Karen Neander’s (1991a, b) Selected Effects (SE) theory of biological proper functions argues that the function of a trait is the action for which it was “caused” to be selected by natural selection. Her life’s work has already left a lasting impact, however SE theory has yet to be more properly formalized as a conceptual analysis of biological functions. Although other SE theories have sought to build upon Neander’s work (e.g., Garson, 2017), there remains an ambiguity in the theory’s use (...) of causal descriptors. For the success of her successors, delineating the function of causality for SE theory is of utmost importance. Here, I systematize Neander’s theory according to the different senses of causation inherent to it. I argue that structuring SE theory in terms of causal transitivity and intransitivity reveals that Neander’s analysis not only supersedes her detractors but likely exposes areas of vulnerability in others’ SE theory derivatives. (shrink)

The paper argues that the evident features of all human affairs of interest to the social scientist demand Darwinian explanations. It must however be recognized that the range of regularities, models, theories that a successful Darwinian research program will inspire must be heterogeneous, operate at very different scales, identify a diversity of distinct and often unrepeated processes operating through multifarious instances of blind variation and environmental selection. There will be no canonical statement of a Darwinian theory of cultural and/or social (...) affairs. (shrink)

Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Volume 52, Issue 1-2, Page 53-80, January-March 2022. Although it is clear that many of the major contemporary social problems center on the extent to which social institutions do or do not function as they are meant to do, it is still unclear exactly what the function of a social institution is—and thus when this function is undermined. This paper presents and defends a novel theory of social functionalism—presentist social functionalism—to answer these questions. According to (...) this theory, the function of social institutions is grounded in those of their features that, in the current cultural environment, increase their chances to survive or reproduce. To bring out the fruitfulness of this account, the paper analyzes the question of the function of corporations, and shows that present social functionalism points to the kinds of data that would be helpful to determine this function, brings up hitherto overlooked theoretical possibilities, and allows for the clearer assessment and handling of corporate corruption. (shrink)

1. IntroductionIn What Biological Functions Are and Why They Matter, Justin Garson offers a novel theory of biological functions, the generalized selected effects (GSE) theory.1 He presents the theory in a clear and comprehensive way, defends it against various objections and applies it to different areas of philosophy, including the philosophy of psychiatry, the debate about mechanisms and the debate about teleosemantic theories of mental content.2Like other proponents of the aetiological approach to functions, Garson maintains that a trait’s biological functions (...) are grounded in its selectional history. However, his GSE theory differs from standard versions of the aetiological approach – so-called selected effects (SE) theories – in a crucial respect: while SE theories assume that all biological functions must ultimately be grounded in phylogenetic processes of natural selection or other (closely analogous) processes of differential reproduction (Millikan 1984: 15–82, Neander 1991, Godfrey-Smith 1994), the GSE theory allows that functions may also be grounded in processes of differential retention (see §2 for details). Garson forcefully argues that this broader account is theoretically well-motivated and has significant advantages over standard SE accounts when it comes to accommodating certain important classes of ontogenetically determined functions. (shrink)

This essay deals with the terms “form” and “function” as well as their relationship insofar as they are still used in philosophical and design-theory discourse to determine the aesthetic dimension of designed artefacts, especially of everyday objects, and often also to distinguish them from objects of art. I discuss whether our common understanding of these terms and their relationship is an appropriate instrument for such determinations. What is up for discussion here are not only conceptions of functional beauty with regard (...) to design methodology and the philosophical discourse on aesthetics, in which form and function become thematic, but also basic concepts of philosophical aesthetics itself. It is shown that the philosophical understanding of design aesthetics and the concepts of form and function are determined by profound preliminary decisions that restrict our access to the aesthetic dimension of designed artefacts, and a conceptualisation of an initial change in thinking is proposed. (shrink)

We argue that Brette's arguments, or some variation on them, work only against the immodest codes imputed by neuroscientists to the signals they study; they do not tell against “modest” codes, which may be learned by neurons themselves. Still, caution is warranted: modest neural codes likely lead to only modest explanatory gains.

I argue that explanations of doxastic transparency which go via an appeal to an aim or norm of belief are problematic. I offer a new explanation which appeals to a biological function of our mechanisms for belief production. I begin by characterizing the phenomenon, and then move to the teleological and normative accounts of belief, advertised by their proponents as able to give an explanation of it. I argue that, at the very least, both accounts face serious difficulties in this (...) endeavour. These difficulties are a function of seeking an explanation of transparency at the agential level, either with the subject aiming at truth, or being guided by a norm of truth. I adopt a motivational account of belief, one which severs the connection between belief and truth, and supplement this with an account of actual world beliefs. My alternative explanation is found at the sub-intentional, non-agential level, secured by biology. This explanation casts transparency not as related to the nature of deliberation over what to believe, but rather as contingently characterizing the beliefs of some believers, namely those with a particular biological history. My explanation thus parts company with what has come before along two dimensions: it moves away from transparency being something related to the agent’s aims or commitments, and it understands it as a contingent phenomenon. I close by considering an objection to my view—that transparency must not be understood as a contingent phenomenon—and a nearby alternative position which avoids this consequence. I respond to this objection and give reasons not to endorse the nearby alternative. I conclude that my explanation does not face the difficulties of those offered by teleologists and normativists, and, that by moving away from agential explanations, and casting transparency as contingent, we can provide a successful explanation of it. (shrink)

Though Wilfrid Sellars portrayed himself as a latter-day Kantian, I argue here that he was at least as much a Hegelian. Several themes Sellars shares with Hegel are investigated: the sociality and normativity of the intentional, categorial change, the rejection of the given, and especially their denial of an unknowable thing-in-itself. They are also united by an emphasis on the unity of things—the belief that things do “hang together.” Hegel’s unity is idealist; Sellars’ is physicalist; the differences are substantial, but (...) so are the resonances. (shrink)

It is well known that informational theories of representation have trouble accounting for error. Informational semantics is a family of theories attempting a naturalistic, unashamedly reductive explanation of the semantic and intentional properties of thought and language. Most simply, the informational approach explains truth-conditional content in terms of causal, nomic, or simply regular correlation between a representation and a state of affairs. The central work is Dretske (1981), and the theory was largely developed at the University of Wisconsin by Fred (...) Dretske, Dennis Stampe, and Berent Enc. Recently, informational semantics has roamed far beyond its Wisconsin home, and built a sizeable collection of followers. Converts include Jerry Fodor (1987), Robert Stalnaker (1984) and, less faithfully, Paul and Patricia Churchland (1983) and Hartry Field (1986). But for some years informational semantics has been hounded by a problem with error – the classic presentation is Fodor (1984) – and no other problem has hounded the theory so persistently. (shrink)

In several works that start from the seminal text Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories, Ruth Millikan has presented her well know teleosemantic approach to philosophy of mind and philosophy of language. Millikan presents her theory of linguistic signs as a theory which, unlike other semantic theories, is able to more adequately solve problems such as that which is called “Freges’s puzzle”. Millikan considers that the Fregean modes of presentation are inconsistent with a representational theory of mind. In this paper, (...) the relevance of Millikan’s objections to Frege is evaluated and the scope of these objections is discussed in the context of her own conception. We conclude that Millikan’s analysis of Fregean semantics relies on false assumptions and, in consequence, her doctrine is weakened. (shrink)

There has been considerable debate in the literature about the relative merits of information processing versus dynamical approaches to understanding cognitive processes. In this article, we explore the relationship between these two styles of explanation using a model agent evolved to solve a relational categorization task. Specifically, we separately analyze the operation of this agent using the mathematical tools of information theory and dynamical systems theory. Information-theoretic analysis reveals how task-relevant information flows through the system to be combined into a (...) categorization decision. Dynamical analysis reveals the key geometrical and temporal interrelationships underlying the categorization decision. Finally, we propose a framework for directly relating these two different styles of explanation and discuss the possible implications of our analysis for some of the ongoing debates in cognitive science. (shrink)

Jednym z kluczowych pojęć znaturalizowanej epistemologii, a także wyrastających z niej nauk kognitywistycznych jest znaturalizowane pojęcie reprezentacji poznawczej. W ramach tego znaturalizowanego pojęcia próbuje się jednolicie ująć pojęcie błędu reprezentacyjnego. W tekście pokazane są argumenty przeciwko adekwatności stosowania znaturalizowanego pojęcia błędu reprezentacyjnego oraz wątpliwości co do tak szerokiego programu naturalizacji zagadnień związanych z ludzką pojęciowością.

Predictive processing and its apparent commitment to explaining cognition in terms of Bayesian inference over hierarchical generative models seems to flatly contradict the pragmatist conception of mind and experience. Against this, I argue that this appearance results from philosophical overlays at odd with the science itself, and that the two frameworks are in fact well-poised for mutually beneficial theoretical exchange. Specifically, I argue: first, that predictive processing illuminates pragmatism’s commitment to both the primacy of pragmatic coping in accounts of the (...) mind and the profound organism-relativity of experience; second, that this pragmatic, “narcissistic” character of prediction error minimization undermines its ability to explain the distinctive normativity of intentionality; and third, that predictive processing therefore mandates an extra-neural account of intentional content of exactly the sort that pragmatism’s communitarian vision of human thought can provide. (shrink)

The authors favor a “color realism” theory that considers colors to be physical properties residing in objects that reflect, emit, or transmit light. It is opposed to the theory that colors are sensations or visual experiences. This commentary suggests that both theories are correct, and that context usually indicates which of these dual aspects is being considered.

The problem of natural teleology in biology has traditionally focused on reconciling Aristotle’s efficient and final causation. In this paper, however, I emphasize the importance of formal causation in natural teleological explanations and suggest that undermining its legitimacy is a backdoor route to undermining natural teleology itself. Formal causation, I argue, represents the “phenotype” of an object, to use a familiar word from genetics. This means that formal causes specify not only intrinsic “genotypic” qualities of an object but also a (...) range of environments in which the object is “properly” to inhabit. Such environmental specificity is possible through conscious activity, but is not found anywhere in non-conscious nature. Das Problem der natürlichen Teleologie ist traditionellerweise darin gesehen worden, Aristoteles’ Wirkursache und seine Finalursache miteinander zu vereinbaren. Dagegen betone ich in diesem Aufsatz die Bedeutung der formalen Verursachung in natürlichen teleologischen Erklärungen. Wenn man ihre Legitimität untergräbt, so lege ich nahe, untergräbt man gleichsam durch die Hintertür natürliche Teleologie als solche. Ich argumentiere, dass formale Verursachung den „Phänotyp“ eines Objekts darstellt, um ein geläufiges Wort aus der Genetik zu verwenden. Dies bedeutet, dass formale Ursachen nicht nur intrinsische „genotypische“ Eigenschaften eines Objekts spezifizieren, sondern auch eine Bandbreite von Umgebungen, in denen das Objekt „im eigentlichen Sinn“ angesiedelt sein sollte. Diese Spezifizierung der Umgebung ist durch bewusste Aktivität möglich, findet sich aber nirgendwo in der nicht-bewussten Natur. (shrink)

Ramsey (1997) argues that connectionist representations ‘do not earn their explanatory keep’. The aim of this paper is to examine the argument Ramsey gives to support that conclusion. In doing so, I identify two kinds of explanatory need—need relative to a possible explanation and need relative to a true explanation and argue that internal representations are not needed for either connectionist or non‐connectionist possible explanations but that it is quite likely that they are needed for true explanations. However, to show (...) that the latter is the case requires more than a consideration of the form of explanation involved. (shrink)

The first part of the essay tries to show that Davidson's explanation of irrationality in terms of a fragmentation of the mind is not compatible with interpretationist premises of his own theory. Instead of adopting the conception of two semi-autonomous departments of the mind, I argue for an explanation of strong forms of irrationality based on two kinds of contentful mental states: functionally individuated representational states and states whose content depends on a rationalizing interpretation. Akrasia – as a form of (...) irrationality caused by mental states that are not propositionally transparent – seems to fit neatly into that picture. (shrink)

The reflectance types that Byrne & Hilbert identify with colors count as types only in a way that is more dependent on, and more relative to color perceivers, than their account suggests. Their account of perceptual content may be overly focused on input conditions and distal causes.

A number of recent writers have argued that we should explain mental representation teleologically, in terms of the biological purposes of beliefs and other mental states.A rather older idea is that the truth condition of a belief is that condition which guarantees that actions based on that belief will succeed.What I want to show in this paper is that these two ideas complement each other. The teleological theory is inadequate unless it incorporates the thesis that truth is the guarantee of (...) successful action. Conversely, the success-guaranteeing account of truth conditions is incomplete until it is placed in a teleological context. (shrink)

False beliefs and delusions are usually regarded negatively, especially in psychology and evolutionary biology. Recently, McKay and Dennett have argued that there are ungrounded beliefs which confer benefits on individuals even if they are false. I propose to expand this class of beliefs to include the belief that one has free will, and I will defend the claim that this belief is advantageous, even if it is false. One derives one’s belief in control from one’s experience of control, which is (...) generated by a set of cognitive systems termed “control systems.” While the control systems and the interpretive mechanism are useful in and of themselves, the belief in personal free will is adaptive because it directly leads to fitness-increasing behaviors. As such, we have good reason to regard the belief that one has free will as an adaptive, ungrounded belief. This paper will also suggest that further research on the possible distinction between belief in personal free will and belief in general free will may put us in a better position to understand recent, apparently contradictory data on individuals’ beliefs regarding free will and other related phenomena. (shrink)

1. Social institutions greatly enhance the cognitive reach and repertoire of humans. Legal systems, monetary systems, educational systems, and systems of cultural conventions, for example, allow us...

More than one researcher is currently proposing that the notion of information become an important element for defining living systems as well as for explaining conditions that make their origins possible. During the pre-biotic era, the type of compounds encountered would mainly have been very simple in nature and might have been immersed in the natural dynamic of the physical world and in processes of self-organization. It is furthermore quite possible that they formed a relationship between and among certain types (...) of processes that here we are specifically proposing as central for the emergence of cell organization. Consequently, an important initial step towards constructing a theory of biological information is to ask ourselves the question: how do biological systems process information? In this way, we will be contributing to the proposals of this paper where we seek to identify general principles that govern biological computing and that deal with biosemiotic approaches as they are defended in naturalistic normative terms. (shrink)