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  1. We Read Minds to Shape Relationships.Vivian Bohl - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (5):674-694.
    Mindreading is often considered to be the most important human social cognitive skill, and over the past three decades, several theories of the cognitive mechanisms for mindreading have been proposed. But why do we read minds? According to the standard view, we attribute mental states to individuals to predict and explain their behavior. I argue that the standard view is too general to capture the distinctive function of mindreading, and that it does not explain what motivates people to read minds. (...)
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  • Mindshaping and the Intentional Control of the Mind.Tillmann Vierkant & Andreas Paraskevaides - 2012 - In Fabio Paglieri (ed.), Consciousness in Interaction: The role of the natural and social context in shaping consciousness. John Benjamins.
    Understanding and controlling our minds is one of the most fascinating features of human cognition. It has often been assumed that this ability requires a theoretical understanding of psychological states. This assumption has recently been put under pressure by so called mindshaping approaches. We agree that these approaches provide us with a new way of self-understanding and that they enable a very powerful form of self-regulation which we label narrative control. However, we insist that there still is a crucial role (...)
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  • No Intentions in the Brain: A Wittgensteinian Perspective on the Science of Intention.Annemarie Kalis - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.
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  • How Do You Know That You Settled a Question?Tillmann Vierkant - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):199-211.
    It is commonly assumed in the philosophical literature that in order to acquire an intention, the agent has to settle a question of what to do in practical deliberation. Carruthers, P. has recently used this to argue that the acquisition of intentions can never be conscious even in cases where the agent asserts having the intention in inner speech. Because of that Carruthers also believes that knowledge of intentions even in first person cases is observational. This paper explores the challenge (...)
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  • What is a Social Practice?Sally Haslanger - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82:231-247.
    This paper provides an account of social practices that reveals how they are constitutive of social agency, enable coordination around things of value, and are a site for social intervention. The social world, on this account, does not begin when psychologically sophisticated individuals interact to share knowledge or make plans. Instead, culture shapes agents to interpret and respond both to each other and the physical world around us. Practices shape us as we shape them. This provides resources for understanding why (...)
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  • The Model-Model of the Theory-Theory.Marc Slors - 2012 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 55 (5):521-542.
    Abstract ?Theory of Mind? (ToM) is widely held to be ubiquitous in our navigation of the social world. Recently this standard view has been contested by phenomenologists and enactivists. Proponents of the ubiquity of ToM, however, accept and effectively neutralize the intuitions behind their arguments by arguing that ToM is mostly sub-personal. This paper proposes a similar move on behalf of the phenomenologists and enactivists: it offers a novel explanation of the intuition that ToM is ubiquitous that is compatible with (...)
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  • The Complementarity of Mindshaping and Mindreading.Uwe Peters - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (3):533-549.
    Why do we engage in folk psychology, that is, why do we think about and ascribe propositional attitudes such as beliefs, desires, intentions etc. to people? On the standard view, folk psychology is primarily for mindreading, for detecting mental states and explaining and/or predicting people’s behaviour in terms of them. In contrast, McGeer (1996, 2007, 2015), and Zawidzki (2008, 2013) maintain that folk psychology is not primarily for mindreading but for mindshaping, that is, for moulding people’s behavior and minds (e.g., (...)
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  • Folk Psychology Without Principles: An Alternative to the Belief–Desire Model of Action Interpretation.Leon C. de Bruin & Derek W. Strijbos - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):257-274.
    In this paper, we take issue with the belief?desire model of second- and third-person action interpretation as it is presented by both theory theories and cognitivist versions of simulation theory. These accounts take action interpretation to consist in the (tacit) attribution of proper belief?desire pairs that mirror the structure of formally valid practical inferences. We argue that the belief?desire model rests on the unwarranted assumption that the interpreter can only reach the agent's practical context of action through inference. This assumption (...)
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  • Theory of Mind and the Unobservability of Other Minds.Vivian Bohl & Nivedita Gangopadhyay - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (2):203-222.
    The theory of mind (ToM) framework has been criticised by emerging alternative accounts. Each alternative begins with the accusation that ToM's validity as a research paradigm rests on the assumption of the ‘unobservability’ of other minds. We argue that the critics' discussion of the unobservability assumption (UA) targets a straw man. We discuss metaphysical, phenomenological, epistemological, and psychological readings of UA and demonstrate that it is not the case that ToM assumes the metaphysical, phenomenological, or epistemological claims. However, ToM supports (...)
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  • Mind-Making Practices: The Social Infrastructure of Self-Knowing Agency and Responsibility.Victoria McGeer - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):259-281.
    This paper is divided into two parts. In Section 1, I explore and defend a “regulative view” of folk-psychology as against the “standard view”. On the regulative view, folk-psychology is conceptualized in fundamentally interpersonal terms as a “mind-making” practice through which we come to form and regulate our minds in accordance with a rich array of socially shared and socially maintained sense-making norms. It is not, as the standard view maintains, simply an epistemic capacity for coming to know about the (...)
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  • Introduction: Self-Knowledge in Perspective.Fleur Jongepier & Derek Strijbos - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):123-133.
    This introduction is part of the special issue ‘ Self-knowledge in perspective’ guest edited by Fleur Jongepier and Derek Strijbos. // Papers included in the special issue: Transparency, expression, and self-knowledge Dorit Bar-On -/- Self-knowledge and communication Johannes Roessler -/- First-person privilege, judgment, and avowal Kateryna Samoilova -/- Self-knowledge about attitudes: rationalism meets interpretation Franz Knappik -/- How do you know that you settled a question? Tillmann Vierkant -/- On knowing one’s own resistant beliefs Cristina Borgoni -/- Self-knowledge and imagination (...)
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  • Social Cognition: A Normative Approach.Víctor Fernández Castro & Manuel Heras-Escribano - 2019 - Acta Analytica:1-26.
    The main aim of this paper is to introduce an approach for understanding social cognition that we call the normative approach to social cognition. Such an approach, which results from a systematization of previous arguments and ideas from authors such as Ryle, Dewey, or Wittgenstein, is an alternative to the classic model and the direct social perception model. In section 2, we evaluate the virtues and flaws of these two models. In section 3, we introduce the normative approach, according to (...)
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  • Il test della falsa credenza.Marco Fenici - 2013 - Analytical and Philosophical Explanation 8:1-56.
    La ricerca empirica nelle scienze cognitive può essere di supporto all’indagine filosofica sullo statuto ontologico e epistemologico dei concetti mentali, ed in particolare del concetto di credenza. Da oltre trent’anni gli psicologi utilizzano il test della falsa credenza per valutare la capacità dei bambini di attribuire stati mentali a se stessi e a agli altri. Tuttavia non è stato ancora pienamente compreso né quali requisiti cognitivi siano necessari per passare il test né quale sia il loro sviluppo. In questo articolo (...)
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  • The Expressive Function of Folk Psychology.Victor Fernandez Castro - 2017 - Filosofia Unisinos 18 (1).
    The aim of this paper is to present a challenge to the received view in folk psychology. According to this challenge, the semantic assumption behind the received view, which considers that propositional attitude ascriptions are descriptions of the internal causally efficacious states underlying behavior, cannot account for the main function of reasons in terms of mental states.
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  • Self Knowledge and Knowing Other Minds: The Implicit / Explicit Distinction as a Tool in Understanding Theory of Mind.Tillmann Vierkant - 2012 - British Journal of Developmental Psychology 30 (1):141-155.
    Holding content explicitly requires a form of self knowledge. But what does the relevant self knowledge look like? Using theory of mind as an example, this paper argues that the correct answer to this question will have to take into account the crucial role of language based deliberation, but warns against the standard assumption that explicitness is necessary for ascribing awareness. It argues in line with Bayne that intentional action is at least an equally valid criterion for awareness. This leads (...)
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  • Delusions and Not-Quite-Beliefs.Maura Tumulty - 2012 - Neuroethics 5 (1):29-37.
    Bortolotti argues that the irrationality of many delusions is no different in kind from the irrationality that marks many non-pathological states typically treated as beliefs. She takes this to secure the doxastic status of those delusions. Bortolotti’s approach has many benefits. For example, it accounts for the fact that we can often make some sense of what deluded subjects are up to, and helps explain why some deluded subjects are helped by cognitive behavioral therapy. But there is an alternative approach (...)
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  • Modeling Expressing on Demonstrating.Maura Tumulty - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Research 36:43-76.
    We can increase our understanding of expression by considering an analogy to demonstrative reference. The connections between a demonstrative phrase and its referent, in a case of fully successful communication with that phrase, are analogous to the connections between an expressible state and the behavior that expresses it. The connections in each case serve to maintain a certain status for the connected elements: as actions of persons; or as objects, events, or states significant to persons. The analogy to demonstrative reference (...)
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  • Managing Mismatch Between Belief and Behavior.Maura Tumulty - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (3):261-292.
    Our behavior doesn't always match the beliefs attributed to us, and sometimes the mismatch raises questions about what our beliefs actually are. I compare two approaches to such cases, and argue in favor of the one which allows some belief-attributions to lack a determinate truth-value. That approach avoids an inappropriate assumption about cognitive activity: namely, that whenever we fail in performing one cognitive activity, there is a distinct cognitive activity at which we succeed. The indeterminacy-allowing approach also meshes well with (...)
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  • Extended Cognition, Personal Responsibility, and Relational Autonomy.Mason Cash - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):645-671.
    The Hypothesis of Extended Cognition (HEC)—that many cognitive processes are carried out by a hybrid coalition of neural, bodily and environmental factors—entails that the intentional states that are reasons for action might best be ascribed to wider entities of which individual persons are only parts. I look at different kinds of extended cognition and agency, exploring their consequences for concerns about the moral agency and personal responsibility of such extended entities. Can extended entities be moral agents and bear responsibility for (...)
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  • Action, Mindreading and Embodied Social Cognition.Joshua Shepherd - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):507-518.
    One of the central insights of the embodied cognition (EC) movement is that cognition is closely tied to action. In this paper, I formulate an EC-inspired hypothesis concerning social cognition. In this domain, most think that our capacity to understand and interact with one another is best explained by appeal to some form of mindreading. I argue that prominent accounts of mindreading likely contain a significant lacuna. Evidence indicates that what I call an agent’s actional processes and states—her goals, needs, (...)
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  • Beliefs and Desires: From Attribution to Evaluation.Uku Tooming - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (1):359-369.
    The ability to attribute beliefs and desires is taken by many to be an essential component of human social cognition, enabling us to predict, explain and shape behaviour and other mental states. In this paper, I argue that there are certain basic responses to attributed attitudes which have thus far been overlooked in the study of social cognition, although they underlie many of the moves we make in our social interactions. The claim is that belief and desire attributions allow for (...)
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  • Inner Opacity. Nietzsche on Introspection and Agency.Mattia Riccardi - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (3):221-243.
    Nietzsche believes that we do not know our own actions, nor their real motives. This belief, however, is but a consequence of his assuming a quite general skepticism about introspection. The main aim of this paper is to offer a reading of this last view, which I shall call the Inner Opacity (IO) view. In the first part of the paper I show that a strong motivation behind IO lies in Nietzsche’s claim that self-knowledge exploits the same set of cognitive (...)
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  • Interacting? Yes. But, of What Kind and on What Basis?Daniel D. Hutto - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2):543-546.
    De Jaegher’s (2009) paper argues that Gallagher, who aims to replace traditional theory-of-mind accounts of social understanding with accounts based on direct perception (hereafter DP), has missed an important opportunity. Despite a desire to break faith with tradition, there is a danger that proponents of DP accounts will remain (at least tacitly) committed to an unchallenged, and perhaps unnoticed, sort of individualism inherent in traditional theories (i.e. those that regard our engagement with others as a ‘problem’ to be solved: a (...)
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  • Situating Emotions: From Embodied Cognition to Mindreading.Leon de Bruin, Derek Strijbos & Marc Slors - 2014 - Topoi 33 (1):173-184.
    In this article we analyze the strengths and weaknesses of mindreading versus embodied cognition approaches to emotion understanding. In the first part of the article we argue that mindreading explanations of how we understand the emotions of others (TT, ST or hybrid) face a version of the frame problem, i.e. the problem of how to limit the scope of the information that is relevant to mindreading. Also, we show that embodied cognition explanations are able to by-pass this problem because they (...)
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  • Delusions and Dispositionalism About Belief.Maura Tumulty - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (5):596-628.
    The imperviousness of delusions to counter-evidence makes it tempting to classify them as imaginings. Bayne and Pacherie argue that adopting a dispositional account of belief can secure the doxastic status of delusions. But dispositionalism can only secure genuinely doxastic status for mental states by giving folk-psychological norms a significant role in the individuation of attitudes. When such norms individuate belief, deluded subjects will not count as believing their delusions. In general, dispositionalism won't confer genuinely doxastic status more often than do (...)
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