Inspite of the great success in many disciplines the program of reductionism has failed its genuine purpose. Systemtheory however has yielded a new concept of reductionism which we call reductionism by correspondence and which may imply a new understanding of the mind-body problem. The crucial operations of reductionism by correspondence are called idealization, interpretation and classification. They are used to optimize the description of a system. Nevertheless they lead to certain deficiencies which cannot be avoided in principle. We are therefore (...) driven to the assumption that natural systems can only be described as probabilistic systems. From this point of view nothing is said about the direction of the reduction. (shrink)

We submit that, contrary to the standard view, gravitational waves do not carry energy-momentum. Analysing the four standard arguments on which the standard view rests - viz. the kinetic effects of a GW on a detector, Feynman’s Sticky Bead Argument, an application of Noether’s Theorem and a general perturbative approach – we find none of them to be successful: Pre-relativistic premises underlie each of them – premises that, as we argue, no longer hold in General Relativity. Finally, we outline a (...) GR-consistent interpretation of the effects and, in particular, the spin-down of binary systems. (shrink)

The article investigates the way in which Peter Mittelstaedt has been contributing to the philosophy of physics for half a century. It is shown that he pursues a path between rationalism and empiricism in the sense of Erhard Scheibe’s philosophy of the physicists. Starting from Kant’s a priori he gives a rational reconstruction of the conceptual revolutions of 20th century physics. The central topic of his philosophy of physics is the quest for semantic self-consistency, which for quantum mechanics is a (...) hard nut to crack. (shrink)

Quantum theory is a tremendously successful physical theory, but nevertheless suffers from two serious problems: the measurement problem and the problem of interpretational underdetermination. The latter, however, is largely overlooked as a genuine problem of its own. Both problems concern the doctrine of realism, but pull, quite curiously, into opposite directions. The measurement problem can be captured such that due to scientific realism about quantum theory common sense anti-realism follows, while theory underdetermination usually counts as an argument against scientific realism. (...) I will also consider the more refined distinctions of ontic and epistemic realism and demonstrate that quantum theory in its most viable interpretations conflicts with at least one of the various realism claims. A way out of the conundrum is to come to the bold conclusion that quantum theory is, possibly, wrong (in the realist sense). (shrink)

An Objectivity Principle (O) and a Locality Principle (L) are considered with respect to two simple, but fundamental Gedanken experiments, namely a “Welcher-Weg” Gedanken experiment and an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) Gedanken experiment. It is shown that, if both principles (O) and (L) are assumed to be valid, a contradiction, in the EPR case Bell’s inequality, can be derived implying that at least one of the two principles (O) and (L) has to be denied. It is shown that, if (O) is denied, (...) (L) is preserved in the EPR-Gedanken experiment. For a more adequate discussion, in particular of (L), the two experiments are described in Minkowskian space-time of special relativity. (shrink)

Between Calculability and Non-Calculability. Issues of Calculability and Predictability in the Physics of Complex Systems. The ability to predict has been a very important qualifier of what constitutes scientific knowledge, ever since the successes of Babylonian and Greek astronomy. More recent is the general appreciation of the fact that in the presence of deterministic chaos, predictability is severely limited (the so-called ‘butterfly effect’): Nearby trajectories diverge during time evolution; small errors typically grow exponentially with time. The system obeys deterministic laws (...) and still is unpredictable, seemingly a paradox for the traditional viewpoint of Laplacian determinisms. With the concept of deterministic chaos the epistemological issue about an adequate understanding of predictability is no longer just a mere philosophical topic. Physicists on the one hand recognize the limits of (long term) predictability, computability and even of scientific knowledge, on the other hand they work on concepts for extending the horizon of predictability. It is shown in this paper that physics of complex systems is useful to clarify the jungle of different meanings of the terms ‘predictability’ and ‘computability’ — also with philosophical implications for understanding science and nature. Today, from the physical point of view, the relevance of the concepts of predictability seems to be underestimated by philosophers as a mere methodological topic. In the paper I analyse the importance of predictability and computability in physics of complex systems. I show a way how to cope with problems of unpredictability and noncomputability. Nine different concepts of predictability and computability (i.e. open solution, sensitivity/chaos, redundancy/chance) are presented, compared and evaluated. (shrink)

Phytomorphology — if concerned with development — often concentrates on correlative changes of form and neglects the aspects of age, time and clock, although the plant's spatial and temporal organisation are intimately interconnected. Common age as measured in physical time by a physical process is compared to biological age as measured by a biological clock based on a biological process. A typical example for a biological clock on the organ level is, for example, a shoot. Its biological age is measured (...) by the biological time unit of a plastochron, which itself is defined by the cyclic-periodic initiation of the leaves. In a controlled environment biological age may replace physical age. However, biological and physical age are not necessarily linearly convertible into each other. In stationary or steady state conditions the repetitive initiation of any organ, unit or module of an articulate plant or plant modular system may define the biological time unit. A linear — monotonous biological process, e.g. axis elongation, may also define a biological time unit as a certain amount of additional growth, e.g. of length. One may speak of periodical and of continuous plastochron or, perhaps, of plastochron and rheochron. A precise measure of biological age is the generalized plastochron index applying to any modular system and module respectively. However, one should be aware that it is based on two clocks, one of them referring to the periodic process of module initiation for counting the integer plastochrons and the other to the continuous plastochron of module growth for the determination of the fraction of one plastochron. The application of the concepts is restricted to phases of stationary or steady state growth and development. In certain cases of non-stationary or non-steady state conditions a normalized-age concept may apply. (shrink)

The belief that laws of nature are contingent played an important role in the emergence of the empirical method of modern physics. During the scientific revolution, this belief was based on the idea of voluntary creation. Taking up Peter Mittelstaedt’s work on laws of nature, this article explores several alternative answers which do not overtly make use of metaphysics: some laws are laws of mathematics; macroscopic laws can emerge from the interplay of numerous subsystems without any specific microscopic nomic structures (...) (John Wheeler’s “law without law”); laws are the preconditions of scientific experience (Kant); laws are theoretical abstractions which only apply in very limited circumstances (Nancy Cartwright). Whereas Cartwright’s approach is in tension with modern scientific methodology, the first three strategies count as illuminating, though partial answers. It is important for the empirical method of modern physics that these three strategies, even when taken together, do not provide a complete explanation of the order of nature. Thus the question of why laws are valid is still relevant. In the concluding section, I argue that the traditional answer, based on voluntary creation, provides the right balance of contingency and coherence which is in harmony with modern scientific method. (shrink)

I argue that quantum theory can, and in fact must, be applied to the Universe as a whole. After a general introduction, I discuss two concepts that are essential for my chain of arguments: the universality of quantum theory and the emergence of classical behaviors by decoherence. A further motivation is given by the open problem of quantum gravity. I then present the main ingredients of quantum cosmology and discuss their relevance for the interpretation of quantum theory. I end with (...) some brief epistemological remarks. (shrink)

Inspite of the great success in many disciplines the program of reductionism has failed its genuine purpose. Systemtheory however has yielded a new concept of reductionism which we call reductionism by correspondence and which may imply a new understanding of the mind-body problem. The crucial operations of reductionism by correspondence are called idealization, interpretation and classification. They are used to optimize the description of a system. Nevertheless they lead to certain deficiencies which cannot be avoided in principle. We are therefore (...) driven to the assumption that natural systems can only be described as probabilistic systems. From this point of view nothing is said about the direction of the reduction. (shrink)

Although the introduction of the modern axiomatic method in physics is attributed to Hilbert, it is only recently that physicists and mathematicians have applied it significantly, i.e. on a basis extensive enough to promise fruitful results. Carnap, for one, stresses the importance of the axiomatic method, yet he considers its application in physics as a task for the future.

We analyse the various conceptual notions that go under the umbrella “relationalism/substantivalism”. Our focus will be on evaluating the ontological status of spacetime in General Relativity. To this end we systematically develop the ontological framework that implicitly underlies the traditional debate and common understanding of physics. We submit that spacetime with its chronogeometric and inertial structure, represented by the triple of the bare manifold, the metric and the affine structure, is best construed as the totality of possible and actual spatiotemporal (...) relations of events. This can explain the non-fundamentality of general relativistic gravitational energy and suggests a non-causal, non-interactional understanding of the interdependence of matter in spacetime in GR. (shrink)

This article examines Cohen’s “transcendental method”, Windelband’s “critical method”, the neo-Kantian distinctions between natural science and the humanities (i. e., human or cultural sciences), and Weber’s account of ideal-typical explanations. The Marburg and the Southwest Schools of neo-Kantianism have in common that their respective philosophies of science focused on method, but they substantially differ in their approaches. Cohen advanced the “transcendental method”, which was taken up and transformed by Natorp and Cassirer; later, it became influential in neo-Kantian approaches to 20th (...) century physics. Windelband distinguished between facts and values, linking the former to the “genetic” method of history and the latter to the “critical” method of philosophy; and between the “nomothetic” and “idiographic” methods of the empirical sciences, a distinction further elaborated by Rickert. The distinction does not give rise to a sharp discrimination but is rather what Weber would later call an ideal type. All these approaches contribute in different ways to understanding the structure of scientific knowledge, focusing on different aspects of the general path of the empirical sciences between rationalism and empiricism. (shrink)