There is, I shall assume, such a thing as moral evil (more on which below). My question is whether is also such a thing as non-moral evil, and in particular whether there are such things as aesthetic evil and epistemic evil. More exactly, my question is whether there is such a thing as moral evil but not such a thing as non-moral evil, in some sense that reveals something special about the moral, as opposed to such would-be non-moral domains as (...) the aesthetic and the epistemic. The philosophical issue at stake here is that of the nature of these different normative domains, and the nature and extent of their difference. (shrink)

The usual way of discussing normativity and naturalism is by running through a standard range of issues: the relations of fact and value, objectivity, reason and emotion, is and ought, and the so-called ‘naturalistic fallacy’. This is a naturalism that is virtually silent on nature. I outline an alternative approach that relates normativity to our nature as living beings, for whom specific things are good or bad for us. Our nature as evaluative beings is shown to be rooted in and (...) emergent from this biological normativity. There is also significant downward causation, such that our brain-bodies are continually modified by our experience and thoughts. Cultures, as emergent from the affordances of our brain-bodies, create further extensive, irreducible sources of normativity, albeit ones which do not wholly escape biological normativity and can impact back on it. (shrink)

Evil acts strike us, by their very nature, as not only horrifying and reprehensible, but also as deeply puzzling. No doubt for reasons like this, evil has often been seen as mysterious, demonic and beyond our human powers of understanding. The question I examine in this paper is whether or not we can (or would want to) overcome this puzzlement in the face of evil acts. I shall argue that we ought want to (in all cases) and can (in at (...) least most cases) come to understand why people perpetrate evil acts. This is an appealing conclusion as it allows us to take practical steps to both minimise future occurrences of evil and come to terms with its past abominations. (shrink)

What kind of persons could engage in political torture? Not only the morally impaired who lack empathy or compassion, or even the merely obedient, but also the righteous who struggle with conscience, and the realists who set morality aside.

Pelkey’s anchoring of the semiotic square in embodiment is excellent news for cognitive literary theory, a dynamic field still in search of itself. However, his validation of the square, though theoretically unexceptionable, suffers in the execution, for his interpretation of the country song “Follow your Arrow” is less successful. The present article benefits from Pelkey’s validation as it organizes a tool of cultural-semantic analysis (CS-tool) as a ‘deviant’ semiotic square. The article then shows how this particular semiotic square allows us (...) to analyze the song in terms which build on Pelkey’s analysis, but also arrive at more satisfying results. Where Pelkey sees liberation in the song and the square, the tool uncovers manipulation in the former and closure in the latter. The article then assesses the complementarity of and differences between the two squares: Pelkey works on a local sentence-level through direct implicature, thus following the narrative/authorial voice of the poem. The CS-tool starts from a position of higher abstraction requiring a less defined, but still sufficient and more wide-ranging, three-step implicature. This allows the tool to step back from the song’s authorial voice and uncover its manipulations. The article closes by discussing the deviant features of the present square. (shrink)

This contribution aims at discussing the agonistic dimension of John Dewey’s pragmatism. The paper starts by reconstructing Dewey’s influence on Albert Meyer, a leading figure of 20th-century American psychiatry. This comparison will shed light on Dewey’s influence on Meyer, focusing on some core psychological notions such as mental health and growth. Moreover, it will show the key role played by the category of conflict in Dewey’s pragmatism, and how the latter can account for the darker and more problematic sides of (...) human life. The paper ends with a quick elaboration on the notion of survivance, which denotes the ability to “go on” – both as individuals and as societies – in the face of conflict and devastation. (shrink)

This contribution explores the assertion that climate change may be described as a “wicked problem.” It notes that the term was introduced in the context of the management sciences where a managerial ethos prevailed and where moral connotations were excluded. Subsequent references to climate change as a wicked problem maintained both these features. Yet, if climate change not only poses technological, economic, and political problems but also has moral and, indeed, spiritual challenges—as is widely maintained—then such moral connotations cannot be (...) avoided. The description of a problem as wicked then becomes part of the problem. It is argued that the term is best understood as one used in jest, so that if we seek to define a problem’s wickedness in a conceptually precise way, we are missing the joke. The major moral dimensions of the challenges posed by climate changes should be taken seriously, but perhaps there is no need to take the term wicked problems all that seriously. What should not be laughed off is the managerial ethos that presumes that the challenges posed by climate changes can be addressed “exactly” through climate engineering or even social engineering. (shrink)

This paper discusses the philosophical doctrine of moral luck, as described by Bernard Williams in his book of the same name. It first describes Williams' account and then uses the case of Michael Stone, a convicted murderer with a long history of mental disorder, and mental health practitioners’ interventions in his case, to test and debate Williams’ views. It examines four major areas of these, including the classical notion of moral luck, retroactive judgement, agent regret and justifiable and unjustifiable decision‐making. (...) It concludes that, in view of what has been said, whilst Williams’ views are applicable and appropriate to many areas of the Stone case, ‘traditional’ moral views on rights, obligations and principles cannot be entirely laid aside in evaluating this. (shrink)

Mary Midgley belongs to a small group of most inspiring women philosophers of the 20th and early 21st century. Her impressive oeuvre, characterised by an exceptionally clear and witty style, combines contributions to such different fields of philosophical inquiry as moral philosophy, philosophical anthropology, philosophy of science in general and of biology in particular, as well as philosophy of religion. With her early article “The Concept of Beastliness”, we have something like a germ cell of her philosophy, introducing a range (...) of concerns that will remain central to her work. The commentary focuses on five of them, traces how they show up in later works of Midgley’s, and suggests how they could inform philosophizing about humans and animals today. These are, first, Midgley’s adherence to the concept of ‘human nature’. Second, her insistence that a comparative, ethologically informed perspective on humans and animals helps to refute myths about both the animal and the human animal. Third, her alerting us to the fact that concepts of ‘human nature’ always influence our moral self-understanding. Fourth, her focus on the positive, open instincts in humans like caring, friendship, loyalty, or sociality that exist not only alongside but in a complex interplay with negative, open instincts such as aggression, and the idea that both classes of instincts can be shaped to some extent. And, finally, her focus on the conditions of social life that are important for people to be able to structure their lives in meaningful ways. (shrink)

Doing violence and evil always indirectly or directly leads to making someone else suffer. Such is the dialogical structure of evil and it seems to be the dialogical structure of elder abuse as well. There is a perturbing sameness between definitions of evil and definitions of elder abuse. It is hard at times to see how or if there is any line of demarcation between the subjects. Two modern‐day philosophers, Paul Ricoeur and Simone Weil have delved particularly into the concept (...) of evil. The symbolism Ricoeur analyses in depth is that of defilement, sin, and guilt and the concept of the servile will. Integral in Weil's description of evil are the concepts of suffering and the special situation of extreme suffering, termed affliction. Grounded in the writings of Ricoeur and Weil, this paper is a series of reflections on the intersection of evil and elder abuse as exemplified in the narrative of an abused older woman. This woman provided around the clock care at home for her husband who had vascular dementia. She was also abused by her husband. This was witnessed by both family and others but no one intervened. In her narrative there were indications of defilement, sin, guilt, and true affliction as a servile will. This paper illuminates the evil of elder abuse that is harm and suffering, and the challenge of untangling issues of blame, free will, responsibility, and self‐determinism. When engaging with abused, older persons it can be worthwhile for nurses to enter the encounter with non‐judgemental compassion founded on the human to human connection and recognition of our mutual fallibility and potential for evil that is part of our human fragility. (shrink)

Following the rise of virtue and character education, educational philosophers have recently given much attention to questions relating to virtue and the good. This, however, has not been paralleled by a similar interest in vice and evil, which, in this context, are examined only rarely. In this article, I use the work of the American philosopher John Kekes as a backdrop for discussing the role coping with vice and evil should play in virtue and character education. I show how Kekes’ (...) assumptions that people have natural inclinations towards both virtue and vice and that evil and vice are an inevitable part of human existence lead to the idea that character education should explicitly discuss not only the virtues but also the vices, that it should promote self-control and that it should bring people to recognize that they have mixed moral inclinations. I then argue that even if we reject Kekes’ key assumptions, embracing these three ideas that attempt to provide means to counter the vices might still have marked benefits for character education. The article concludes by suggesting that while the ideas that stem from Kekes’ approach should not necessarily be embraced, the themes that they raise call for greater consideration and further analysis. (shrink)

Statements of need are used promiscuously by caretakers and children. The term may refer to mere wants (desire), to wants that have become socialized into secondary needs, to needs inferred by adults based on interpretations of future adaptive requirements, as well as to fundamental needs required for a child's well-being. It is important to distinguish the various uses of the term, first, because need carries an imperative-it would be unethical to frustrate a child's basic needs. Second, when confounding meanings, there (...) is the risk that what appears as an expression of concern-'you need to'-is more arbitrarily coercive than benevolent. Because even genuine needs are multiple and often in tension (protection and independence), separating meanings does not necessarily determine appropriate responses. Caretakers are advised to critically refine and reflect their need statements and, when balancing, remain faithful to the fundamental human need for autonomy. (shrink)

Certain difficulties pervade the course of moral education and in this essay a broad picture of these shall be sketched. Moral educators need to understand the problems they will face if they intend to enhance their performance; this includes knowing the limits of moral education, and not going beyond their capacities. These difficulties may be put in two groups, one internal, which is within the control of moral educators; the other external, which is beyond the control of moral educators. Internal (...) difficulties concern the gap between moral cognition and moral conduct. Since moral educators are not saints and suffer from vices themselves, students might learn the contrary of what educators mean to convey. External difficulties are more complicated. In this essay the author concentrates on proving how moral education provides an incentive to breach morality itself. The author shall also endeavor to show that a higher standard of morality might cause greater failure in moral education. Under this logic, we need to first deal with the external difficulties in order to tackle internal ones, for they are intertwined. (shrink)

Can schools encourage children to become independent moral decision-makers, maintaining controlled environments suitable to instructing large numbers of children? Two opposing responses are reviewed: one holds that the road to morality is through discipline and obedience, the other through children's experimentation and choice-making. Circumventing these polarities, I look to distinctions within rules that may help in balancing claims of restraint and freedom. Using a pharmacological analogy, one might, in principle, justify ‘pills’ for uncontrollable and/or morally trivial behaviors, but not for (...) intentional behaviors of moral significance where volition matters. However, since we cannot permit children to choose to harm, their agency must be curbed. As a compromise, I suggest that teachers hold extended moral discussions, and involve students in rule-making and sanction-giving. (shrink)

The anti-capitalist debate has traditionally drawn up battle lines between oppressed individuals on the one hand, and an oppressive system on the other. While this has high rhetorical value, it is based on imprecise use of language. The language confuses an amoral system with im/moral agents but at the same time uses anthropomorphic language to lend capitalism moral agency. This inevitably leads to a confused debate. Given that all opponents of capitalism want the reformation of what they see as a (...) flawed system, precision in the use of the language employed would move the debate into arenas of action, and thus the debate is more likely to generate change. (shrink)

Most clinicians and mental health practitioners are reluctant to work with people with dangerous and severe personality disorders because they believe there is nothing that mental health services can offer. Dangerous and severe personality disorder also signals a diagnosis which is problematic morally. Moral philosophy has not found an adequate way of dealing with personality disorders. This paper explores the question: What makes a person morally responsible for his actions and what is a legitimate mitigating factor? How do psychiatric nurses (...) working with this client group understand the awful things some clients do? What concepts do they need, if they are to know how to explain and how to react? It is suggested that dangerous and severe personality disorder is best regarded as a moral category, framed in terms of goodness, badness, obligation and other ethical concepts. It seems plausible that in important ways the dangerous and severe personality disordered client does not understand morality or understands it differently. The peculiar position of the dangerous and severe personality disordered individual in our system of moral responsibility stems from his apparent inability to see the importance of the interests of others. It might be more helpful to regard personality disordered clients as we do children: partially but not fully reasonable for their actions. We might regard the dangerous and severe personality disordered client responsible for those actions which he most clearly understands, such as causing others physical pain, but not for those with which he is only superficially engaged, such as causing emotional pain. The paper concludes by suggesting that the dangerous and severe personality disordered individual does not fit easily into any conventional moral category, be it criminal, patient, animal or child, and thus an assessment of his moral accountability must take into consideration his special circumstances. (shrink)

To agonise is to undergo great mental anguish through worrying about something, according to the New Oxford Dictionary of English. I suggest that agonising in this sense is a fundamental response to any ethical dilemma. It has a long intellectual and literary lineage. In this essay, I agonise over the dilemmas posed by street beggars, their intrusiveness and their appeal to our intuitive sense of social duty. I explore the discomfort we may feel at their presence, and the value that (...) discomfort may have for the evolution of our ethical lives. (shrink)