This paper explores the theory of freedom that Emilie du Châtelet advances in her essay “On Freedom.” Using contemporary terminology, we can characterize this theory as a version of agent-causal compatibilism. More specifically, the theory has the following elements: (a) freedom consists in the power to act in accordance with one’s choices, (b) freedom requires the ability to suspend desires and master passions, (c) freedom requires a power of self-motion in the agent, and (d) freedom is compatible with moral necessity (...) but not with physical necessity. While these elements may at first appear disparate, the paper shows that they fit together quite well. The resulting theory is a surprising combination of doctrines that appear to be based on Samuel Clarke’s libertarian account of free will and doctrines that are reminiscent of the compatibilist accounts of John Locke, Anthony Collins, Gottfried Leibniz, and Thomas Hobbes. (shrink)

Leibniz argues that God doesn't create everything possible because not all possible things are compossible, that is, compatible with each other. Much recent debate has focused on Leibniz's conception of compossibility. One important aspect of this debate, which has not been examined directly, is the distinction between possible worlds and possible creations: the notion of possible world is more robust than simply whatever God can create. Many commentators have relied on this distinction without a clear formulation of it. I develop (...) the distinction between possible worlds and possible creations by looking at how Leibniz characterizes what God is capable of creating. I argue that possible creations must be both logically consistent and determinate. Possible creations differ from possible worlds insofar as possible creations fail to be either maximal or harmonious. I conclude, therefore, that focusing on the notion of determinateness offers a new approach to answering the question why doesn't God create everything possible? (shrink)

This volume explores the relation between legal reasoning and logic from both a historical and a systematic perspective. The topics addressed include, among others, conditional legal acts, disjunctions in legal acts, presumptions and conjectures, conflicts of values, Jørgensen´s Dilemma, the Rhetor´s Dilemma, the theory of legal fictions and the categorization of contracts. The unifying problematic of these contributions concerns the conditional structures and, more particularly, the relationship between legal theory and legal reasoning in the context of conditions.

Today, many philosophers write on topics of contemporary interest, such as emerging technologies, scientific advancements, or major political events. However, many of these reflections, while philosophically valuable, fail to contribute to those who may benefit the most from them. In this article, we discuss our own experience of engaging with nursing researchers and practicing nurses. By drawing on the field of philosophical phenomenology, we intervene in a longstanding debate over the meaning of “empathy” in nursing, which has important implications for (...) nursing research, training, and practice. However, our intention is not only to introduce and discuss this philosophical intervention. Rather, we present this intervention as a model for how philosophers might successfully engage with the field of nursing, and perhaps with other fields as well, with the aim of effecting positive change in research or practice. The article proceeds in five parts. First, we introduce the problem of conceptual clarity in nursing and explain why many nursing concepts are still in need of refinement. Second, we discuss the origins of the concept of empathy in nursing and outline the challenges associated with borrowing theory from other fields. Third, we explain how nurses tend to conceptualize empathy today, drawing upon the psychological distinction between cognitive and emotional empathy. Fourth, we discuss our intervention in this debate and explain how we attempt to resolve existing conceptual confusions by developing the concept of empathy from the ground up. Fifth, we conclude by briefly reflecting upon some of the challenges of interdisciplinary engagement and providing some recommendations based upon our own experience. (shrink)

Leibniz thinks that every created substance is causally active, and yet causally independent of every other: none can cause changes in any but itself. This is not controversial. But Leibniz also thinks that every created substance is existentially independent of every other: it is metaphysically possible for any to exist with or without any other. This is controversial. I argue that, given a mainstream reading of Leibniz’s essentialism, if one accepts the former, uncontroversial interpretation concerning causal independence, then one ought (...) also to accept the latter, controversial one concerning existential independence. This is a new way to defend the ‘existential independence’ interpretation. Moreover, this defense provides a new approach for defending the broadly ‘non-logical’ interpretive camp in the longstanding debate over Leibniz’s views on incompossibility, against perhaps the strongest objection leveled by advocates of the opposing broadly ‘logical’ interpretation. (shrink)

Leibniz's famous proposition that God has created the best of all possible worlds holds a significant place in his philosophical system. However, the precise manner in which God determines which world is the best remains somewhat ambiguous. Leibniz suggests that a form of "Divine mathematics" is employed to construct and evaluate possible worlds. In this paper, I uncover the underlying mechanics of Divine mathematics by formally reconstructing it. I argue that Divine mathematics is a one-player combinatorial game, in which God's (...) goal is to find the best combination among many possibilities. Drawing on the combinatorial theory, I provide new solutions to some puzzles of compossibility. (shrink)

This essay critically examines a widely held assumption in interpreting Leibniz's modal metaphysics: that whatever is necessarily actual is necessary. I argue that Leibniz rejected this axiom for principled reasons having to do with his views on the grounding of metaphysical modalities in divine power and intellect (but not divine will). I also argue that if we read him in light of this rejection, his per se possibility theory becomes (contrary to its reception in the literature) quite successful in addressing (...) the problem of necessitarianism. (shrink)

En este artículo examinamos los aspectos más relevantes de la concepción del espacio de Leibniz. A través de un enfoque genético, nuestro propósito es mostrar que, en su desarrollo evolutivo, dicha concepción sufre dos transiciones destacables, las que separan y distinguen tres versiones teóricas. En su juventud, Leibniz defiende una concepción substancialista del espacio. Sin embargo, debido a la adopción del nominalismo, dicha concepción sufre un primer giro que decanta en un monismo substancialoide, el que se consolida en el período (...) medio de la filosofía de Leibniz. Ya en el período tardío, Leibniz reformula, en una segunda transición, su concepción del espacio, la que adopta la forma definitiva de -lo que llamamos- un relacionismo substancialoide. (shrink)