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  1. Why presume analyses are on-line?Georges Rey - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):74-75.
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  • Constituent causation and the reality of mind.Georges Rey - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):620-621.
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  • Theories of mind: Some methodological/conceptual problems and an alternative approach.Sam S. Rakover - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):73-74.
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  • Theory-theory theory.Howard Rachlin - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):72-73.
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  • General-purpose content.Carolyn Price - 2000 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14 (2):123-133.
    In this paper, I consider the objection, raised by Radu Bogdan, that a teleological theory of content is unable to ascribe content to a general-purpose, doxastic system. I begin by giving some attention to the notion of general-purpose representation, and suggest that this notion can best be understood as what I term "interest-independent" representation. I then outline Bogdan's objection in what I take to be its simplest form. I attempt to counter the objection by explaining how a teleologist might ascribe (...)
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  • Matching and mental-state ascription.Ian Pratt - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):71-72.
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  • Representational development and theory-of-mind computations.David C. Plaut & Annette Karmiloff-Smith - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):70-71.
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  • Limitations on first-person experience: Implications of the “extent”.Bradford H. Pillow - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):69-69.
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  • First-person authority and beliefs as representations.Paul M. Pietroski - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):67-69.
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  • Somebody flew over Searle's ontological prison.Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):618-619.
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  • Sélection sémantique et sélection naturelle le rôle causal du lexique.Massimo Piaitelli-Palmarini - 1990 - Revue de Synthèse 111 (1-2):57-94.
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  • Ever since language and learning: afterthoughts on the Piaget-Chomsky debate.Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini - 1994 - Cognition 50 (1-3):315-346.
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  • Peacocke on concepts.Herman Philipse - 1994 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):225 – 252.
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  • The trouble with two-factor conceptual role theories.Mark Perlman - 1997 - Minds and Machines 7 (4):495-513.
    Two-Factor conceptual role theories of mental content are often intended to allow mental representations to satisfy two competing requirements. One is the Fregean requirement that two representations, like public language expressions, can have different meanings even though they have the same reference (as in the case of ‘morning star’ and ‘evening star’). The other is Putnam's Twin-earth requirement that two representations or expressions can have the same conceptual role but differ in meaning due to differing references. But I argue that (...)
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  • A plea for the second functionalist model and the insufficiency of simulation.Josef Perner - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):66-67.
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  • Sellars on thoughts and beliefs.Mitch Parsell - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (2):261-275.
    In this paper, I examine Wilfrid Sellars’ famous Myth of Jones. I argue the myth provides an ontologically austere account of thoughts and beliefs that makes sense of the full range of our folk psychological abilities. Sellars’ account draws on both Gilbert Ryle and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Ryle provides Sellars with the resources to make thoughts metaphysically respectable and Wittgenstein the resources to make beliefs rationally criticisable. By combining these insights into a single account, Sellars is able to see reasons as (...)
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  • Explanation in Psychology: Truth and Teleology.David Papineau - 1990 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 27:21-43.
    A number of recent writers have argued that we should explain mental representation teleologically, in terms of the biological purposes of beliefs and other mental states.A rather older idea is that the truth condition of a belief is that condition which guarantees that actions based on that belief will succeed.What I want to show in this paper is that these two ideas complement each other. The teleological theory is inadequate unless it incorporates the thesis that truth is the guarantee of (...)
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  • Explanation in Psychology: Truth and Teleology.David Papineau - 1990 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 27:21-43.
    A number of recent writers have argued that we should explain mental representation teleologically, in terms of the biological purposes of beliefs and other mental states.A rather older idea is that the truth condition of a belief is that condition which guarantees that actions based on that belief will succeed.What I want to show in this paper is that these two ideas complement each other. The teleological theory is inadequate unless it incorporates the thesis that truth is the guarantee of (...)
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  • The role of concepts in perception and inference.David R. Olson & Janet Wilde Astington - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):65-66.
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  • Developmental evidence and introspection.Shaun Nichols - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):64-65.
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  • The teleological notion of 'function'.Karen Neander - 1991 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (4):454 – 468.
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  • Some problems for Fodor's theory of content.Erik Myin - 1992 - Philosophica 50 (2):101-122.
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  • Mismatching categories?William Edward Morris & Robert C. Richardson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):62-63.
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  • Heuristics and counterfactual self-knowledge.Adam Morton - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):63-64.
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  • Knowledge of the psychological states of self and others is not only theory-laden but also data-driven.Chris Moore & John Barresi - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):61-62.
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  • Psychologism, folk psychology and one's own case.Richard Montgomery - 1987 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 17 (2):195–218.
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  • In defense of proper functions.Ruth Millikan - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (June):288-302.
    I defend the historical definition of "function" originally given in my Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories (1984a). The definition was not offered in the spirit of conceptual analysis but is more akin to a theoretical definition of "function". A major theme is that nonhistorical analyses of "function" fail to deal adequately with items that are not capable of performing their functions.
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  • The Hard Problem Of Content: Solved (Long Ago).Marcin Miłkowski - 2015 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 41 (1):73-88.
    In this paper, I argue that even if the Hard Problem of Content, as identified by Hutto and Myin, is important, it was already solved in natu- ralized semantics, and satisfactory solutions to the problem do not rely merely on the notion of information as covariance. I point out that Hutto and Myin have double standards for linguistic and mental representation, which leads to a peculiar inconsistency. Were they to apply the same standards to basic and linguistic minds, they would (...)
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  • The causal capacities of linguistic rules.Alice ter Meulen - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):626-627.
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  • Naturalizing Intentionality: Tracking Theories Versus Phenomenal Intentionality Theories.Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (5):325-337.
    This paper compares tracking and phenomenal intentionality theories of intentionality with respect to the issue of naturalism. Tracking theories explicitly aim to naturalize intentionality, while phenomenal intentionality theories generally do not. It might seem that considerations of naturalism count in favor of tracking theories. We survey key considerations relevant to this claim, including some motivations for and objections to the two kinds of theories. We conclude by suggesting that naturalistic considerations may in fact support phenomenal intentionality theories over tracking theories.
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  • Reporting on Past Psychological States: Beliefs, Desires, and Intentions.Alfred Mele - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):61.
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  • What Do We Aim At When We Believe?Conor Mchugh - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (3):369-392.
    It is often said that belief aims at truth. I argue that if belief has an aim then that aim is knowledge rather than merely truth. My main argument appeals to the impossibility of forming a belief on the basis of evidence that only weakly favours a proposition. This phenomenon, I argue, is a problem for the truth-aim hypothesis. By contrast, it can be given a simple and satisfying explanation on the knowledge-aim hypothesis. Furthermore, the knowledge-aim hypothesis suggests a very (...)
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  • Belief and aims.Conor McHugh - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (3):425-439.
    Does belief have an aim? According to the claim of exclusivity, non-truth-directed considerations cannot motivate belief within doxastic deliberation. This claim has been used to argue that, far from aiming at truth, belief is not aim-directed at all, because the regulation of belief fails to exhibit a kind of interaction among aims that is characteristic of ordinary aim-directed behaviour. The most prominent reply to this objection has been offered by Steglich-Petersen (Philos Stud 145:395–405, 2009), who claims that exclusivity is in (...)
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  • Zombies are people, too.Drew McDermott - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):617-618.
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  • Does cognitive science need “real” intentionality?Robert J. Matthews - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):616-617.
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  • The Grounds for Anti-Historicism.Graham Macdonald - 1995 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 39:241-257.
    In his seminal The Poverty of Historicism Sir Karl Popper deployed a number of arguments to prick the pretensions of those who thought that they were, or could come to be, in possession of knowledge of the future. These ‘historicists’ assumed that they could lay bare the law of evolution of a society, and that their possession of knowledge of such a law justified political action which had the aim of removing obstacles to the progress of history. In arguing against (...)
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  • Intentionality and modern philosophical psychology, III. The appeal to teleology.William Lyons - 1992 - Philosophical Psychology 5 (3):309-326.
    This article is the sequel to 'Intentionality and Modern philosophical psychology, I. The modern reduction of intentionality,' (Philosophical Psychology, 3 (2), 1990) which examined the view of intentionality pioneered by Carnap and reaching its apotheosis in the work of Daniel Dennett. In 'Intentionality and modem philosophical psychology, II. The return to representation' (Philosophical Psychology, 4(1), 1991) I examined the approach to intentionality which can be traced back to the work of Noam Chomsky but which has been given its canonical treatment (...)
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  • The fallibility of first-person knowledge of intentionality.Peter Ludlow & Norah Martin - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):60-60.
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  • Functionalism can explain self-ascription.Brian Loar - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):58-60.
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  • Loose connections: Four problems in Searie's argument for the “Connection Principle”.Dan Lloyd - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):615-616.
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  • What's it like to be a gutbrain?John Limber - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):614-615.
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  • Three inferential temptations.Alexander Levine & Georg Schwarz - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):57-58.
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  • Even a theory-theory needs information processing: ToMM, an alternative theory-theory of the child's theory of mind.Alan M. Leslie, Tim P. German & Francesca G. Happé - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):56-57.
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  • Is Searle conscious?John C. Kulli - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):614-614.
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  • Self-attributions help constitute mental types.Bernard W. Kobes - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):54-56.
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  • A proper understanding of Millikan.Justine Kingsbury - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (40):23-40.
    Ruth Millikan’s teleological theory of mental content is complex and often misunderstood. This paper motivates and clarifies some of the complexities of the theory, and shows that paying careful attention to its details yields answers to a number of common objections to teleological theories, in particular, the problem of novel mental states, the problem of functionally false beliefs, and problems about indeterminacy or multiplicity of function.
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  • Common sense and adult theory of communication.Boaz Keysar - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):54-54.
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  • “Good developmental sequence” and the paradoxes of children's skills.Brian D. Josephson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):53-54.
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  • Gopnik's invention of intentionality.Carl N. Johnson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):52-53.
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  • Qualia for propositional attitudes?Frank Jackson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):52-52.
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