In Abram Brummett and Erica K. Salter's excellent paper, “Mapping the Moral Terrain of Clinical Deception,” they rightly note that it is sometimes ethically appropriate for health care professionals to deceive patients and families. However, they also note that because doing so violates a prima facie duty of honesty, the ethical burden of proof falls upon the deceiver. Hence, they also provide a sophisticated framework for determining whether any given case is warranted. I applaud their overall approach but also critique (...) some of their claims, in particular, their conclusion that lies of commission require greater justification than those of omission and their conflation of the principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence. I also urge them to give greater attention to how power asymmetries should be accounted for and to the impact such deceptive choices might have on the clinician's character. (shrink)

Background Physical morbidity is rife among patients with serious mental illness. When they are involuntarily hospitalized and even treated, they may still refuse treatment for physical illness leading clinicians to wonder about the ethics of coercing such treatments. Research aim This survey study explored psychiatric caregivers’ perceptions on whether compulsory treatment of physical illness is legal and whether it is justifiable in patients with serious mental illness and under what circumstances. Research design A questionnaire that included two case vignettes of (...) an involuntarily hospitalized psychiatric patient with diabetes refusing treatment with insulin for various reasons. The cases differed in terms of diabetes severity. Participants answered questions regarding the appropriateness of involuntary treatment. Participants and research context Psychiatric medical doctors and nurses working in a mental health center. ( N = 89, 50 female, ages 26–66). Ethical considerations The study was approved by the Medical Centre Institutional Review Board (IRB) and the University Ethics Committee. The respondents’ anonymity was kept. Participation was voluntary and consent was obtained. Results The severity of the patient’s medical condition and their reason for refusing treatment were associated with participants’ willingness to give insulin despite patient objection [( F(1, 87) = 49.41, p <.01; ( F(1, 87) = 33.44, p <.01), respectively]. Participants were more inclined to support compulsory treatment if the patient’s refusal was “illness-oriented” (i.e. directly related to psychiatric illness). Participants presented diverse views regarding the perceived legality of compulsory treatment of physical illness in such situations (illegal 63.09%; legal 23.8%; 13% unsure). The majority (53.5%–55.3%) of those who thought it was illegal supported compulsory treatment in high-severity, illness-oriented refusal situations. Conclusions The severity of the medical condition and the reason for treatment refusal influence psychiatric caregivers’ willingness to provide compulsory treatment for physical illness in involuntary hospitalized psychiatric patients. Beyond the legal framework, ethical guidelines for these situations are warranted, while decisions should be made on a case-by-case basis. (shrink)

The implementation of care robotics in care settings is identified by some authors as a disruptive innovation, in the sense that it will upend the praxis of care. It is an open ethical question whether this alleged disruption will also have a transformative impact on established ethical concepts and principles. One prevalent worry is that the implementation of care robots will turn deception into a routine component of elderly care, at least to the extent that these robots will function as (...) simulacra for something that they are not (i.e. human caregivers). At face value, this may indeed seem to indicate a concern for how this technology may upend existing practices and relationships within a care setting. Yet, on closer inspection, this reaction may rather point to a rediscovery and a revaluation of a particularly well-entrenched value or virtue, i.e. veracity. The virtue of veracity is one of the values that is mobilized to argue against a substitution of human caregivers (while a combination of care robots and human caregivers is much more accepted). The subject of this paper is to explore how the moral panic surrounding care robots should not so much be interpreted as an anticipated and probable disruptor in a care setting, but rather as a sensitizing – in a way conservationist – argument that identifies veracity as an established value that is supposed to be protected and advanced in present day and future care settings. (shrink)

The use of placebo in clinical practice has been the topic of extensive debate in the bioethics literature, with much scholarship focusing on concerns regarding deception. While considerations of placebo without deception have largely centred on open-label placebo, this paper considers a different kind of ethical quandary regarding placebo without an intent to deceive—one where the provider believes a treatment is effective due to a direct physiological mechanism, even though that belief may not be supported by rigorous scientific evidence. This (...) is often the case with complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) techniques and also with some mainstream therapies that have not proven to be better than sham. Using one such CAM technique as a case study—electroencephalography (EEG) neurofeedback for attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)—this paper explores the ethics of providing therapies that may have some beneficial effect, although one that is likely due to placebo effect. First, we provide background on EEG neurofeedback for ADHD and its evidence base, showing how it has proven to be equivalent to—but not better than—sham neurofeedback. Subsequently, we explore whether offering therapies that are claimed to work via specific physical pathways, but may actually work due to the placebo effect, constitute deception. We suggest that this practice may constitute unintentional deception regarding mechanism of action. Ultimately, we argue that providers have increased information provision obligations when offering treatments that diverge from standard of care and we make recommendations for mitigating unintentional deception. (shrink)

Clinical ethics consultants should show bold moral courage in discharging their duties to patients, families, and healthcare providers. Given the corrosive impact on trust, and on the appropriate d...

How one reacts to lying depends on individual temperament, intellectual training and value commitments, freedom status,, consideration of consequences, emotional resilience an...

Christopher Meyers attempts a utilitarian defense of the deception of patients when the purported harms of truthful disclosure outweigh its benefits. He suggests that honesty i...

In “Deception and the Clinical Ethicist,” Meyers defends the argument that the clinical ethicist should sometimes be an active participant in the deception of patients and their families. Me...

We argue against Christopher Meyers’s call for clinical ethicists to participate in deceiving patients, surrogate decision-makers, or family members. While we acknowledge that some forms of deception may be ethically appropriate in highly circumscribed situations, the type of case Meyers describes as involving justifiable deception differs in at least two important ways. First, Meyers fails to distinguish acts of deception based on the critical feature of who is being deceived—patient, surrogate, or family member—and the overarching duty to respect the autonomy (...) of relevant decision-makers to make rationally-informed decisions. Second, Meyers’s analysis relies on an assessment of harm, a value-laden concept which health care professionals and ethicists should not presumptively assess without considering how the patient, surrogate, or family might assess specific harms. (shrink)

In “Deception and the Clinical Ethicist,” Christopher Meyers defends that view that deception practiced by clinical ethicists is legitimate if it satisfies a series of justifying conditions (Meyers...

Anyone who is not a deontological absolutist regarding truthfulness will readily agree with Christopher Meyers’s thesis that there are cases in which...

The opening sentence of Christopher Meyers’ Target Article is “Lying to one’s patient is wrong”. The author continues, “This truism is one that bioethicists have heartedly endorsed fo...

The target article by Christopher Meyers concerning justification of deception for clinical ethicists is both well-reasoned and plausible. Clearly grounded in utilitarian considerations, its...

In “Deception and the Clinical Ethicist,” Christopher Meyers argues that clinical ethicists sometimes ought to actively help deceive patients or their families, all...

Not only is deception commonplace in medical encounters, according to Christopher Meyers (2021), but the clinical ethicist might have moral obligations to support and even enact deception. Descriptively Meyers is right that there are “opportunistic, self-interested and benevolent reasons” for deception through omission and commission in clinical medicine. But it is possible to retain this premise while rejecting the normative conclusion that the clinical ethicist “should sometimes be an active participant in the deception of patients and families.” One reason to (...) reject the normative conclusion is its incompatibility with providing trauma informed ethics consultation (TIEC). In the TIEC framework I developed with Uchenna Anani, we defend the integration of trauma informed care (TIC) into ethics consultation (Lanphier and Anani 2021). While ethicists narrowly attend to the question and scope of the ethics consults made to them, doing so in alignment with trauma informed principles is tantamount to providing good ethics consultation. According to Meyers, the clinical ethicist is an “advocate for the best ethical choices.” The best ethical choices are also trauma informed ones. (shrink)

I am grateful to colleagues for their comments on my target article ; they are almost uniformly insightful, telling, and helpful. In this brief response, I extend the discussion on, in order...

Meyers argues that clinical ethicists should sometimes be active participants in the deception of patients and families, whether that involves lies of omission or commission. I shall...

I trust my lawyer more than I trust my doctor.—Shana Alexander, 1992 [The audience laughed.]1The Hippocratic Oath makes the physician invoke external supervision of her adherence to what she affirm...

Lying to one’s patients is wrong. So obvious as to border on a platitude, this truism is one that bioethicists have heartily endorsed for several decades. Deception, the standard line holds, underc...