred R. Mele - 2005 - In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 78-88.details
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Representation without Thought: Confusion, Reference, and Communication.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2015 - Dissertation, Cuny Graduate Centerdetails
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How Many Accounts of Act Individuation Are There?Joseph Ulatowski - 2008 - Dissertation, University of Utahdetails
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Causalism and Intentional Omission.Joshua Shepherd - 2014 - American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (1):15-26.details
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Causal after all : a model of mental causation for dualists.Bram Vaassen - 2019 - Dissertation, Umeå Universitydetails
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Meaningful Human Control over Smart Home Systems: A Value Sensitive Design Approach.Steven Umbrello - 2020 - Humana.Mente Journal of Philosophical Studies 13 (37):40-65.details
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You don't say! Lying, asserting and insincerity.Neri Marsili - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Sheffielddetails
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Modeling Long-Term Intentions and Narratives in Autonomous Agents.Christian Kronsted & Zachariah A. Neemeh - forthcoming - Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness.details
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Intentions: The Dynamic Hierarchical Model Revisited.Elisabeth Pacherie & Myrto Mylopoulos - 2019 - WIREs Cognitive Science 10 (2):e1481.details
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Towards a Value Sensitive Design Framework for Attaining Meaningful Human Control over Autonomous Weapons Systems.Steven Umbrello - 2021 - Dissertation, Consortium Finodetails
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Motivierende Gründe: Aktuelle Probleme und Kontroversen.Jean Moritz Müller - 2019 - Information Philosophie 2019 (4):16-28.details
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Actor-observer asymmetries in explanations of behavior: New answers to an old question.Bertram F. Malle, Joshua Knobe & S. Nelson - 2007 - Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 9 (4):491-514.details
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Act and Intentionality.Benjamin Sheredos - 2016 - Dissertation, University of California, San Diegodetails
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Attributions as behavior explanations: Toward a new theory.Bertram Malle - 2003details
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Qual a motivação para se defender uma teoria causal da memória?César Schirmer Dos Santos - 2018 - In Juliano Santos do Carmo & Rogério F. Saucedo Corrêa (eds.), Linguagem e cognição. Pelotas: NEPFil. pp. 63-89.details
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Agency and control.Jesus H. Aguilar - unknowndetails
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Against the Distinction between Intentions for the Future and Intentions for the Present.Chiara Brozzo - 2021 - American Philosophical Quarterly 4 (58):333-346.details
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Causation, Action, and Free Will.Alfred Mele - 2009 - In H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock & P. Menzies (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Causation. Oxford University Press.details
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Belief and Difficult Action.Berislav Marušić - 2012 - Philosophers' Imprint 12:1-30.details
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Agency as difference-making: causal foundations of moral responsibility.Johannes Himmelreich - 2015 - Dissertation, London School of Economics and Political Sciencedetails
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Action, Deviance, and Guidance.Ezio Di Nucci - 2013 - Abstracta (2):41-59.details
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The conclusion of practical reason.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2007 - In New Trends in Philosophy: Moral Psychology. Rodopi. pp. 323-343.details
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