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  1. The Evolution of Compositionality in Signaling Games.Michael Franke - 2016 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 25 (3-4):355-377.
    Compositionality is a key design feature of human language: the meaning of complex expressions is, for the most part, systematically constructed from the meanings of its parts and their manner of composition. This paper demonstrates that rudimentary forms of compositional communicative behavior can emerge from a variant of reinforcement learning applied to signaling games. This helps explain how compositionality could have emerged gradually: if unsophisticated agents can evolve prevalent dispositions to communicate compositional-like, there is a direct evolutionary benefit for adaptations (...)
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  • The change of signaling conventions in social networks.Roland Mühlenbernd - 2019 - AI and Society 34 (4):721-734.
    To depict the mechanisms that have enabled the emergence of semantic conventions, philosophers and researchers particularly access a game-theoretic model: the signaling game. In this article I argue that this model is also quite appropriate to analyze not only the emergence of a semantic convention, but also its change. I delineate how the application of signaling games helps to reproduce and depict mechanisms of semantic change. For that purpose I present a model that combines a signaling game with innovative reinforcement (...)
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  • Bidirectional Optimization from Reasoning and Learning in Games.Michael Franke & Gerhard Jäger - 2012 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 21 (1):117-139.
    We reopen the investigation into the formal and conceptual relationship between bidirectional optimality theory (Blutner in J Semant 15(2):115–162, 1998 , J Semant 17(3):189–216, 2000 ) and game theory. Unlike a likeminded previous endeavor by Dekker and van Rooij (J Semant 17:217–242, 2000 ), we consider signaling games not strategic games, and seek to ground bidirectional optimization once in a model of rational step-by-step reasoning and once in a model of reinforcement learning. We give sufficient conditions for equivalence of bidirectional (...)
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  • Evolutionary Explanations of Simple Communication: Signalling Games and Their Models.Travis LaCroix - 2020 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 51 (1):19-43.
    This paper applies the theoretical criteria laid out by D’Arms et al. to various aspects of evolutionary models of signalling. The question that D’Arms et al. seek to answer can be formulated as follows: Are the models that we use to explain the phenomena in question conceptually adequate? The conceptual adequacy question relates the formal aspects of the model to those aspects of the natural world that the model is supposed to capture. Moreover, this paper extends the analysis of D’Arms (...)
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  • Game Theoretic Pragmatics.Michael Franke - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (3):269-284.
    Game theoretic pragmatics is a small but growing part of formal pragmatics, the linguistic subfield studying language use. The general logic of a game theoretic explanation of a pragmatic phenomenon is this: the conversational context is modelled as a game between speaker and hearer; an adequate solution concept then selects the to‐be‐explained behavior in the game model. For such an explanation to be convincing, both components, game model and solution concept, should be formulated and scrutinized as explicitly as possible. The (...)
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  • Pragmatic Reasoning About Unawareness.Michael Franke - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S4):1-39.
    Language use and interpretation is heavily contingent on context. But human interlocutors need not always agree what the actual context is. In game theoretic approaches to language use and interpretation, interlocutors’ beliefs about the context are the players’ beliefs about the game that they are playing. Together this entails that we need to consider cases in which interlocutors have different subjective conceptualizations of the game they are in. This paper therefore extends iterated best response reasoning, as an established model for (...)
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