Perceptual experiences inform us about objective properties of things in our environment. But they also have perspectival character in the sense that they differ phenomenally when objects are viewed from different points of view. Contemporary representationalists hold, at a minimum, that phenomenal character supervenes on representational content. Thus, in order to account for perspectival character, they need to indentify a type of representational content that changes in appropriate ways with the perceiver’s point of view. Many representationlists, including Shoemaker and Lycan, (...) argue that such contents are best construed in terms of mind-dependent properties. Other representationalists, including Tye and Dretske, hold that these contents involve only mind-independent properties. Susanna Schellenberg has recently developed an account of perceptual experience that would serve these latter representationalists extremely well. She suggests that we can do justice to the perspectival character of perceptual experience by appeal to representations of a certain type of relational properties, so-called ‘situation-dependent properties.’ In this paper, I critically engage with Schellenberg’s proposal in order to show how mind-independent representationalists can explain perspectival character. I argue that appeal to situation-dependent properties is problematic. I then show that mind-independent representationalists can account for perspectical character by means of scenario contents in Christopher Peacocke’s sense. (shrink)

The development of immersive media-communication environments, and their theorization in terms of the `haptic', calls for a reconsideration of the relationship between sensuality and the ethics of contact. For the most part, the cultural theorization of the virtual which remains preoccupied with the visual has tended to limit its scope to the paradoxes, politics and ethics of representation. Much of media and cultural studies work, for instance, has adopted, directly or indirectly, the traditional visual and ocularcentric paradigm in its analyses (...) of cultural forms and technologies as these have become integrated into contemporary life. Whilst it has been argued, for instance by Mark Hansen in his recent books, that this paradigm is inadequate to digital media and the developments of human-machine interactions the digital introduces, few comentators have addressed how new developments in immersive sensory media environments bear on the ethics of communication. By way of a reflection on the themes of the tactility of contact and the ethics of touch in the work of Emmanuel Levinas, this article critically evaluates the ethical significance of the `sensory extension' haptic media represent. It identifies and argues against the neo-positivist tendency of Hansen's reliance on the empiricism of the neurosciences whilst locating the resources for an ethics of touch in Levinas' concept of time as `diachrony'. (shrink)

The article explores E.M. Forster’s story The Machine Stops as an example of dystopian literature and its possible associations with the use of technology and with today’s cyber culture. Dystopian societies are often characterized by dehumanization and Forster’s novel raises questions about how we live in time and space; and how we establish relationships with the Other and with the world through technology. We suggest that the fear of technology depicted in dystopian literature indicates a fear that machines are mimicking (...) the roles that humans already play in relational encounters. Our relationship with machines frequently suggests a classical “I-it” situation. However, a genuine dialogue is where there is no master and where communication and understanding are achieved through the encounter and through openness to difference and to change. The article examines the ways machines and automata are imagined and become part of lived human existence, in the light of Martin Buber’s philosophy of dialogue and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception and otherness. The problem seems to be how everyday technological interfaces can change the way we first perceive the world and the possibility that with certain types of mediation there is a loss of connection with the Other. It is argued that understanding dialogical conditions could help turn the relationship with technology into something more humane. Literature such as Forster’s is considered as an example of such a dialogical condition, suggesting ways of dealing with human dilemmas by exploring the field of possibilities. (shrink)

Since its inception, phenomenological philosophy has exerted an influence on empirical science. But what is the best way to practice, use and apply phenomenology in a non‐philosophical context? How deeply rooted in phenomenological philosophy must qualitative research be in order to qualify as phenomenological? How many of the core commitments of phenomenology must it accept? In the following contribution, I will take a closer look at Max van Manen's work. I will argue that van Manen's understanding of and presentation of (...) phenomenology is quite problematic and that his book Phenomenology of Practice rather than amounting to a clear and accessible presentation of the phenomenological method that would make it do‐able to researchers who are not themselves professional philosophers is in fact both abstruse and excessively complicated. I will then turn to nursing, and by taking that as my example, outline a better way to apply and practice phenomenology. (shrink)

In his bookThe Conscious MindDavid Chalmers introduced a now-familiar distinction between the hard problem and the easy problems of consciousness. The easy problems are those concerned with the question of how the mind can process information, react to environmental stimuli, and exhibit such capacities as discrimination, categorization, and introspection. All of these abilities are impressive, but they are, according to Chalmers, not metaphysically baffling, since they can all be tackled by means of the standard repertoire of cognitive science and explained (...) in terms of computational or neural mechanisms. This task might still be difficult, but it is within reach. In contrast, the hard problem — also known astheproblem of consciousness — is the problem of explaining why mental states have phenomenal or experiential qualities. Why is it like something to ‘taste coffee,’ to ‘touch an ice cube,’ to ‘look at a sunset,’ etc.? Why does it feel the way it does? Why does it feel like anything at all? (shrink)

Don Ihde has recently launched a sweeping attack against Husserl’s late philosophy of science. Ihde takes particular exception to Husserl’s portrayal of Galileo and to the results Husserl draws from his understanding of Galilean science. Ihde’s main point is that Husserl paints an overly intellectualistic picture of the “father of modern science”, neglecting Galileo’s engagement with scientific instruments such as, most notably, the telescope. According to Ihde, this omission is not merely a historiographical shortcoming. On Ihde’s view, it is only (...) on the basis of a distorted picture of Galileo that Husserl can “create“ the division between Lifeworld and the “world of science“, a division that is indeed fundamental for Husserl’s overall position. Hence, if successful, Ihde’s argument effectively undermines Husserl’s late philosophy of science. The aim of this paper is to show that Ihde’s criticism does not stand up to closer historical or philosophical scrutiny. (shrink)

This paper explores some of the ways in which phenomenological approaches have been linked to contemporary social science inquiry into human ways of knowing and learning in the fields of education and nursing research. It then looks at four contemporary approaches which draw on phenomenology namely: distinguishing imaginal from rational/logical knowing as an alternative and complementary mode of knowing; using ‘arts based’ or ‘expressive’ approaches to inquiry; developing hermeneutic text making to present research findings and using heuristics in a cyclical (...) approach to understanding forms of human experience. The suggestion is that these approaches could be enriched and deepened by a more explicit exploration of phenomenological approaches and that conversely, some of forms of phenomenological research might be enriched by the use of these approaches. Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology , Volume 4, Edition 1 July 2004. (shrink)

This article revisits an oft-studied phenomenon from the vantage point of the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, Keen, and Giorgi. The protocols used have been taken from the first comprehensive academic study conducted on the runner’s high phenomenon. Throughout its experimental study, the runner’s high has remained a poorly understood phenomenon. Possible reasons for this are considered alongside the phenomenological analysis. Considered phenomenologically, the runner’s high is an experience of the absence of the limitations of body, time, and space. It is experienced (...) on the backdrop of a typical run experience which is characterized by familiar pains and labor. However, in the event of the runner’s high the familiar pains and labor do not present, making the runner’s high an experience of absence. Since these limitations play a role of restriction, their absence is pleasurable. (shrink)

The thrust of the argument presented in this paper is that phenomenological ontology survives the criticism of “correlationism” as advanced by speculative realism, a movement that has evolved in continental philosophy over the past decade. Correlationism is the position, allegedly occupied by phenomenology, that presupposes the ontological primacy of the human subject. Phenomenology survives this criticism not because the criticism misses its mark, but because phenomenology occupies a position that is broader than that of correlationism. With its critique of correlationism, (...) speculative realism rightly identifies a battle that no longer needs to be fought: the battle against 19th century brands of mechanical realism. Free from the impatient and defensive posturing against the mechanization of the human, phenomenology is also free to explore the world beyond its emphasis on human experience. Doing so requires a return to Husserl's discussion of hylé and the “twofold bed” of phenomenology. Phenomenology may emphasize hylé – that is, material; or it may emphasize nous – the world as it appears to or is transformed by consciousness. By returning to Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception, a case is made for hyletic phenomenology. Hyletic phenomenology allows for ontological reversibility and recognizes the “unhuman” elements in things. It is hyletic phenomenology that grounds phenomenological ontology after the critique of correlationism has been assessed. (shrink)

Recent years have seen growing evidence of a fruitful engagement between phenomenology and cognitive science. This paper confronts an in-principle problem that stands in the way of this intellectual coalition, namely the fact that a tension exists between the transcendentalism that characterizes phenomenology and the naturalism that accompanies cognitive science. After articulating the general shape of this tension, I respond as follows. First, I argue that, if we view things through a kind of neo-McDowellian lens, we can open up a (...) conceptual space in which phenomenology and cognitive science may exert productive constraints on each other. Second, I describe some examples of phenomenological cognitive science that illustrate such constraints in action. Third, I use the mutually constraining relationship at work here as the platform from which to bring to light a domesticated version of the transcendental and a minimal form of naturalism that are compatible with each other. (shrink)

This paper presents an account of empathy as the form of experience directed at embodied unities of expressive movement. After outlining the key differences between simulation theory and the phenomenological approach to empathy, the paper argues that while the phenomenological approach is closer to respecting a necessary constitutional asymmetry between first-personal and second-personal senses of embodiment, it still presupposes a general concept of embodiment that ends up being problematic. A different account is proposed that is neutral on the explanatory role (...) of the first-person sense of embodiment, which leads to an emphasis on the transformative nature of empathy and a broadening of the scope of possible targets of empathic awareness. (shrink)

A pianist experiences the thingness of the piano as an extension of the body. Although contact occurs only through the player’s extremities, the piano invites the use of the whole body to transmit emotion, transport the player into the body and mind of a composer, and transform the pianist’s ability to hear.

In this paper, we draw on developmental findings to provide a nuanced understanding of background emotions, particularly those in depression. We demonstrate how they reflect our basic proximity (feeling of interpersonal connectedness) to others and defend both a phenomenological and a functional claim. First, we substantiate a conjecture by Fonagy & Target (International Journal of Psychoanalysis 88(4):917–937, 2007) that an important phenomenological aspect of depression is the experiential recreation of the infantile loss of proximity to significant others. Second, we argue (...) that proximity has a particular cognitive function that allows individuals to morph into a cohesive dyadic system able to carry out distributed emotion regulation. We show that elevated levels of psychological suffering connected to depressive background emotions may be explained not only in terms of a psychological loss, but also as the felt inability to enter into dyadic regulatory relations with others—an experiential constraint that decreases the individual’s ability to adapt to demanding situations. (shrink)

Phenomenology of practice is formative of sensitive practice, issuing from the pathic power of phenomenological reflections. Pathic knowing inheres in the sense and sensuality of our practical actions, in encounters with others and in the ways that our bodies are responsive to the things of our world and to the situations and relations in which we find ourselves. Phenomenology of practice is an ethical corrective of the technological and calculative modalities of contemporary life. It finds its source and impetus in (...) practical phenomenologies of reading and writing that open up possibilities for creating formative relations between being and acting, self and other, interiorities and exteriorities, between who we are and how we act. (shrink)

This article explores the experience of ethical responsivity from the perspective of the parent whose child requires medical care. The concern is with the lived meaning of ethics itself as it originates and wells up in the parent’s experience of being touched by his or her child. Examples are taken from the practice of neonatal-perinatal medicine where newborns require hospitalization for issues such as prematurity, transitional problems, congenital abnormalities, and so forth. Here, the condition of the child and the techno-medical (...) environment itself have the potential of complicating the touching contact of parent and child. (shrink)

Electronic sports and other variants of ‘digital sports’ have increased in popularity all over the world and may even come to challenge hegemonic concepts of sport. More relevant than the apparent opposition between ‘physical’ and ‘non-physical’ is the question what kind of embodiment is manifested within virtual environments. In this paper, we argue that eSports do require the learning and performance of motor skills and that embodiment within a virtual environment may be considered playful or even athletic. The type of (...) skills that might be tested can even be considered fundamental movement skills. Under appropriate educational supervision, with knowledge of the game, eSports can be utilized for the development of specific elements of digital literacy. Although motor skills are a defining characteristic of eSports, we do not argue that eSports should be integrated within PE. These arguments have not so much to do with the status of physicality present, but with differences in t... (shrink)

This paper discusses the most persistent controversial issue that occurred in Western educational philosophy ever since Socrates questioned the Sophists: the role of truth in teaching. Ways of teaching these kinds of controversy issues are briefly considered to isolate their epistemic characteristics, which will enable the interpretation of Plato and Dewey as exemplars of rationalism and empiricism regarding the role of knowledge in the curriculum and thus include their partial truths in the epistemic ethos of teaching. The consideration of pedagogy (...) will then include the partial truths of rationalism and empiricism in the epistemic ethos of teaching by following Kant's ‘Concepts without percepts are empty; perceptions without conceptions are blind’.This claim, however, is narrowed down in two ways compatible with postmodernism and the heavy emphasis on constructionism in faculties of education. After quoting Harry Broudy's statement that the educational epistemic ethos should be domain‐specific, guided by the experts’ inquiry protocols in each curricular area, it is narrowed down further with Maxine Greene's explication that it should be pluralistic and lesson‐specific. This epistemic ethos is not argued as a synthesis but as an aggregate of the partial truths of various epistemologies in the spirit of the postmodern doubt in any one theory of knowledge without throwing out the baby with the dirty bath water.Finally, the streams of consciousness involved in teaching and learning good knowledge are described phenomenologically to disclose how truth can be disclosed in teaching, thereby grounding propositional knowledge, for example, ontologically in the being of the student and in the being of the world. (shrink)

This study discusses the mimic octopus’ (Thaumoctopus mimicus) acts of imitation of a banded sea-snake (Laticauda sp.) as an antagonistic response to enemies from a cognitive-semiotic perspective. This mimicry model, which involves very close physical resemblance and highly precise enactment, displays goal-orientedness because the octopus only takes it on when encountering damselfish, a territorial species, and not other sea animals that the octopus has been shown to imitate, such as lionfish and flounders (Norman et al. 2001). Based on theoretical principles (...) and analytic tools from Mitchell’s (1986) typology of deceptive acts, Zlatev’s (2008) Mimesis Hierarchy and Zlatev’s (2018) types and levels of (self-)consciousness, this research raises the possibility that T. mimicus exhibits the following attributes: (i) bodily self-awareness; (ii) cognitive empathy, which builds upon deception and perspective-taking strategies to imagine or project itself into the place of the antagonist; and (iii) capability to reflectively reorganise the standard complete imitation pattern into a partial one in order to optimise its effect, based on conscious visual appraisal of the stimulus position. These capacities would place T. mimicus at the dyadic mimetic level on the Mimesis Hierarchy. For this reason, it is suggested that the name mimic octopus could be replaced by mimetic octopus. (shrink)

The phenomenological technique of imaginative variation was identified by Husserl as conducive to elucidating the manner in which phenomena appear to consciousness. In brief, by engaging in the phenomenological reduction and using imaginative variation, phenomenologists are able to describe the experience of consciousness, having stepped outside of the natural attitude through the epoché. Imaginative variation is a stage aimed at explicating the structures of experience more distinctively, and is best described as a mental experiment. Features of the experience are imaginatively (...) altered in order to view the phenomenon under investigation from varying perspectives. Husserl envisaged this process as ultimately definitive of the essential elements of an experience, as only those aspects that are invariant to the experience of the phenomenon will not be able to change through the variation.Often in qualitative research interviews, participants struggle to articulate or verbalise their experiences. The purpose of this paper is to present a radically novel way of using imaginative variation as an interview technique by engaging the participants in imaginative variation in order to elicit a richly detailed and insightful experiential account of a phenomenon. We will discuss how the first author successfully used imaginative variation in this way in her study of the erotic experience of bondage, discipline, dominance and submission, and sadism and masochism, before considering the usefulness of this technique when applied to areas of study beyond human sexuality. (shrink)

Questions on what it means to live and die well are raised and discussed in the hospice movement. A phenomenological lifeworld perspective may help professionals to be aware of meaningful and important dimensions in the lives of persons close to death. Lifeworld is not an abstract philosophical term, but rather the opposite. Lifeworld is about everyday, common life in all its aspects. In the writings of Cicely Saunders, known as the founder of the modern hospice movement, facets of lifeworld are (...) presented as important elements in caring for dying patients. Palliative care and palliative medicine today are, in many ways, replacing hospices. This represents not only a change in name, but also in the main focus. Hospice care was originally very much about providing support and comfort for, and interactions with the patients. Improved medical knowledge today means improved symptomatic palliation, but also time and resources spent in other ways than before. Observations from a Nordic hospice ward indicate that seriously ill and dying persons spend much time on their own. Different aspects of lifeworld and intersubjectivity in the dying persons’ room is presented and discussed. (shrink)

The enactive approach offers a distinctive view of how mental life relates to bodily activity at three levels: bodily self-regulation, sensorimotor coupling, and intersubjective interaction. This paper concentrates on the second level of sensorimotor coupling. An account is given of how the subjectively lived body and the living body of the organism are related via dynamic sensorimotor activity, and it is shown how this account helps to bridge the explanatory gap between consciousness and the brain. Arguments by O'Regan, Noë, and (...) Myin that seek to account for the phenomenal character of perceptual consciousness in terms of ‘bodiliness’ and ‘grabbiness’ are considered. It is suggested that their account does not pay sufficient attention to two other key aspects of perceptual phenomenality: the autonomous nature of the experiencing self or agent, and the pre-reflective nature of bodily self-consciousness. (shrink)

This research examines the practice of cryonics and provides empirical evidence for an improved understanding of the motivations and attitudes of participants. Cryonics is the freezing of a person who has died of a disease in hopes of restoring life at some future time when a cure may be available. So far, about 300 people have been cryopreserved, and an additional 1200 have enrolled in such programs. The current work has three vectors. First, the results of a worldwide cryonics survey (...) carried out as part of this research are discussed. Second, a theoretical model is developed from the survey results to propose a Theory of Cryonic Life Extension which explains an individual’s decision to select cryopreservation. Third, the most distinctive survey result, a conceptualization of personal identity malleability, is extended with a philosophical formulation. Personal identity is found to be emergent, not fundamental, and thus may continue to evolve in concept and application, particularly in the longer time frames implicated by cryonics. The potential consequences of this work are that the conceptual norms materializing in the cryonics community could be forerunners of wider societal trends of how humans understand themselves as subjects in an era increasingly configured by science and technology. (shrink)

In this paper I present and compare the ideas behind naturalistic theories of health on the one hand and phenomenological theories of health on the other. The basic difference between the two sets of theories is no doubt that whereas naturalistic theories claim to rest on value neutral concepts, such as normal biological function, the phenomenological suggestions for theories of health take their starting point in what is often named intentionality: meaningful stances taken by the embodied person in experiencing and (...) understanding her situation and taking action in the world.Although naturalism and phenomenology are fundamentally different in their approach to health, they are not necessarily opposed when it comes to understanding the predicament of ill persons. The starting point of medical investigations is what the patient feels and says about her illness and the phenomenological investigation should include the way diagnoses of different diseases are interpreted by the person experiencing the diseases as an embodied being. Furthermore, the two theories display similarities in their emphasis of embodiment as the central element of health theory and in their stress on the alien nature of the body displayed in illness. Theories of biology and phenomenology are, indeed, compatible and in many cases also mutually supportive in the realm of health and illness. (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty's claim in Phenomenology of Perception that the anonymous body guarantees an intersubjective world is problematic because it omits the particularities of bodies. This omission produces an account of “dialogue” with another in which I solipsistically hear only myself and dominate others with my intentionality. This essay develops an alternative to projective intentionality called “hypothetical construction,” in which meaning is socially constructed through an appreciation of the differences of others.

It is now generally accepted that human beings are naturally, possibly even essentially, intersubjective. This chapter offers a robust defence of an enhanced and extended intersubjectivity, criticising the paucity of individuating notions of agency and emphasising the community and reciprocity of our affective co-existence with other living organisms and things. I refer to this modified intersubjectivity, which most closely expresses the implicit intricacy of our pre-reflective neuro-muscular experiential entanglement, as ‘enkinaesthesia’. The community and reciprocity of this entanglement is characterised as (...) dialogical, and in this dialogue, as part of our anticipatory preparedness, we have a capacity for intentional transgression, feeling our way with our world but, more particularly, co-feeling our way with the mind and intentions of the other. Thus we are, not so much ‘mind’-reading, as ‘mind’-feeling, and it is through this enkinaesthetic ‘mind’-feeling dialogue that values-realising activity originates and we uncover the deep roots of morality. (shrink)

What someone’s behaviour must be like if we are to be aware of their emotions in it Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-14 DOI 10.1007/s11097-011-9224-0 Authors Rowland Stout, School of Philosophy, UCD Dublin, Dublin 4, Republic of Ireland Journal Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Online ISSN 1572-8676 Print ISSN 1568-7759.

Body experience can be seen as the basis for the formation of the self-concept. The relation between body experience and self-concept is fundamental for human existence and is especially in focus in the fields of psychotherapy and movement activities . But body experience is a "data source" which is difficult to handle scientifically. Body experiences are based on "internal physical sensations" - which Gendlin also describes as the felt meaning or the felt sense, and is not in opposition to phenomenology. (...) To bridge the gap between internal sensations - which are the foundation of the creation of meaning - and language as the medium in both everyday and scientific communication, a form of visualisation technique is introduced to help to evoke descriptions and metaphors that are able to transform body experiences as the pre-reflective mode of information into language as the digital mode of information. Metaphors are the source domain for the target domain body experience . Through the presentation of an empirical project in the field of movement and sport, the theoretical reflections on the process of transforming body experience into language will be exemplified. (shrink)

The author argues that the notion of wearable technology betrays a materialistic approach to design that constrains the construction of a means to fully facilitate the functionality of technology. It is argued that by taking the view that technology can be considered an extensive form of humanity a space can be opened for designers to explore how the body can be considered an architecture for facilitating consciousness and technology a means of distributing consciousness by means of an extended body. The (...) author—by sketching out a new design territory calling into question some current approaches to usability—intends to provoke thought rather than to provide answers. (shrink)

Because of the recent rapid transition in Britain from an elite system of higher education to one in which a much larger propor tion of the population is intended to participate, many students—whose social backgrounds would previously have precluded their involvement in HE—experience strangerhood within academia in a particularly acute form. This paper deals with the experiences of members of an one particular HE course, especially designed for students over 21 years old—such "mature" students are a group who has not (...) been traditionally found in large numbers in British HE Such students describe dramatic changes in their sense of self and in their relationships with others—to the extent that their biographical continuity with their own past becomes problematical.The applicability of an idea touted by certain postmodern writers, "the new selfconsciousness," is considered. Attention is also paid to the practical implications of the findings. (shrink)

In order to account for how organisms can apprehend the contents of the external representations they manipulate in cognizing, the endorsement of representationalism fosters a situation of what I call cognitive overdetermination. I argue that this situation is problematic for the inclusion of these external representations in cognitive processing, as the hypothesis of extended cognition would like to have it. Since that situation arises from a commitment to representationalism (even minimal), it only affects the viability of representationalist versions of extended (...) cognition. (shrink)

This paper addresses racism from a phenomenological viewpoint. Its main task is, ultimately, to show that racism as a process of “negative socialization” does not amount to a contingent deficiency that simply disappears under the conditions of a fully integrated society. In other words, I suspect that racism does not only indicate a lack of integration, solidarity, responsibility, recognition, etc.; rather, that it is, in its extraordinary negativity, a socially constitutive phenomenon per se . After suggesting phenomenology’s potential to tackle (...) the question of racism, I will focus on the experiential oppressiveness of racism, i.e., the ways in which it affects its victims’ lived experiences, in transforming their habitual ways of life and, finally, their subjectivities. My major thesis is that racism works via both inter-kinaesthetically as well as symbolically inflicted distortions of the victim’s body schema. As such a process of “negative socialization,” racism, however, influences the embodied self-conception of the oppressor, who finds himself compelled to adhere to some kind of invisible norm such as, e.g., “whiteness.”. (shrink)

Cognitively-oriented theories have dominated the recent history of the study of emotion. However, critics of this perspective suggest the role of the body in the experience of emotion is largely ignored by cognitive theorists. As an alternative to the cognitive perspective, critics are increasingly pointing to William James’ theory, which emphasized somatic aspects of emotions. This emerging emphasis on the embodiment of emotions is shared by those in the field of AI attempting to model human emotions. Behavior-based agents in AI (...) are attempts to model the role the body might play in the experiencing of emotions. Progress in creating such behavior-based models that function in their environments has been slow, suggesting some potential problems with Jamesian alternatives to cognitive perspectives of emotions. Heidegger’s and Merleau-Ponty’s conceptions of embodiment are suggested as alternatives to James’ and as means for addressing the shortcomings of the cognitive perspective. (shrink)

Whether the "call" to write a eulogy comes when we learn of our loved one's death or shortly after, it comes when we may not yet be able to mourn--let alone make a declaration. The death of a loved one may alienate us from the world and from the sense of self that rests on our daily living in the world and with others. It may "individualize us down to ourselves" by throwing us into a world utterly devoid of meaning (...) and anchors. Paradoxically, from this "nothing," a call may usher forth demanding us to take a stand on our loved one's death and ultimately on our being here. Trying to avoid hearing this call when threatened by the nothingness and world-collapse that a loved one's death brings may be the most natural response. But what happens when we are asked to write a eulogy? Can we ignore the call or is it itself inextricably intertwined with our mourning and precisely that which begs to be expressed? This paper describes the experience of eulogizing a loved one as an encounter with the mortality of words, as listening to silence, and as addressing the deceased--without bathos or pathos. (shrink)

The paper attempts to situate Sennett philosophically by placing him in the tradition of ontological hermeneutics. This way of reading Sennett is justified not only by the core principles that govern Sennett's social anthropology, but is also useful for tracing the trajectory of Sennett's philosophically informed diagnoses of the times. These diagnoses focus on the role of work in shaping subjectivity. After reconstructing the basic conceptual shape of Sennett's diagnoses of the work-related maladies of the "old" and the "new" capitalism, (...) the paper presents some broader reflections on the philosophical presuppositions of social criticism that takes its departure from the centrality of work. (shrink)

The Epilogue reviews the findings presented by indirect ontology. First, indirect ontology discovers a consistency to The Visible and the Invisible which has been overlooked. Secondly, it provides a resolution to problems which are first uncovered in his Phenomenology of Perception, notably the connection between tacit and spoken cogitos, as well as the relationship of silence to speech. Thirdly, indirect ontology serves as a useful tool in understanding the development of Merleau-Ponty's thought from its beginning in The Structure of Behavior (...) through his ontological phase. Finally, indirect ontology brings to clarity the uniqueness of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy which is often overlooked; this uniqueness points to the fact that Merleau-Ponty's thought seems to move in a direction different from many of his successors and interpreters. ;Chapter four of the dissertation begins a positive delineation of Being by means of the indirect ontology examined in the first three chapters. This chapter situates philosophy within the hyperdialectic, thus showing how philosophy can investigate the world from which thought emerges. Chapter five unites the sequential analyses of the first four chapters in order to provide a detailed account of how the natural world serves as the basis of all human expression. Chapter six builds upon the description of nature provided by indirect ontology; in this chapter the working notes of The Visible and the Invisible are examined in order to discuss the philosophy of history and of culture provided by indirect ontology. ;The first three chapters of the dissertation examine the ontology of Being provided by perception. Chapter one concerns itself with our radical dependence upon perception, our "perceptual faith" in the world. By examining Merleau-Ponty's discussion of traditional ontology the dissertation develops the differences between ontology and the perceptual process. In chapter two the gap between ontology and perception is eliminated by providing an ontology which conforms to the manner in which perception presents itself to the body. This union of perception and human expression is made possible by Merleau-Ponty's implementation of hyper-reflection, the theory that perception is itself a form of originary reflection. Hyper-reflection is used to explain the existence of myself, others, and thinking within a shared visible world. Chapter three investigates the natural dialectic or hyper-dialectic which holds between the perceived world and throught; the result is a view of the dialectic which insists that thought remains attached to the perceived world. ;The goal of this dissertation is to present a sustained examination of The Visible and the Invisible. In contrast to the critical literature on Merleau-Ponty which maintains that the work is fragmentary, the position taken in the dissertation is that The Visible and the Invisible is a consistent and cohesive work. The key to unlocking the inner format of The Visible and the Invisible lies in abandoning the popular assumption that the first three chapters of the work are primarily critiques of other philosophers' positions. The dissertation attempts to replace this assumption by seeking, within the resources of the text itself, a new meaning and order. ;In the working notes accompanying The Visible and the Invisible Merleau-Ponty provides the necessary interpretive tool for understanding the work in the form of an "indirect ontology." Indirect ontology is Merleau-Ponty's effort to explain how our perceptual contact with the world is itself the ontological format of all Being. The Visible and the Invisible attempts to account for all phases of human expression through this model. (shrink)

Attention is drawn to the movements of the body and to the ethical imperative that emerges in compelling, flowing moments of teaching. Such moments of teaching are not primarily intellectual, discursive events, but physical, sensual experiences in which the body surrenders to its own movements. Teaching is recognized momentarily as a carnal intensity embedded in and emerging from the flesh. The ethical imperative to this teaching is felt proprioceptively and kinaesthetically when one holds in self-motion the well-being of another as (...) being of the same flesh. The teaching caress offers a primary example. This gesture of intimacy discloses an embodied ethic that contrasts with the transcendental ethics of curricular prescriptions, professional codes of conduct, and the presumptions of self-monitoring behavior. It is a gesture of care for another person, without fastidious carefulness. It is a gesture of pure duration, without sanctimonious purity, in its contact with the beauty, truth and value of the teachable moment. From earliest engagements with children to the dynamics of the university classroom, what makes for good teaching is essentially attentiveness to intimate gestures, such as the caress, that guide teachers kinethically in the moment. (shrink)

Tertiary qualities have been studied primarily by Gestalt psychologists. My aim in this article is to revisit the theoretical assumptions regarding tertiary qualities. I start from the Galilean distinction of the qualities of experience, the Lockean subdivision of qualities, the subjectivist definition in aesthetics and the theoretical contribution of Gestalt theory, to show the theoretical value of ‘tertiary qualities’ in the current context of experimental psychological research. I conclude that tertiary qualities are a crucial keyword for an experimental psychology based (...) on the primacy of perception. Such a perspective is in favour of a neo-Gestalt Experimental Phenomenology. (shrink)

Infants who suffer severe neglect fail to thrive emotionally as well as bodily. The absence of early coexistential structures that provide well-being leads to a narrowing of the child's perceptual and social developmental horizon. What is the nature of these early structures? In this essay, an ontology of well-being or housedness is elaborated through phenomenological reflections on breast-feeding and infant perception. Merleau-Ponty's ontology of the flesh makes a contribution to the ontology of well-being: it gives us a conceptual and evocative (...) language to describe human existence in its pre-verbal, syncretic, and non-dualistic manifestations. It also allows for a re-evaluation and re-interpretation of the results of current research in infant perception. Through the structures of infant perception we perceive the coexistential fit between infants, other human beings, and the world of things. An infant's fundamental housedness in the flesh is taken up and cultivated or destroyed by the child's social and cultural environment. (shrink)

It is argued that when it comes to the hard problem of consciousness neutral monism beats out the competition. It is further argued that neutral monism provides a unique route to a novel type of panentheism via Advaita Vedanta Hinduism.

Client-provider relationships have significant effects on how individuals comprehend their life situation during chronic disease and illness. Yet, little is known about how frontline health care providers (HCPs) influence client’s identity formation through meaning-making with clients such as HIV-positive women living in poverty. This requires ethical consideration of the meanings made between clients and providers about client’s health and well-being, both individually and in the larger society. Health care providers (N = 15) and married women living with HIV (N = (...) 33) in north-central India engaged in separate intensive interviews providing narrative data which were analysed using a conceptual framework crossing Lipsky’s street-level bureaucracy theory (Lipsky 2010) with meaning-making processes. HCPs and women construct meanings of women’s role as caregivers that impact women’s sense of identity, health, and well-being. Findings indicate that despite being well-intentioned, HCPs inadvertently reinforce rigid gender norms and convey that women’s worth is tied to their familial caregiving role. HCPs’ discretionary advocacy may also reinforce societal images of women as incapable and needy, thereby harming them more generally. Attention to the gender-sensitive training of HIV health care providers may assure that discretion is ethically interrogated to promote gender equity and enhance women’s access to social welfare services. (shrink)