Switch to: References

Citations of:

Folk psychology is not a predictive device

Mind 105 (417):119-37 (1996)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. We Read Minds to Shape Relationships.Vivian Bohl - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (5):674-694.
    Mindreading is often considered to be the most important human social cognitive skill, and over the past three decades, several theories of the cognitive mechanisms for mindreading have been proposed. But why do we read minds? According to the standard view, we attribute mental states to individuals to predict and explain their behavior. I argue that the standard view is too general to capture the distinctive function of mindreading, and that it does not explain what motivates people to read minds. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Moving Ourselves, Moving Others: Motion and Emotion in Intersubjectivity, Consciousness, and Language.Andrea Schiavio - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (5):735-739.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Stereotypes, Theory of Mind, and the Action–Prediction Hierarchy.Evan Westra - 2019 - Synthese 196 (7):2821-2846.
    Both mindreading and stereotyping are forms of social cognition that play a pervasive role in our everyday lives, yet too little attention has been paid to the question of how these two processes are related. This paper offers a theory of the influence of stereotyping on mental-state attribution that draws on hierarchical predictive coding accounts of action prediction. It is argued that the key to understanding the relation between stereotyping and mindreading lies in the fact that stereotypes centrally involve character-trait (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • When Does ‘Folk Psychology’ Count as Folk Psychological?Eric Hochstein - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (4):1125-1147.
    It has commonly been argued that certain types of mental descriptions, specifically those characterized in terms of propositional attitudes, are part of a folk psychological understanding of the mind. Recently, however, it has also been argued that this is the case even when such descriptions are employed as part of scientific theories in domains like social psychology and comparative psychology. In this paper, I argue that there is no plausible way to understand the distinction between folk and scientific psychology that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Model-Model of the Theory-Theory.Marc Slors - 2012 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 55 (5):521-542.
    Abstract ?Theory of Mind? (ToM) is widely held to be ubiquitous in our navigation of the social world. Recently this standard view has been contested by phenomenologists and enactivists. Proponents of the ubiquity of ToM, however, accept and effectively neutralize the intuitions behind their arguments by arguing that ToM is mostly sub-personal. This paper proposes a similar move on behalf of the phenomenologists and enactivists: it offers a novel explanation of the intuition that ToM is ubiquitous that is compatible with (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • The Complementarity of Mindshaping and Mindreading.Uwe Peters - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (3):533-549.
    Why do we engage in folk psychology, that is, why do we think about and ascribe propositional attitudes such as beliefs, desires, intentions etc. to people? On the standard view, folk psychology is primarily for mindreading, for detecting mental states and explaining and/or predicting people’s behaviour in terms of them. In contrast, McGeer (1996, 2007, 2015), and Zawidzki (2008, 2013) maintain that folk psychology is not primarily for mindreading but for mindshaping, that is, for moulding people’s behavior and minds (e.g., (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Mind-Making Practices: The Social Infrastructure of Self-Knowing Agency and Responsibility.Victoria McGeer - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):259-281.
    This paper is divided into two parts. In Section 1, I explore and defend a “regulative view” of folk-psychology as against the “standard view”. On the regulative view, folk-psychology is conceptualized in fundamentally interpersonal terms as a “mind-making” practice through which we come to form and regulate our minds in accordance with a rich array of socially shared and socially maintained sense-making norms. It is not, as the standard view maintains, simply an epistemic capacity for coming to know about the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • The Function of Folk Psychology: Mind Reading or Mind Shaping?Tadeusz W. Zawidzki - 2008 - Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):193 – 210.
    I argue for two claims. First I argue against the consensus view that accurate behavioral prediction based on accurate representation of cognitive states, i.e. mind reading , is the sustaining function of propositional attitude ascription. This practice cannot have been selected in evolution and cannot persist, in virtue of its predictive utility, because there are principled reasons why it is inadequate as a tool for behavioral prediction. Second I give reasons that favor an alternative account of the sustaining function of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  • Rethinking Folk-Psychology: Alternatives to Theories of Mind.Marc Slors & Cynthia Macdonald - 2008 - Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):153 – 161.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • How Beliefs Make A Difference.Susan G. Sterrett - 1999 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    How are beliefs efficacious? One answer is: via rational intentional action. But there are other ways that beliefs are efficacious. This dissertation examines these other ways, and sketches an answer to the question of how beliefs are efficacious that takes into account how beliefs are involved in the full range of behavioral disciplines, from psychophysiology and cognition to social and economic phenomena. The account of how beliefs are efficacious I propose draws on work on active accounts of perception. I develop (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Shit Happens.Pete Mandik - 2007 - Episteme 4 (2):205-218.
    Abstract In this paper I embrace what Brian Keeley calls in “Of Conspiracy Theories” the absurdist horn of the dilemma for philosophers who criticize such theories. I thus defend the view that there is indeed something deeply epistemically wrong with conspiracy theorizing. My complaint is that conspiracy theories apply intentional explanations to situations that give rise to special problems concerning the elimination of competing intentional explanations.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Notes Toward an Analysis of Conceptual Change.Mark Bevir - 2003 - Social Epistemology 17 (1):55 – 63.
    This paper analyses conceptual change. A rejection of pure experience has prompted philosophers of science to adopt a certain perspective from which to view changes of belief. Popper, Kuhn, and others have analysed conceptual change in terms of problems or anomalies, that is, in terms of contingent reasoning about issues posed in the context of an inherited web of belief. This paper explores a more general analysis of conceptual change in dialogue with these philosophers of science. Because changes of belief (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Social Systems.Heidi L. Maibom - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (5):557 – 578.
    It used to be thought that folk psychology is the only game in town. Focusing merely on what people do will not allow you to predict what they are likely to do next. For that, you must consider their beliefs, desires, intentions, etc. Recent evidence from developmental psychology and fMRI studies indicates that this conclusion was premature. We parse motion in an environment as behavior of a particular type, and behavior thus construed can feature in systematizations that we know. Building (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Simulation, Theory and Collapse.Bill Wringe - 2009 - Erkenntnis 71 (2):223-232.
    Recent philosophical discussions of our capacity to attribute mental states to other human beings, and to produce accurate predictions and informative explanations of their behavior which make reference to the content of those states have focused on two apparently contrasting ways in which we might hope to account for these abilities. The first is that of regarding our competence as being under-girded by our grasp of a tacit psychological theory. The second builds on the idea that in trying to get (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • How to Interpret Infant Socio-Cognitive Competence.Tadeusz Wieslaw Zawidzki - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):483-497.
    I review recent evidence that very young, pre-verbal infants attribute belief-like states when anticipating the behavior of others. This evidence is drawn from infant performance on non-verbal false belief tasks. I argue that, contrary to typical interpretations, such evidence does not show that infants attribute belief-like states. Rather, it shows that infants apply an enhanced version of what Gergely ( 2011 ) calls the “teleological stance” to brief bouts of behavior. This requires them to parse behavioral sequences into goals and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Continuing Debates on Direct Social Perception: Some Notes on Gallagher’s Analysis of “the New Hybrids”.Vivian Bohl - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:466-471.
    This commentary argues that Gallagher's account of direct social perception has remained underdeveloped in several respects. Gallagher has not provided convincing evidence to support his claim that mindreading is rare in social situations. He and other direct perception theorists have not offered a substantive critique of standard theories of mindreading because they have attacked a much stronger claim about the putative unobservability of mental states than most theories of mindreading imply. To provide a genuine alternative to standard theories of mindreading, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Empathy and the Melodic Unity of the Other.Joona Taipale - 2015 - Human Studies 38 (4):463-479.
    Current discussions on social cognition, empathy, and interpersonal understanding are largely built on the question of how we recognize and access particular mental states of others. Mental states have been treated as temporally individuated, momentary or temporally narrow unities that can be grasped at one go. Drawing on the phenomenological tradition—on Stein and Husserl in particular—I will problematize this approach, and argue that the other’s experiential states can appear meaningful to us only they are viewed in connection with further, non-simultaneous (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Situating Emotions: From Embodied Cognition to Mindreading.Leon de Bruin, Derek Strijbos & Marc Slors - 2014 - Topoi 33 (1):173-184.
    In this article we analyze the strengths and weaknesses of mindreading versus embodied cognition approaches to emotion understanding. In the first part of the article we argue that mindreading explanations of how we understand the emotions of others (TT, ST or hybrid) face a version of the frame problem, i.e. the problem of how to limit the scope of the information that is relevant to mindreading. Also, we show that embodied cognition explanations are able to by-pass this problem because they (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation