- Free Will, Causality, and Neuroscience.Bernard Feltz, Marcus Missal & Andrew Cameron Sims (eds.) - 2019 - Leiden: Brill.details
|
|
Agents in movement.István Zoltán Zárdai - 2019 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 143:61-83.details
|
|
An action theoretic problem for intralevel mental causation.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):89-105.details
|
|
Basic causal deviance, action repertoires, and reliability.Jesús H. Aguilar - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):1-19.details
|
|
Action explanation and the free will debate: How incompatibilist arguments go wrong1.Scott Sehon - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):351-368.details
|
|
A Critique of Alfred R Mele’s Work on Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy: Oxford University Press, New York, 1995. [REVIEW]Pujarini Das - 2018 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 35 (3):603-617.details
|
|
The trouble with externalist compatibilist autonomy.Stefaan E. Cuypers - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 129 (2):171-196.details
|
|
On the Nature of Testimony.Andrew Cullison - 2010 - Episteme 7 (2):114-127.details
|
|
Unsettledness and the intentionality of practical decisions.E. J. Coffman - 2022 - Philosophical Explorations 25 (2):220-231.details
|
|
Is Fallible Knowledge Attributable?E. J. Coffman - 2021 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):73-83.details
|
|
Involuntarism impugned?E. J. Coffman - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-11.details
|
|
Do We Decide Intentionally?E. J. Coffman - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (4):822-827.details
|
|
Skilled activity and the causal theory of action.Randolph Clarke - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):523-550.details
|
|
Intentional omissions.Randolph Clarke - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):158-177.details
|
|
Free choice, effort, and wanting more.Randolph Clarke - 1999 - Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):20-41.details
|
|
Dispositions, Abilities to Act, and Free Will: The New Dispositionalism.Randolph Clarke - 2009 - Mind 118 (470):323-351.details
|
|
Commanding Intentions and Prize-Winning Decisions.Randolph Clarke - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (3):391-409.details
|
|
Because She Wanted To.Randolph Clarke - 2010 - The Journal of Ethics 14 (1):27-35.details
|
|
Autonomous reasons for intending.Randolph Clarke - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):191 – 212.details
|
|
Unintentional collective action.Sara Rachel Chant - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (3):245 – 256.details
|
|
Incommensurability, incomparability, and practical reason.Ruth Chang (ed.) - 1997 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard.details
|
|
Collective Responsibility in a Hollywood Standoff.Sara Rachel Chant - 2015 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):83-92.details
|
|
Belief, experience and the act of picture-making.Dan Cavedon-Taylor - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (1):1-14.details
|
|
New Essays on the Metaphysics of Moral Responsibility.Joseph Keim Campbell - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):193 - 201.details
|
|
Individualism and the metaphysics of actions.Matias Bulnes - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):113-132.details
|
|
The Primacy of the Mental in the Explanation of Human Action.Andrei A. Buckareff & Jing Zhu - 2009 - Disputatio 3 (26):1 - 16.details
|
|
I’m just sitting around doing nothing: on exercising intentional agency in omitting to act.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2018 - Synthese 195 (10):4617-4635.details
|
|
Intralevel mental causation.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2011 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):402-425.details
|
|
Hobartian Voluntarism and Epistemic Deontologism.Andrei Buckareff - 2006 - Disputatio 2 (21):1 - 17.details
|
|
How (not) to think about mental action.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):83-89.details
|
|
Doxastic decisions and controlling belief.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (1):102-114.details
|
|
Causalisms Reconsidered.Andrei A. Buckareff & Jing Zhu - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (1):147-.details
|
|
Compatibilism and doxastic control.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (2):143-152.details
|
|
Action-Individuation and Doxastic Agency.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2011 - Theoria 77 (4):312-332.details
|
|
Motor Intentions: How Intentions and Motor Representations Come Together.Chiara Brozzo - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (2):231-256.details
|
|
Implicit biases in visually guided action.Berit Brogaard - 2021 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 17):S3943–S3967.details
|
|
A Role for Conscious Accessibility in Skilled Action.Chiara Brozzo - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (3):683-697.details
|
|
Meditation and the Scope of Mental Action.Michael Brent & Candace Upton - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (1):52-71.details
|
|
Agent causation as a solution to the problem of action.Michael Brent - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (5):656-673.details
|
|
Meaning and Emotion: The Extended Gricean Model and What Emotional Signs Mean.Constant Bonard - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Geneva and University of Antwerpdetails
|
|
From Freedom From to Freedom To: New Perspectives on Intentional Action.Sofia Bonicalzi & Patrick Haggard - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10:459073.details
|
|
Rejecting epiphobia.Umut Baysan - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2773-2791.details
|
|
The Guidance Theory of Action: A Critical Review.Lieke Joske Franci Asma - 2021 - Topoi 40 (3):687-694.details
|
|
Shared Agency Without Shared Intention.Samuel Asarnow - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):665-688.details
|
|
On not getting out of bed.Samuel Asarnow - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1639-1666.details
|
|
Noncognitivism in Metaethics and the Philosophy of Action.Samuel Asarnow - 2020 - Erkenntnis 88 (1):95-115.details
|
|
Chimps as secret agents.Caroline T. Arruda & Daniel J. Povinelli - 2016 - Synthese 193 (7):2129-2158.details
|
|
Intentional mind-wandering as intentional omission: the surrealist method.Santiago Arango-Muñoz & Juan Pablo Bermúdez - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7727-7748.details
|
|
Two kinds of intentions: a new defense of the Simple View.Santiago Amaya - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1767-1786.details
|
|
Slips.Santiago Amaya - 2011 - Noûs 47 (3):559-576.details
|
|