- The new evil demon problem at 40.Peter J. Graham - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 109 (2):478-504.details
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Is Knowledge a Social Phenomenon?Robin McKenna - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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A Teleofunctionalist Solution to the Problem of Deviant Causal Chains of Actions.Jakob Roloff - 2022 - Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy (3-4):247-261.details
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Dretske’s Naturalistic Representationalism and Privileged Accessibility Thesis.Manas Kumar Sahu - 2022 - Philosophia 51:933-955.details
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Proper Functionalism and the Organizational Theory of Functions.Peter J. Graham - 2023 - In Luis R. G. Oliveira (ed.), Externalism about Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 249-276.details
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Acquittal from Knowledge Laundering.Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (1):39-54.details
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Epistemic Reasons, Transparency, and Evolutionary Debunking.Nicole Dular & Nikki Fortier - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (4):1455-1473.details
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Epistemically flawless false beliefs.Kate Nolfi - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11291-11309.details
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Non‐Accidental Knowing.Niall J. Paterson - 2020 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 58 (2):302-326.details
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Safety and Necessity.Niall J. Paterson - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1081-1097.details
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Is There a Place for Epistemic Virtues in Theory Choice?Milena Ivanova - 2014 - In Abrol Fairweather & Owen Flanagan (eds.), Virtue Epistemology Naturalized: Bridges between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Cham: Synthese Library. pp. 207-226.details
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Why is Warrant Normative?Peter J. Graham - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):110-128.details
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Cognitive Penetrability.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification: how appearances justify beliefs. Cham: Springer.details
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Fiabilismo.Ernesto Perini-Santos - 2018 - Compêndio Em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica.details
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How to Use Cognitive Faculties You Never Knew You Had.Andrew Moon - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (S1):251-275.details
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Fictional persuasion, transparency, and the aim of belief.Ema Sullivan-Bissett & Lisa Bortolotti - 2017 - In Ema Sullivan-Bissett, Helen Bradley & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Art and Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 153-73.details
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Darwinism in metaethics: What if the universal acid cannot be contained?Eleonora Severini & Fabio Sterpetti - 2017 - History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 39 (3):1-25.details
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Small Steps and Great Leaps in Thought: The Epistemology of Basic Deductive Rules.Joshua Schechter - 2019 - In Magdalena Balcerak Jackson & Brendan Jackson (eds.), Reasoning: New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking. Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge attributions in iterated fake barn cases.John Turri - 2017 - Analysis 77 (1):104-115.details
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Evolutionary Debunking Arguments in Ethics.Andreas Lech Mogensen - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Oxforddetails
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In Defense of Proper Functionalism: Cognitive Science Takes on Swampman.Kenny Boyce & Andrew Moon - 2016 - Synthese 193 (9):2987–3001.details
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Formalizing Darwinism, Naturalizing Mathematics.Fabio Sterpetti - 2015 - Paradigmi. Rivista di Critica Filosofica 33 (2):133-160.details
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Scientific Realism, Adaptationism and the Problem of the Criterion.Fabio Sterpetti - 2015 - Kairos 13 (1):7-45.details
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Literalness and other pragmatic principles.François Recanati - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):729-730.details
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Presumptions of relevance.Dan Sperber & Deirdre Wilson - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):736.details
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The evolution of misbelief.Ryan McKay & Daniel Dennett - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):493–510; discussion 510–61.details
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La naturalizzazione dell'epistemologia. Contro una soluzione quineana.Nicla Vassallo - 1997 - Franco Angeli.details
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Naturalistic Epistemologies and Normativity.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2002 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):299-317.details
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Can Human Rationality Be Defended "A Priori"?David Shier - 2000 - Behavior and Philosophy 28 (1/2):67 - 81.details
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Epistemic Entitlement.Peter J. Graham - 2012 - Noûs 46 (3):449-482.details
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Reflexive A priori.Vanessa Isabel Morlock - unknowndetails
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Developmental Process Reliabilism: on Justification, Defeat, and Evidence.Matthew S. Bedke - 2010 - Erkenntnis 73 (1):1 - 17.details
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Is knowledge a natural kind?Tuomas K. Pernu - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (3):371 - 386.details
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Plantinga's proper functioning analysis of epistemic warrant.James E. Taylor & Alvin Plantinga - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 64 (2):185 - 202.details
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In defense of proper functions.Ruth Millikan - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (June):288-302.details
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The Rediscovery of Common Sense Philosophy.Stephen Boulter - 2007 - Basingstoke, England: Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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The aim of belief and the aim of science.Alexander Bird - 2019 - Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 34 (2):171.details
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Biological Function and Epistemic Normativity.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (1):94-110.details
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How relevant?Pieter A. M. Seuren - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):731.details
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Explaining doxastic transparency: aim, norm, or function?Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3453-3476.details
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Belief in free will as an adaptive, ungrounded belief.Matthew Smithdeal - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (8):1241-1252.details
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The relevance of Relevance for fiction.Anne Reboul - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):729.details
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Inference and information.Philip Pettit - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):727.details
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On the adaptive advantage of always being right (even when one is not).Nathalia L. Gjersoe & Bruce M. Hood - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):521-522.details
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False beliefs and naive beliefs: They can be good for you.Roberto Casati & Marco Bertamini - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):512-513.details
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Can Teleosemantics Deflect the EAAN?Brian Leahy - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (1):221-238.details
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When is it selectively advantageous to have true beliefs? Sandwiching the better safe than sorry argument.Christopher L. Stephens - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 105 (2):161-189.details
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(3 other versions)Knowledge: The Safe-Apt View.Christoph Kelp - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):265-278.details
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An Input Condition for Teleosemantics? Reply to Shea (and Godfrey-Smith).Ruth Garrett Millikan - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):436-455.details
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Against Mixed Epistemology.Joe Milburn - 2015 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 19 (2):183-195.details
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