Leibniz’s juvenile work De arte combinatoria of 1666 included the “Proof for the Existence of God.” This proof bears a mathematical character and is constructed in line with Euclid’s pattern. I attempted to logically formalize it in 1982. In this text, on the basis of then analysis and the contents of the proof, I seek to show what concept of substance Leibniz used on behalf of the proof. Besides, Leibnizian conception of the whole and part as well as Leibniz’s definitional (...) method have been reconstructed here. (shrink)

The much-welcomed recent acknowledgement that there is a plurality of philosophical traditions has an important consequence: that we must acknowledge too that there are many philosophical modernities. Modernity, I will claim, is a polycentric notion, and I will substantiate my claim by examining in some detail one particular non-western philosophical modernity, a remarkable period in 16th to 17th century India where a diversity of philosophical projects fully deserve the label.

Introduction: Transformations of the Soul. Aristotelian Psychology 1250-1650.

Philosophers today have largely given up on the project of categorizing being. Aristotle’s ten categories now strike us as quaint, and no attempt to improve on that effort meets with much interest. Still, no one supposes that reality is smoothly distributed over space. The world at large comes in chunks, and there remains a widespread intuition, even among philosophers, that some of these chunks have a special sort of unity and persistence. These, we tend to suppose, are most truly agents (...) and subjects, and are what exist in the most proper sense of the term. We believe, in other words, in substances. (shrink)

William Gilbert’s 1600 book, De magnete, greatly influenced early modern natural philosophy. The book describes an impressive array of physical experiments, but it also advances a metaphysical view at odds with the soon to emerge mechanical philosophy. That view was animism. I distinguish two kinds of animism – Aristotelian and Platonic – and argue that Gilbert was an Aristotelian animist. Taking Robert Boyle as an example, I then show that early modern arguments against animism were often effective only against Platonic (...) animism. In fact, unacknowledged traces of Aristotelian animism can be found in Boyle’s mechanical account of nature. This was Gilbert’s legacy. (shrink)

The aim of this dissertation is to provide a critique of the idea that skepticism was the driving force in the development of early modern thought. Historian of philosophy Richard Popkin introduced this thesis in the 1950s and elaborated on it over the next five decades, and recent scholarship shows that it has become an increasingly accepted interpretation. I begin with a study of the relevant historical antecedents—the ancient skeptical traditions of which early modern thinkers were aware—Pyrrhonism and Academicism. Then (...) I discuss the influence of skepticism on three pre-Cartesians: Francisco Sanches, Michel de Montaigne, and Pierre Charron. Basing my arguments on an informed understanding of both ancient Greek skepticism and some of the writings of these philosophers, I contend that it is inaccurate to predominantly characterize Sanches, Montaigne, and Charron as skeptics. To support his thesis about the singular influence of skepticism on early modern thought, Popkin says that René Descartes’ metaphysical philosophy was formed as a response to a skeptical threat and that Descartes ultimately conceded to the force of skepticism. He also argues that David Hume was a Pyrrhonist par excellence. I disagree with Popkin’s claims. I argue that Descartes was not as deeply affected by skepticism as Popkin suggests and that it is inaccurate to characterize Hume as a Pyrrhonist. By offering this critique, I hope to make clear to the readers two things: first, that Popkin’s thesis, though it is both enticing and generally accepted by many scholars, is questionable with regard to its plausibility; second, that the arguments I present in this dissertation reveal that further research into the role of skepticism in early modern philosophy is in order. (shrink)

The essay offers a brief introduction to Bartolomeo Mastri's life and thought, a vast introduction to the history of University philosophy in the age of Schools during the Aristotelian period, and the abstracts of the essays published in the volume.

This paper argues for two claims. (1) In his biological views, Kenelm Digby tries to reconcile aspects of an Aristotelian theory of composite substance with early modern corpuscularianism. (2) From a methodological point of view, he uses the Stoic-Epicurean epistemology of common notions in order to show the adequacy of his conciliatory approach. The first claim is substantiated by an analysis of Digby’s views on the role of mixture and homogeneity in the process of animal generation. The second claim is (...) substantiated by an analysis of Digby’s views on the role of the concept of quantity in the evaluation of scientific hypotheses. Both arguments make use of the context of Digby’s philosophy: the first argument draws on his background in the work of early modern corpuscularian Aristotelians such as Daniel Sennert; the second argument draws on his background in the epistemology of Pierre Gassendi. (shrink)

Se plantea el problema de la influencia de Suárez en la concepción de la individualidad por Leibniz. Para ello se analiza principalmente la Disputatio Metaphysica de principio individui de Leibniz. Se diferencian tres posturas: tomista, scotista y suareziana. Se confronta la idea de ‘forma’ de Leibniz con la de Aristóteles y la idea de ‘forma sustancial’ con la escolástica y Suárez. La comparación de Leibniz con Suárez se centra en la noción clave de “forma sustancial” y se analizan sus diversos (...) significados. Se formula la coincidencia de ambos autores en torno a la tesis de que la individuación tiene lugar en virtud de la “entidad total”. Finalmente se analiza el significado exacto de esta expresión y se señalan las diferencias entre ambos autores, especialmente las que se producen en la evolución final de Leibniz. Ahí se introduce la concepción de la forma sustancial como principio vital que cohesiona los cuerpos. (shrink)

1. In the Physics and Metaphysics, Aristotle lays out four kinds of causes and provides examples of each. Bronze and silver are offered as examples of the material causes of artefacts, the father a...