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  1. The 'shared manifold' hypothesis: From mirror neurons to empathy.Vittorio Gallese - 2001 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):33-50.
    My initial scope will be limited: starting from a neurobiological standpoint, I will analyse how actions are possibly represented and understood. The main aim of my arguments will be to show that, far from being exclusively dependent upon mentalistic/linguistic abilities, the capacity for understanding others as intentional agents is deeply grounded in the relational nature of action. Action is relational, and the relation holds both between the agent and the object target of the action , as between the agent of (...)
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  • Minimal self-models and the free energy principle.Jakub Limanowski & Felix Blankenburg - 2013 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.
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  • The “sense of agency” and its underlying cognitive and neural mechanisms.Nicole David, Albert Newen & Kai Vogeley - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2):523-534.
    The sense of agency is a central aspect of human self-consciousness and refers to the experience of oneself as the agent of one’s own actions. Several different cognitive theories on the sense of agency have been proposed implying divergent empirical approaches and results, especially with respect to neural correlates. A multifactorial and multilevel model of the sense of agency may provide the most constructive framework for integrating divergent theories and findings, meeting the complex nature of this intriguing phenomenon.
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  • Phenomenal transparency and cognitive self-reference.Thomas Metzinger - 2003 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (4):353-393.
    A representationalist analysis of strong first-person phenomena is developed (Baker 1998), and it is argued that conscious, cognitive self-reference can be naturalized under this representationalist analysis. According to this view, the phenomenal first-person perspective is a condition of possibility for the emergence of a cognitive first-person perspective. Cognitive self-reference always is reference to the phenomenal content of a transparent self-model. The concepts of phenomenal transparency and introspection are clarified. More generally, I suggest that the concepts of phenomenal opacity and phenomenal (...)
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  • Neural correlates of the first-person perspective.Kai Vogeley & Gereon R. Fink - 2003 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):38-42.
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  • The sense of agency – a phenomenological consequence of enacting sensorimotor schemes.Thomas Buhrmann & Ezequiel Di Paolo - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (2):207-236.
    The sensorimotor approach to perception addresses various aspects of perceptual experience, but not the subjectivity of intentional action. Conversely, the problem that current accounts of the sense of agency deal with is primarily one of subjectivity. But the proposed models, based on internal signal comparisons, arguably fail to make the transition from subpersonal computations to personal experience. In this paper we suggest an alternative direction towards explaining the sense of agency by braiding three theoretical strands: a world-involving, dynamical interpretation of (...)
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  • The emergence of a shared action ontology: Building blocks for a theory.Thomas Metzinger & Vittorio Gallese - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):549-571.
    To have an ontology is to interpret a world. In this paper we argue that the brain, viewed as a representational system aimed at interpreting our world, possesses an ontology too. It creates primitives and makes existence assumptions. It decomposes target space in a way that exhibits a certain invariance, which in turn is functionally significant. We will investigate which are the functional regularities guiding this decomposition process, by answering to the following questions: What are the explicit and implicit assumptions (...)
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  • Motor ontology: The representational reality of goals, actions and selves.Vittorio Gallese & Thomas Metzinger - 2003 - Philosophical Psychology 16 (3):365 – 388.
    The representational dynamics of the brain is a subsymbolic process, and it has to be conceived as an "agent-free" type of dynamical self-organization. However, in generating a coherent internal world-model, the brain decomposes target space in a certain way. In doing so, it defines an "ontology": to have an ontology is to interpret a world. In this paper we argue that the brain, viewed as a representational system aimed at interpreting the world, possesses an ontology too. It decomposes target space (...)
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  • (1 other version)Flow and structure of time experience – concept, empirical validation and implications for psychopathology.David H. V. Vogel, Christine M. Falter-Wagner, Theresa Schoofs, Katharina Krämer, Christian Kupke & Kai Vogeley - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (2):235-258.
    We present a conceptual framework on the experience of time and provide a coherent basis on which to base further inquiries into qualitative approaches concerning time experience. We propose two Time-Layers and two Time-Formats forming four Time-Domains. Micro-Flow and Micro-Structure represent the implicit phenomenal basis, from which the explicit experiences of Macro-Flow and Macro-Structure emerge. Complementary to this theoretical proposal, we present empirical results from qualitative content analysis obtained from 25 healthy participants. The data essentially corroborate the theoretical proposal. With (...)
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  • (1 other version)Flow and structure of time experience – concept, empirical validation and implications for psychopathology.David H. V. Vogel, Christine M. Falter-Wagner, Theresa Schoofs, Katharina Krämer, Christian Kupke & Kai Vogeley - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-24.
    We present a conceptual framework on the experience of time and provide a coherent basis on which to base further inquiries into qualitative approaches concerning time experience. We propose two Time-Layers and two Time-Formats forming four Time-Domains. Micro-Flow and Micro-Structure represent the implicit phenomenal basis, from which the explicit experiences of Macro-Flow and Macro-Structure emerge. Complementary to this theoretical proposal, we present empirical results from qualitative content analysis obtained from 25 healthy participants. The data essentially corroborate the theoretical proposal. With (...)
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  • Robots With Internal Models A Route to Machine Consciousness?Owen Holland & Rod Goodman - 2003 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (4-5):4-5.
    We are engineers, and our view of consciousness is shaped by an engineering ambition: we would like to build a conscious machine. We begin by acknowledging that we may be a little disadvantaged, in that consciousness studies do not form part of the engineering curriculum, and so we may be starting from a position of considerable ignorance as regards the study of consciousness itself. In practice, however, this may not set us back very far; almost a decade ago, Crick wrote: (...)
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  • The evolution of cognition—a hypothesis.Holk Cruse - 2003 - Cognitive Science 27 (1):135-155.
    Behavior may be controlled by reactive systems. In a reactive system the motor output is exclusively driven by actual sensory input. An alternative solution to control behavior is given by “cognitive” systems capable of planning ahead. To this end the system has to be equipped with some kind of internal world model. A sensible basis of an internal world model might be a model of the system's own body. I show that a reactive system with the ability to control a (...)
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  • Identification and integration of sensory modalities: Neural basis and relation to consciousness.Cyriel M. A. Pennartz - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (3):718-739.
    A key question in studying consciousness is how neural operations in the brain can identify streams of sensory input as belonging to distinct modalities, which contributes to the representation of qualitatively different experiences. The basis for identification of modalities is proposed to be constituted by self-organized comparative operations across a network of unimodal and multimodal sensory areas. However, such network interactions alone cannot answer the question how sensory feature detectors collectively account for an integrated, yet phenomenally differentiated experiential content. This (...)
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  • Commentary on jakab's Ineffability of Qualia.Thomas Metzinger - 2000 - Consciousness and Cognition 9 (3):352-362.
    Zoltan Jakab has presented an interesting conceptual analysis of the ineffability of qualia in a functionalist and classical cognitivist framework. But he does not want to commit himself to a certain metaphysical thesis on the ontology of consciousness or qualia. We believe that his strategy has yielded a number of highly relevant and interesting insights, but still suffers from some minor inconsistencies and a certain lack of phenomenological and empirical plausibility. This may be due to some background assumptions relating to (...)
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  • "Consciousness". Selected Bibliography 1970 - 2004.Thomas Metzinger - unknown
    This is a bibliography of books and articles on consciousness in philosophy, cognitive science, and neuroscience over the last 30 years. There are three main sections, devoted to monographs, edited collections of papers, and articles. The first two of these sections are each divided into three subsections containing books in each of the main areas of research. The third section is divided into 12 subsections, with 10 subject headings for philosophical articles along with two additional subsections for articles in cognitive (...)
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  • The Interaction between Interoceptive and Action States within a Framework of Predictive Coding.Amanda C. Marshall, Antje Gentsch & Simone Schütz-Bosbach - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
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  • Pain, dissociation and subliminal self-representations.Petr Bob - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (1):355-369.
    According to recent evidence, neurophysiological processes coupled to pain are closely related to the mechanisms of consciousness. This evidence is in accordance with findings that changes in states of consciousness during hypnosis or traumatic dissociation strongly affect conscious perception and experience of pain, and markedly influence brain functions. Past research indicates that painful experience may induce dissociated state and information about the experience may be stored or processed unconsciously. Reported findings suggest common neurophysiological mechanisms of pain and dissociation and point (...)
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  • The limits of representationalism: A phenomenological critique of Thomas Metzinger's self-model theory.Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl - 2005 - Synthesis Philosophica (40):355-371.
    Thomas Metzinger’s self-model theory offers a frame¬work for naturalizing subjective experiences, e.g. first-person perspective. These phenomena are explained by referring to representational contents which are said to be interrelated at diverse levels of consciousness and correlated with brain activities. The paper begins with a consideration on naturalism and anti-naturalism in order to roughly sketch the background of Metzinger’s claim that his theory renders philosophical speculations on the mind unnecessary . In particular, Husserl’s phenomenological conception of consciousness is refuted as uncritical (...)
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  • Transcendental niche construction.Werner Callebaut - 2007 - Acta Biotheoretica 55 (1):73-90.
    I discuss various reactions to my article “Again, what the philosophy of science is not” [Callebaut (Acta Biotheor 53:92–122 (2005a))], most of which concern the naturalism issue, the place of the philosophy of biology within philosophy of science and philosophy at large, and the proper tasks of the philosophy of biology.
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  • In Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology.Shimon Edelman - unknown
    By what empirical means can a person determine whether he or she is presently awake or dreaming? Any conceivable test addressing this question, which is a special case of the classical metaphysical doubting of reality, must be statistical (for the same reason that empirical science is, as noted by Hume). Subjecting the experienced reality to any kind of statistical test (for instance, a test for bizarreness) requires, however, that a set of baseline measurements be available. In a dream, or in (...)
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  • Carter's Cartesian Paraphrase and "Operational Autonomy": The Cater-Bostrom Anthropic Principle, the Principle of Mediocrity, and "Being No One…".Tim Clark - 2008 - Journal of Evolution and Technology 17 (1):59-70.
    This paper examines Yilmaz; Ören and Aghaee’s outline of present research efforts into the development of simulations that “represent the behavior of active entities in the world.” The paper argues that the Carter-Bostrom formulation of the anthropic principle provides a more functional set of theoretical; and pragmatic proposals to frame the issue of the simulation of human sociocognitive activity than the now standard conjunctive phrases “cognitive simulations;” “Strong Artificial Intelligence;” and “Strong Machinic Consciousness.” More importantly; the principle of “anthropic entity” (...)
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