The volume Applied Ethics. Perspectives from Romania is the first contribution that aims at showing to the Japanese reader a sample of contemporary philosophy in Romania. At the same time a volume of contemporary Japanese philosophy is translated into Romanian and will be published by the University of Bucharest Press. -/- Applied Ethics. Perspectives from Romania includes several original articles in applied ethics and theoretical moral philosophy. It is representative of the variety of research and the growing interest in applied (...) ethics in the last few years in Romania. The philosophy practised here is at the same time an international activity, but also a kind of research deeply involved in Romanian realities. The contributors to the volume are Romanian philosophers from the most important Universities in the country, including members of the Romanian Academy, but also junior researchers. -/- This volume was made possible thanks to the relationship established between the Applied Ethics Centres of the University of Bucharest, Romania, and Hokkaido University, Japan. (shrink)

The arguments advanced in this paper are the following. Firstly, that just as Trevarthen’s three subjective/intersubjective levels, primary, secondary, and tertiary, mapped out different modes of access, so too response is similarly structured, from direct primordial responsiveness, to that informed by shared pragmatic concerns and narrative contexts, to that which demands the distantiation afforded by representation. Secondly, I propose that empathy is an essential mode of intentionality, integral to the primary level of subjectivity/intersubjectivity, which is crucial to our survival as (...) individuals and as a species. Further to this last point, I argue that empathy is not derived on the basis of intersubjectivity, nor does it merely disclose intersubjectivity, rather it is constitutive of intersubjectivity at the primary level. Empathy is a direct, irreducible intentionality separable in thought from the other primary intentional modes of perception, rationality, memory and imagination, but co-arising with these. In regard to the inter-personal level, the concrete relations with others, primary empathy is both the ground for the possibility of the secondary manifestations—pity, sympathy, perspective taking, etc., and motivates them. Thirdly, it is the movement in the core of subjectivity initially generated by shifting attention between the ‘I’ and ‘we’ perspectives and later ‘solidified’ through affect to become shifting identification, which opens up the intersubjective domain. So we can affirm that we are not only born into sociality but our sociality goes to the roots of our being as Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty have claimed. (shrink)

Although better known for his phenomenology of perception and the perceived world, Merleau-Ponty’s writings also contain the outlines of a rich and unique account of the imagination and the imaginary. In this paper, I explicate the phenomenology of the image that Merleau-Ponty develops throughout his work. I show how Merleau-Ponty develops this account of the image in critical response to Sartre and in a way that follows from his own descriptions of what painters do when they paint and of what (...) we experience when we look at their paintings. The investigation of the particular mode of being of images leads to a consideration of the body and Merleau-Ponty’s later ontology. (shrink)

Borrowing conceptual tools from Bergson, this essay asks after the shift in the temporality of life from Merleau‐Ponty's Phénoménologie de la perception to his later works. Although the Phénoménologie conceives life in terms of the field of presence of bodily action, later texts point to a life of invisible and immemorial dimensionality. By reconsidering Bergson, but also thereby revising his reading of Husserl, Merleau‐Ponty develops a nonserial theory of time in the later works, one that acknowledges the verticality and irreducibility (...) of the past. Life in the flesh relies on unconsciousness or forgetting, on an invisibility that structures its passage. (shrink)

Can phenomenology contribute to the burgeoning science of consciousness? Dennett’s reply would probably be that it very much depends upon the type of phenomenology in question. In my paper I discuss the relation between Dennett’s heterophenomenology and the type of classical philosophical phenomenology that one can find in Husserl, Scheler and Merleau-Ponty. I will in particular be looking at Dennett’s criticism of classical phenomenology. How vulnerable is it to Dennett’s criticism, and how much of a challenge does his own alternative (...) constitute? I will argue that there are some rather marked differences between these two approaches to consciousness, but as I also hope to make clear, Dennett’s own account of where the differences are located is off target and ultimately based on a somewhat flawed conception of what classical phenomenology amounts to. (shrink)

In recent years, more and more people have started talking about the necessity of reconciling phenomenology with the project of naturalization. Is it possible to bridge the gap between phenomenological analyses and naturalistic models of consciousness? Is it possible to naturalize phenomenology? Given the transcendental philosophically motivated anti-naturalism found in many phenomenologists such a naturalization proposal might seem doomed from the very start, but in this paper I will examine and evaluate some possible alternatives.

This was originally written and presented at the National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Seminar for College Teachers on Folk Psychology vs. Mental Simulation: How Minds Understand Minds, run by Robert Gordon at the University of Missouri - St. Louis, June-July 1999. It has been only lightly revised since, and should be considered a rough draft. Needless to say, the ideas herein owe a lot to what I learned at the seminar from Robert Gordon and the other participants, particularly Jim (...) Garson. However, any errors are my responsibility alone. (shrink)

What forms of consciousness can the subject have of her body in action? This is a recurrent issue in contemporary research on skilled movement and expertise, and according to a widespread view, the body makes itself inconspicuous in performance in favour of the object or goal that the activity is directed to. However, this attitude to consciousness in bodily performance seems unsatisfying for an understanding of skilled action, and the work of several researchers can be seen as responding to this (...) view: Montero, Legrand, Ravn and others in the philosophy of expertise and of dance have developed various notions of consciousness and cognition to account for the mindful processes at play in performance. Two related questions can be distinguished here: 1. Is there an inherent conflict between skilled action and at least more than marginal awareness of that action, or is it possible – and even desirable – to reflect on our own performance without considerably impeding on it? 2. What forms of consciousness pertaining to the body in action must we distinguish in order to answer the first question? This paper gives an overview of this discussion, focusing on the second issue, although the first will come into play in so far as it is linked with the latter question. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s analyses of bodily reflection and on dancers’ descriptions, I show that there is, in phenomenological terms, a bodily level of reflection: a fully conscious and exploratory activity that is led by the skilled body, and that is explicitly aimed at by many performers. (shrink)

RESUMEN Nos proponemos mostrar que la filosofía de Merleau-Ponty encarna la experiencia fundamental de la dialéctica: llevar a concepto el sentido de las cosas, del mundo, de los otros, a través de unaexperiencia de expresión que no convierte el sentido de estos en un simple resultado de su reflexión. Para él esta dialéctica se resuelve como dialéctica negativa, en el sentido de ser una filosofía que piensa lo negativo en sentido radical, esto es, como una negación que es parte constitutiva (...) de lo positivo, integrada a éste de manera esencial. Veremos, en particular, que esta idea de la dialéctica atraviesa su concepción de un nuevo pensar como 'pensar sensible' o de 'quiasmo'. El texto está conformado por los siguientes apartados: 1. La dialéctica negativa, 2. La dialéctica como reencuentro con el pasado y 3. El sentido de la crítica. ABSTRACT We intend to show that the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty embodies the fundamental experience of the dialectic: To bring concept to the meaning of things, the world, from the others, through an experience expression that does not convert the sense of these in a simple result of its reflection. For him this dialectic is resolved as negative dialectic, in the sense of being a philosophy that thinks the negative in a radical sense, that is, as a denial that is a constitutive part of the positive, integrated to this one in an essential way. We see, in particular, that this idea of the dialectic crosses a new conception of new thinking as sensible thinking sensitive ' or 'chiasmus '. The text consists of the following sections: 1. Negative dialectic, 2. The dialectic as reunion with the past; and, 3. The sense of criticism. (shrink)

Hyppolite stresses his proximity to Merleau-Ponty, but the received interpretation of his “anti-humanist” reading of Hegel suggests a greater distance between their projects. This paper focuses on an under-explored dimension of their philosophical relationship. I argue that Merleau-Ponty and Hyppolite are both committed to formulating a mode of philosophical expression that can avoid the pitfalls of purely formal or literal and purely aesthetic or creative modes of expression. Merleau-Ponty’s attempt to navigate this dichotomy, I suggest, closely resembles Hyppolite’s interpretation of (...) Hegel’s “speculative” mode of expression. In particular, his emphasis on the “mediating” character of philosophical language, which moves between descriptive and creative expression, suggests a debt to Hyppolite. This reading provides more evidence to think that Hyppolite cannot be straightforwardly understood as an anti-humanist or post-phenomenological thinker, and paves the way for a _rapprochement_ between his work and the broader phenomenological tradition. (shrink)

This paper attempts to clarify Merleau-Ponty’s later work by tracing a hitherto overlooked set of concerns that were of key consequence for the formulation of his ontological research. I argue that his ontology can be understood as a response to a set of problems originating in reflections on the intersubjective use of language in dialogue, undertaken in the early 1950s. His study of dialogue disclosed a structure of meaning-formation and pointed towards a theory of truth (both recurring ontological topics) that (...) post-Phenomenology premises could not account for. A study of dialogue shows that speakers’ positions are interchangeable, that speaking subjects are active and passive in varying degrees, and that the intentional roles of subjects and objects are liable to shift or ‘transgress’ themselves. These observations anticipate the concepts of ‘reversibility’ and ‘narcissism’, his later view of activity and passivity, and his later view of intentionality, and sharpened the need to adopt an intersubjective focus in ontological research. (shrink)

Since Husserl, the task of developing an account of intentionality and constitution has been central to the phenomenological enterprise. Some of Merleau-Ponty's descriptions of ‘the flesh’ suggest that he gives up on this task, or, more strongly, that the flesh is in principle incompatible with intentionality or constitution. I show that these remarks, as in Merleau-Ponty's earlier writings, refer to the classical, early Husserlian interpretations of these concepts, and argue that the concept of the flesh can plausibly be understood to (...) advance a refined account of intentionality and constitution. Instead of a first-personal, unidirectional act or embodied motor project, intentionality is a latent openness to things, where the roles of subject and object are reversible. Whereas the view of constitution as meaning-bestowal is untenable, the flesh has a constitutive role, which is supported by a ‘constitutional passivity’ from the subject. On this reading, Merleau-Ponty's later work aims to develop basic tenets of his earlier thought, albeit at a critical distance, an attempt he thought was continuous with the central problems that Husserl claimed a phenomenological philosophy must grapple with, even if Merleau-Ponty's answers to these problems are not Husserl's. (shrink)

The ArgumentMontaigne'sEssayswere an exercise in self-knowledge carried out for more than twenty years in Montaigne's private library located in his mansion near Bordeaux. The library was a place of solitude as well as a place of knowledge, a kind ofheterotopiain which two sets of spatial relations coexisted and interacted: the social and the epistemic. The spatial demarcation and arrangement of the site – in both the physical and the symbolic sense – were necessary elements of the constitution of Montaigne's self (...) as an object of knowledge and as a subject of discourse. The spatial setting of the library made possible and constrained certain discursive patterns through which words were systematically linked to things, authority was correlated with access and visibility, and the epistemological was coordinated with the social. In this sense, Montaigne's library resembled other places of empirical knowledge of the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in which subjects of knowledge were constituted, objects were posited in their proper phenomenal fields and the entire structure of intellectual activity was reproduced through various cultural mechanisms. But the initial similarity is only apparent. The private library never became a culturally recognized place for knowledge of the self; its heterotopic structure could not have been reproduced without the concrete presence of an author and of a self, while Montaigne's skepticism systematically undermined the possibility of the author's position and of the identity of the self. (shrink)

This article examines the particular aesthetic experience brought about by soundwalks. In each case, the point of departure is the phenomenological analysis of two case study: Janet Cardiff’s Walks and the audio-tours Remote x by Rimini Protokoll. Drawing upon Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, I will examine the conflicts of perception and the peculiar shift from one order of perception to another that punctuate the spectator’s walking, as well as the intertwining of the real and the imaginary coming into being in such (...) performances and experienced at the very level of his bodily inscription in space. More specifically, my aim is to address the challenge that the aesthetic experience here in question sets to Husserl’s phenomenology of perception and to show how the extension of the notion of perception achieved by Merleau-Ponty makes it possible to overcome the paradox. (shrink)

This article argues that paintings have a nonconceptual content unlike that of mechanically produced images. The first part of the article outlines an information-theory approach modelled on the camera and based on the idea that pictures convey information about what they depict. Picture structure is conceived of as contentful by virtue of a supposed causal link with what is depicted and as nonconceptual because it is independent of observers’ understanding. The second part introduces an embodied depiction approach based on Merleau-Ponty’s (...) view of style and the act of painting. It is argued that because of bodily mediation the nonconceptual content of paintings cannot be assimilated to the information-theory approach; painted configurations are contentful by virtue of being the product of intelligent activity, but are nonconceptual because they differ from concepts in their representational function. (shrink)

Several works published in the last decades defend the claim that the concept of creativity should be demystified. With the aim of showing that creativity is not an obscure power owned by only few individuals and free from constraints, authors working at the intersection field between philosophy and cognitive science have notably focused on the structure and evolution of cognitive mechanisms underlying our creative capacities. While taking up the suggestion that we should try not to mystify creativity, this article argues (...) that what is required for such demystification is primarily a transcendental and phenomenological inquiry. Kant’s and Merleau-Ponty’s works are here discussed in order to develop such a transcendental inquiry into creativity. Both Kant and Merleau-Ponty bring to the fore the conditions of possibility for creative acts, and highlight fundamental role of creativity itself in the formation of meaningfulness. The keystone of both philosophers’ inquiries is the emphasis on the interdependence between creativity and rules. Yet, due to the different approaches to the transcendental, Kant’s and Merleau-Ponty’s accounts do not fully converge, but should rather be considered as complementary. (shrink)

Michel Foucault’s understanding of painting oriented him and his readers to an alternative history of art through a means or an approach well known to philosophers and literary critics, that of irony. A close reading of the first chapter of The Order of Things shows that Foucault rejected the traditional interpretations of art history generated by a focus on the intentions of the individual artist, the identification of the subjects portrayed, and the expectations of a genre, relying instead on a (...) synthesis of the approaches to painting given by Merleau-Ponty and Jacques Lacan, which converged with his ironic approach. (shrink)

This paper clarifies the relationship between Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception and Fink’s Sixth Cartesian Meditation with regard to ‘the idea of a transcendental theory of method’. Although Fink’s text played a singularly important role in the development of Merleau-Ponty’s postwar thought, contrary to recent claims made by Ronald Bruzina this influence was not positive. Reconstructing the basic methodological claims of each text, in particular with regard to the being of the phenomenologist, the nature of the productivity that makes phenomenology possible, (...) and the problem of methodological self-reference, I show that Phenomenology of Perception is premised on a decisive rejection of the main theses affirmed in the Sixth Cartesian Meditation. In contrast to Fink’s speculative reinterpretation of phenomenology as an absolute science, Merleau-Ponty viewed it as participating in the historical realization of the world, and hence as ultimately based on a practical faith. Albeit with a Marxian inflection, Merleau-Ponty thus related phenomenology much more closely to Kant. This may not be a better philosophical position, but circa 1945 it was Merleau-Ponty’s, whose work must be approached accordingly. (shrink)

Este artículo estudia la razón de Zambrano desde sus albores como razón mediadora. Su rechazo del sistema va unido a su comienzo en la intuición y a su decurso temporal, que analizamos en relación con Bergson y Husserl. La razón poética va más allá de ese núcleo intuitivo para revelar re-flexivamente incluso lo invisible. Su inmersión en las profundidades, en la pasividad actuante, en las entrañas, en la multiplicidad de los tiempos es paralela a la fenomenología de la génesis merleau-pontiana, (...) a su poiesis carnal e incluso al telos de una razón ampliada al sentir. Ambos filósofos ejercitan su nueva concepción de la filosofía en la existencia. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to clarify what “phenomenological” means in the phenomenological researches of nursing and what “method” is or should beadopted in phenomenological researches of nursing. The essay first defines a traditional classification of the phenomenological researches of nursing by Cohen and Omery, and then gives a new attempt to classify the phenomenological approaches in the theories of nursing. On this basis, the essay reviews some representative “phenomenological” researches of nursing today and addresses critical comments to them. (...) Finally, the essay will make clear what “phenomenological” should mean in the phenomenological research of nursing and what kind of “method” should be adopted in those researches. (shrink)

Este trabalho pretende comentar a doutrina que Merleau-Ponty expõe, em seus distintos períodos, sobre o que caracteriza a obra clássica e sua interpretação. Aponta-se como pressupostos dessa doutrina a admissão de uma certa filosofia da linguagem, bem como de uma particular teoria da produtividade. Em função disso, pergunta-se se, efetivamente, foi feita, ali, uma crítica radical da "filosofia da consciência", como usualmente se supõe.  .

The present article is based on a interview with a Japanese experienced caregiver who specializes in patients with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, which generally leads to the locked-in syndrome. Professional caregivers for ALS patients with ventilator experience two particular temporalities in their practice. First, they must monitor the patient continuously during a seven-hour stay. Because a single problem in the ventilator can have fatal consequences, the care of an ALS patient with a ventilator requires long periods of sustained concentration. Second, trying (...) to understand the signs of a patient with a ventilator sometimes requires three hours to go through ten alphabets. In addition to the huge effort that such communication requires, caregivers must complete the meaning of the signs with their imagination: the ten alphabets are not sufficient to understand what the patient really wants to say. This imaginative capacity, however, is based on a long relationship, which started when the patient was still able to speak and move. That is why, as this article will show, even when a patient has entered total LIS, the caregiver can continue to realize his or her wishes. (shrink)

A revisionist movement in Anglo-Saxon philosophy of science seeking to modulate the positivistic stress on formalized systems and to consider science as ongoing research in finite historical context strikes resonances with hermeneutical phenomenology , whose ontology likewise shifts the locus of truth from verification to discovery. Fusion of the two traditions is utilized to illuminate hitherto relatively unexplored facets of the logic and psychology of scientific discovery, as well as its ontology, here developed from the intentional intertwining of man and (...) nature and finding its locus in the linguistic historicity of fundamental scientific concepts. (shrink)

This paper intends to examine some of the limitations of the well-known Merleau- Pontian account of the lived body in terms of "body schema" and "habitual body", by taking into account some alternative references of the philosopher’s textual corpus to certain dimensions of corporeal experience that exceed such frames. After analyzing these former definitions that outline the profile of a skillful and competent body co­rrelative of a pragmatic environment, we consider cases of non-teleological and non-functional behaviors and non-objective and non-instrumental (...) spatialities to end up by showing the relationship between these analyses and the wider Merleau-Pontian account of the natural horizons of experience. Secondarily, we evaluate critiques such as A. Lingis’ and J. Butler’s aiming to certain deficits of Merleau-Pontian theses, and we identify certain relations that these theses hold with philosophical developments showing certain specific affinities, such as E. Levinas’ and R. Caillois’. (shrink)

Following Merleau-Ponty´s inspiration, B. Waldenfels deals with embodiment emphasizing its responsive dimension, i.e., modes of bodily behavior and experience that respond to interpellations of the strange. From this view, the article aims to ex­plaining the intertwining of body and nature with the intention of showing that nature, understood as another side of human being, implies an alterity that cannot be reduced to the logic of intentionality nor to the logic of communication. The interpellation that arises from Nature has, on the (...) one hand, the meaning of appeal in the sense of an address to somebody, and, on the other, of pretention as an interpellation to something. Based on these presuppositions, the second part of the article tries to show how, by means of painting, a responsive action is set in motion. The features of singularity, unavoidable­ness, subsequence, asymmetry, and innovation that characterize the logic of the answer guiding this action. (shrink)

Phenomenological, process-based and post-Marxist approaches have stressed the immanent nature of the ontogenesis of our world. The concept of performativity epitomizes these temporal, spatial and material views. Reality is always in movement itself: it is constantly materially and socially ‘performed’. Other views lead to a pre-defined world that would be mostly revealed through sensations (i.e. ‘representational perspectives’). These transcendental stances assume that a subject, although pre-existing experience, is the absolute condition of possibility of it. In this paper, we develop another (...) view of performativity (either complementary or interrelated to an immanent stance), one that re-introduces transcendence in the analysis but sees in it something dialogical to the process itself. We draw from the notions of visibility-invisibility and continuity-discontinuity (Merleau-Ponty 1945/2013, 1964) in order to show how everyday activity both performs and makes visible the world. From that perspective, modes of visibility appear as conditions of possibility of performativity itself. We draw some implications for the conceptualization of management practices. (shrink)

Uma investigação sobre "a judicialização da política e a politização do judiciário" restrita ao bom funcionamento do "Estado de Direito" se veria presa dos prejuízos que a própria ideia de "Estado" acarreta, consubstanciados na teoria que lhe dá suporte, a teoria da soberania. É preciso escapar ao "estadocentrismo" e um dos modos de fazê-lo é investigar as noções de "poder" e de "direito". Neste artigo, investigamos essas noções em Merleau-Ponty e Lefort.

Článek si klade za cíl objasnit a obohatit Merleau-Pontyho pojetí promlouvající mluvy v kontrastu k mluvě, jíž se mluví. V kontextu tvůrčích vyjadřovacích výkonů, zejm. umění, píše Merleau-Ponty o promlouvající mluvě především jako o mluvě, jež otevírá nové horizonty zkušenosti a vede ke kognitivnímu obohacení recipienta. Mluva, jíž se mluví, je naproti tomu řečovou sedimentací kulturního významu, jejímž prostřednictvím jsou ustavené poznávací vzorce tradovány. Ve studii nejprve vysvětlujeme, jak se promlouvající mluva tvoří na pozadí běžné mluvy, jíž se mluví, a (...) jak souvisí s vnímaným světem. Poté se soustředíme na dva specifické případy promluv, jimiž se sám Merleau-Ponty explicitně nezabývá. Zaprvé jde o sekundární literaturu, jejímž posláním je sloužit nějakému původnímu autorskému dílu. Sekundární literatura sama o sobě nepřichází s původní stylotvornou vizí světa, a přesto tvoří mluvu, jež moderuje a mnohdy vůbec umožňuje porozumět původnosti myšlenek autorů v silném slova smyslu. Zadruhé se zaměřujeme na případy promlouvajících mluv, jež nás manipulují, nevedou k bohatšímu poznání světa, a přitom jsou schopny zakládat nově sdílený vzor. (shrink)

Історія філософії як філософська дисципліна має двоїсте завдання. Історик філософії мусить шукати факти й опікуватися думками. Дискусії щодо поєднання цих завдань тривають. Мета цієї розвідки – прояснити поняття суб’єкта історико-філософського пізнання, функції та форми його присутності у дослідницьких текстах. Маємо прийняти як вихідний пункт декілька припущень. По-перше, тексти є тим місцем, у якому можна локалізувати такого суб’єкта, оскільки він не збігається з емпіричним суб’єктом. Навпаки, емпіричний суб’єкт здобуває свою ідентичність як дослідник у тексті й через текст. По-друге, дослідницький текст наводить (...) мости між минулим і теперішнім, тобто зобов’язує дослідника не лише висловлювати свої думки, а й чути інші. По-третє, існування інтерпретаторів як соціальної групи спростовує можливість прямого контакту тексту і читача та обіцяє реалізувати цей контакт у дослідницькому тексті. Отже, хоча текст сам по собі не становить винятковий інтерес для дослідника, суб’єкт історико-філософського пізнання може бути реконструйований саме на основі текстів. У процесі реалізації поставленої мети визначено, в чому полягає специфіка історико-філософського пізнання та які вимоги висуває текст до свого читача; з’ясовано значення настроїв і почуттів у історико-філософському пізнанні та особливості, що відрізняють суб’єкта історико-філософського пізнання від інших суб’єктів пізнання. В основу аналізу покладено деякі теоретичні пропозиції І. Ш. Зарка та Ф. Р. Анкерсміта. Свої висновки автор підтверджує коротким порівняльним аналізом двох досліджень філософії XVIII століття. (shrink)

Je m’oppose ici à la théorie « structurale » de la sensation développée par Kurt Koffka dans les années 1920, et reprise notamment par Merleau-Ponty, qui en fait le centre théorique des analyses de la psychologie de la forme. Je commence donc par examiner cette théorie et les faits sur lesquels elle repose, en montrant notamment, à l’aide de la méréologie husserlienne, qu’ils ne peuvent paraître corroborer une théorie structurale de la sensation que si l’on confond « abstraire » et (...) « séparer réellement » une qualité de son contexte. Il s’agit par là plus largement de montrer l’impossibilité, en fait comme en droit, de toute philosophie de la perception qui chercherait à réduire les sensations ou « qualia » à des prédicats relationnels. Je convoque alors William James à l’appui de ces conclusions, en rappelant qu’il avait déjà montré contre les théories néo-hégéliennes de son époque l’illégitimité de leur prétention à se réclamer de faits psychologiques similaires, et qu’il avait soutenu contre eux une théorie de la connaissance par accointance et de l’absoluité ontologique des qualités sensorielles que je cherche à reprendre à mon compte. (shrink)

Resumo: O problema da intersubjetividade, tal como colocado pela filosofia da consciência, exigiu de Merleau-Ponty uma investigação de alguns aspectos essenciais envolvidos no fenômeno da comunicação, tais como o valor expressivo da palavra e a questão da verdade, o que acabou por inserir o filósofo no cenário das grandes discussões linguísticas. Pelo aprofundamento especulativo em direção à camada pré-reflexiva da existência, a análise da linguagem e da intersubjetividade favoreceram não apenas a compreensão da questão da criação de novos significados: ela (...) também possibilitou uma autêntica experiência de comunicação. Foi pela realização desse estudo que o filósofo radicalizou seu pensamento em direção a uma ontologia indireta, afastando-se da noção de cogito tácito como condição de possibilidade da experiência intersubjetiva. O objetivo desse artigo é acompanhar esse percurso realizado por Merleau-Ponty na década de 1950, a fim de evidenciar a relação entre o fenômeno da criação no domínio da linguagem e a possibilidade da experiência intersubjetiva. Palavras-chave: criação; intersubjetividade; linguagem; verdade. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to discuss the connection between Arendt and Merleau-Ponty’s political thought based on the relation between the contingency of action and the spatiality of conflict. Even though the shared concern for developing a phenomenology of action institutes a common ground between their theories, I intend to show that there are significant philosophical differences when it comes to their understanding of conflict and the space in which it unfolds. Although both authors approach the question of action (...) by decentering the subject and by rejecting the notion of an objective and “egocentered” space, the way in which history and the social sphere inform their elucidation of the spatiality of conflict reveals a mismatch between Arendt’s plurality and Merleau-Ponty’s coexistence. I argue that this mismatch holds important consequences as to what each of them understands by political action. (shrink)

En varias oportunidades, el filósofo francés Maurice Merleau-Ponty plantea que hay una "carne del lenguaje" que se puede entender como la comprensión paradójica de sí y del otro en el seno mismo del lenguaje; esta "carne" está en relación con el desarrollo de la vida humana y da testimonio del cambio en los individuos que, observándose a sí mismos, quieren ser individuos nuevos a cada momento. Siguiendo a Merleau-Ponty, el presente ensayo se propone reconocer la condición del ser reinventado continuamente (...) por la expresión del lenguaje. On several occasions, the French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty says there is a "flesh of language" that can be understood as a paradoxical understanding of self and the other within the same language. This "flesh" is related to the development of human life and bears witness to the change in individuals, observing themselves, who want to be new individuals each time. Following Merleau-Ponty, this essay proposes to recognize the condi-tion of being continually reinvented by the expression of language. (shrink)

This dissertation combines two scientific disciplines and research fields, namely philosophy and psychopathology. Within such a wide field of investigation, two precise perspectives are to be adopted in this inquiry: stemming from the first field, the phenomenological perspective on subjectivity and intersubjectivity; stemming from the second, the psychopathological perspective on schizophrenia. The combination of philosophy and psychopathology has often proven fruitful. Moreover, the main motivation for such combined approach is justified by the strong belief that, when critically used, phenomenology offers (...) a viable method of studying the first-personal perspective of experience, including the experiences of people with mental disorders. Philosophical analysis can thereby be used as a means to evaluate the meaning and adequacy of psychopathological concepts and ideas. As a result, phenomenological psychopathology may help understand what is often claimed to be incomprehensible. Particularly for the understanding of schizophrenia, this is taken to be a valuable contribution. For more than twenty years now, the phenomenological approach to schizophrenia has developed a strong and influential hypothesis on the basic alterations of this disorder. Schizophrenia, it is claimed, is a disorder of subjectivity, and more specifically, a disorder of the minimal self. Simultaneously, and often in conjunction, philosophical research on the self has vastly proliferated. The vivid interaction between these two fields makes the phenomenology of schizophrenia a good example of effective interdisciplinary work. Within the philosophical debate on subjectivity, intersubjectivity, or the relation between self and other, is currently a key topic. However, this has not significantly influenced the psychopathology of schizophrenia yet. The initial and fundamental claim of this dissertation is indeed that a renewed evaluation and inclusion of intersubjectivity, next to subjectivity, is to increase the validity of the phenomenological approach to schizophrenia. This would allow the previous hypothesis on schizophrenia as minimal self disorder to be challenged, criticized, or complemented, which would accordingly increase the significance and its clinical value. What I will attempt to do in this dissertation is then to thoroughly evaluate the role of intersubjectivity in schizophrenia. It will hence become clear what this role and its significance are. Consequently, I will finally argue that the basic alterations of schizophrenia concern both subjectivity and intersubjectivity. My argument is developed in four chapters. In the first, I introduce the topic of the self, including the distinction between the minimal and the extended self. This chapter equally introduces schizophrenia as a psychiatric concept, and three different clinical approaches are discussed, among which the phenomenological approach in most detail. After the topics of the self and schizophrenia, I introduce intersubjectivity, notably from a developmental-psychological perspective. By way of status quaestionis, I recapitulate the current research on intersubjectivity and schizophrenia. It will become clear that this research is relatively scarce. I then conclude the chapter with a full formulation of the two research questions informing this dissertation, namely Is schizophrenia an intersubjectivity-disorder? and Which self-concept is suited to define schizophrenia as a self and intersubjectivity disorder? The second chapter examines the phenomenology of intersubjectivity. The exact delineation of what is meant here by intersubjectivity will allow the reader to acknowledge its extent and variety. This chapter is aimed to provide the necessary philosophical tools to analyse schizophrenia in the light of intersubjectivity. In the third chapter I turn to psychopathology. In the first section, I analyse the work of seven major psychopathologists on schizophrenia. The goal of this section is to look for elements of intersubjectivity in their accounts of schizophrenia. Many of these psychopathologists have been influential for the development of the current self-disorder hypothesis, and the investigation intends to show how some crucial intersubjective elements in their work have been neglected. In the second section of this chapter, I focus on the symptoms, signs, and phenomena of schizophrenia that relate to intersubjectivity. This chapter finally offers all the material needed to positively answer the first research question. In the fourth chapter, I bring together psychopathology and philosophy, and I attempt to answer the two research questions. Since Chapter 3 allows me to affirmatively answer the first question, I examine whether the current self-disorder hypothesis is adequate to integrate intersubjectivity disturbances. It will appear that it is not, and the first section of this chapter consequently deals with the question why intersubjectivity and its disturbances have been neglected until now. In the second section it will become clear that no different self-concept is required, but that schizophrenia primarily concerns a particular capacity or orientation of subjectivity. I introduce the concept of open subjectivity and thereby answer the second research question. By describing schizophrenia as a disturbance of open subjectivity, I am finally able to integrate both self-disturbances and intersubjectivity-disturbances into a coherent and unified theory. To conclude this dissertation, I summarize and recapitulate its major issues, questions, and results in Chapter 5. Both clinical implications and possible future research are also discussed here. (shrink)