Conscientious objectors to military service are either general objectors or selective objectors. The former object to all wars; the latter object to only some wars. There is widespread popular and political support in western liberal democracies for exemptions for general objectors, but currently there is little support for exemptions for selective objectors. Many who advocate exemptions for selective objectors attempt to build upon the strength of support that is enjoyed by exemptions for general objectors. They argue that selective objectors ? (...) like general objectors ? sincerely believe that it would be deeply morally wrong for them to fight in the wars to which they object. I argue that a stronger moral case for exemptions for selective objectors relies upon a different claim: selective objections are often accurate. It is often immoral to fight in the wars to which selective objectors object. While some advocates of exemptions for selective objectors have identified accuracy as a reason for offering exemptions, they have usually not adequately distinguished sincerity from accuracy. However, keeping these two moral reasons for exemptions distinct clarifies and strengthens the moral case for exemptions for selective conscientious objectors. (shrink)

Against the backdrop of the massive carnage of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, this article examines the institution of conscientious objection and the treatment of conscientious objectors. It concludes that while the number of objectors discharged from the US military in the two wars was small, the issues of conscience they articulated resonated widely through the ranks. This article seeks to make available their experience as a resource to inform the broader ongoing debate about the wars and their implications (...) for military ethics. (shrink)