Resolution in §201 of the Philosophical Investigations

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (2):393-402 (2020)
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Abstract
It is widely thought that, in §201 of the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein reveals himself to oppose a definite view or theory of rule-following. I argue that, due to the self-undermining character of that section, no such interpretation should be accepted. Then I sketch a reading of Wittgenstein’s method that accounts for the paradoxical nature of §201, and I show how this methodology is realized in his remarks on following a rule.
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Archival date: 2022-09-18
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