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  1. Resolution in §201 of the Philosophical Investigations.Elek Lane - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (2):393-402.
    It is widely thought that, in §201 of the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein reveals himself to oppose a definite view or theory of rule-following. I argue that, due to the self-undermining character of that section, no such interpretation should be accepted. Then I sketch a reading of Wittgenstein’s method that accounts for the paradoxical nature of §201, and I show how this methodology is realized in his remarks on following a rule.
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  • Excursus on Wittgenstein's Rule-Following Considerations.Elek Lane - 2017 - Nordic Wittgenstein Review 6 (1):53-83.
    In this essay, I seek to demonstrate the interplay of philosophical voices – particularly, that of a platonist voice and a community-agreement-view voice – that drives Wittgenstein’s rule-following dialectic forward; and I argue that each voice succumbs to a particular form of dialectical oscillation that renders its response to the problem of rule-following philosophically inadequate. Finally, I suggest that, by seeing and taking stock of the dilemma in which these responses to the skeptical problem are caught, we can come to (...)
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  • Meinen, Deuten, Verstehen.Florian Rieger - 2024 - Wittgenstein-Studien 15 (1):33-55.
    Meaning, Interpreting, Understanding In his Kritik der verstehenden Vernunft (2018), Vittorio Hösle attempts to develop a comprehensive foundation for the so-called Geisteswissenschaften (humanities). The basis for this foundational work is a conception of understanding that ties all understanding to the interpretative grasp of what we and others mean by the use of certain symbols or linguistic expressions. The present essay argues that this makes Hösle’s approach vulnerable to a particular form of skepticism, as it is expounded by Saul Kripke in (...)
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  • Feeling at home in language.Edward H. Minar - 1995 - Synthese 102 (3):413 - 452.
    What do we learn about language from reading Wittgenstein'sPhilosophical Investigations? This question gains urgency from Wittgenstein's alleged animus against philosophical theorizing and his indirectness. Section 1 argues that Wittgenstein's goal is to prevent philosophical questioning about the foundations of language from the beginning. This conception of his aim is not in tension with Wittgenstein's use of the notion of community; community interpretations of his views betray a misguided commitment to the coherence of the idea that language might need grounding. Wittgenstein's (...)
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  • Rule‐Following and Rule‐Breaking: Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein.Daniel Watts - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy (4):1159-1185.
    My aim in this paper is twofold: to establish that Kierkegaard's so‐called theory of the leap strongly anticipates a line of argument that is central to Wittgenstein's so‐called rule‐following considerations; and to begin to show how Kierkegaard's work has fruitful contributions of its own to make to on‐going discussions about rules and rule‐following. The paper focuses throughout on the question of how, if at all, human rule‐following can be distinguished from behaviour that is merely mechanical or instinctual. I identify a (...)
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  • Another Strand in the Rue-Following Considerations.Antonio Ianni Segatto - 2023 - Ideação 1 (47):140-167.
    In this paper, I intend to show, first, that there is a misconception underlying two opposing readings of Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations, notably Kripke’s sceptical reading and Baker and Hacker’s reading. I believe that the correct characterization of this misunderstanding is the first step towards the correct way to read the rule-following considerations, since these readings are still subject to a philosophical confusion that Wittgenstein wants to dissolve. Then I present a commentary on the rule-following considerations inspired by the so-called resolute (...)
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