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  1. Perceptual Variation and Structuralism.John Morrison - 2018 - Noûs 54 (2):290-326.
    I use an old challenge to motivate a new view. The old challenge is due to variation in our perceptions of secondary qualities. The challenge is to say whose perceptions are accurate. The new view is about how we manage to perceive secondary qualities, and thus manage to perceive them accurately or inaccurately. I call it perceptual structuralism. I first introduce the challenge and point out drawbacks with traditional responses. I spend the rest of the paper motivating and defending a (...)
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  • Anti‐Atomism about Color Representation.John Morrison - 2013 - Noûs 47 (2):94-122.
    According to anti-atomism, we represent color properties (e.g., red) in virtue of representing color relations (e.g., redder than). I motivate anti-atomism with a puzzle involving a series of pairwise indistinguishable chips. I then develop two versions of anti-atomism.
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  • Is Consciousness Vague?Geoffrey Hall - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (3):670-684.
    1. Is consciousness vague? This paper will argue that it is. But, first, we need to get clear on the meaning of the question.I will take vagueness to consist in the possibility of borderline cases....
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  • Inexact Knowledge without Improbable Knowing.Jeremy Goodman - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (1):30-53.
    In a series of recent papers, Timothy Williamson has argued for the surprising conclusion that there are cases in which you know a proposition in spite of its being overwhelmingly improbable given what you know that you know it. His argument relies on certain formal models of our imprecise knowledge of the values of perceptible and measurable magnitudes. This paper suggests an alternative class of models that do not predict this sort of improbable knowing. I show that such models are (...)
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